CLIFTON A. LAKE and CHARLEEN J. LAKE ET AL. v. THE MEMPHIS LANDSMEN, L.L.C., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 21, 2011)
This case is before us upon mandate from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of our previous opinion, Clifton Lake, et. al. v. Memphis Landsmen, L.L.C., et al., No.W2009-00526-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 891867 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 15, 2010), in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., et al., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 179 L. Ed.2d 75 (2011).
Our conclusion, in Lake, that Appellants' claims, based upon the type of glass and the lack of passenger seatbelts, are pre-empted is not disturbed by the Williamson decision because the basis of our holding involved more than preservation of the manufacturers' ability to choose under the safety regulations. Under the law of the case doctrine, and because further review would exceed the scope of the Tennessee Supreme Court's mandate, we decline to revisit our decision concerning the perimeter seating issue. Reversed and Remanded.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/lakec_102111.pdf
Saturday, October 22, 2011
Tuesday, October 18, 2011
TWCA reviews whether an employee's injury fell within the scope of employment or whether it was a private activity
MICHAEL A. PARISH v. HIGHLAND PARK BAPTIST CHURCH ET AL. (TWCA October 18, 2011)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee was injured when he was thrown from a horse. He alleged that the injury arose in the course and scope of his employment. His Employer contended that the Employee was engaged in a purely private activity; therefore, the injury was not compensable. The trial court denied the claim. On appeal, the Employee contends that the trial court erred by finding his injury was not related to his employment. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/parishm_101811.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee was injured when he was thrown from a horse. He alleged that the injury arose in the course and scope of his employment. His Employer contended that the Employee was engaged in a purely private activity; therefore, the injury was not compensable. The trial court denied the claim. On appeal, the Employee contends that the trial court erred by finding his injury was not related to his employment. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/parishm_101811.pdf
Friday, October 14, 2011
Court reviews whether the public duty doctrine applied in a wrongful death case
BARBARA A. LYNCH, deceased, by her sister and next of kin, CELINE HAYES, and CELINE HAYES as an individual, v. LOUDON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 14, 2011)
Joseph R. Ford and Ashley Harrison Shudan, Loudon, Tennessee, for the appellants, Barbara A. Lynch, deceased, by her sister and next of kin, Celine Hayes.
Arthur F. Knight, III., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Loudon County, Tennessee and Bryan Blakney.
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff alleged that deceased was involved in a one car accident and the investigating officer, after her car was removed from the guardrail by the wrecker, allowed her to continue driving when he knew or should have known that she was impaired and was a danger to herself, and he violated his duties to her and shortly thereafter she had yet another one-vehicle accident which resulted in her death.
The Trial Court, responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment, found that the public duty doctrine applied and if the officer did undertake to protect deceased, she did not rely upon his undertaking. He granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we hold that under the public duty doctrine, plaintiff owed no specific duty to deceased, unless he undertook to assume such duty. We hold that there is disputed material evidence as to whether he assumed such duty to deceased but discontinued his aid and protection to deceased which left her in a worse position than she was before he intervened. We reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/lynchb_101411.pdf
Joseph R. Ford and Ashley Harrison Shudan, Loudon, Tennessee, for the appellants, Barbara A. Lynch, deceased, by her sister and next of kin, Celine Hayes.
Arthur F. Knight, III., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Loudon County, Tennessee and Bryan Blakney.
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff alleged that deceased was involved in a one car accident and the investigating officer, after her car was removed from the guardrail by the wrecker, allowed her to continue driving when he knew or should have known that she was impaired and was a danger to herself, and he violated his duties to her and shortly thereafter she had yet another one-vehicle accident which resulted in her death.
The Trial Court, responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment, found that the public duty doctrine applied and if the officer did undertake to protect deceased, she did not rely upon his undertaking. He granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we hold that under the public duty doctrine, plaintiff owed no specific duty to deceased, unless he undertook to assume such duty. We hold that there is disputed material evidence as to whether he assumed such duty to deceased but discontinued his aid and protection to deceased which left her in a worse position than she was before he intervened. We reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/lynchb_101411.pdf
Court reviews a Wrongful Death case based upon the Public Duty Doctrine
BARBARA A. LYNCH, deceased, by her sister and next of kin, CELINE HAYES, and CELINE HAYES as an individual, v. LOUDON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 14, 2011)
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff alleged that deceased was involved in a one car accident and the investigating officer, after her car was removed from the guardrail by the wrecker, allowed her to continue driving when he knew or should have known that she was impaired and was a danger to herself, and he violated his duties to her and shortly thereafter she had yet another one-vehicle accident which resulted in her death.
The Trial Court, responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment, found that the public duty doctrine applied and if the officer did undertake to protect deceased, she did not rely upon his undertaking. He granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we hold that under the public duty doctrine, plaintiff owed no specific duty to deceased, unless he undertook to assume such duty. We hold that there is disputed material evidence as to whether he assumed such duty to deceased but discontinued his aid and protection to deceased which left her in a worse position than she was before he intervened. We reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/lynchb_101411.pdf
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff alleged that deceased was involved in a one car accident and the investigating officer, after her car was removed from the guardrail by the wrecker, allowed her to continue driving when he knew or should have known that she was impaired and was a danger to herself, and he violated his duties to her and shortly thereafter she had yet another one-vehicle accident which resulted in her death.
The Trial Court, responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment, found that the public duty doctrine applied and if the officer did undertake to protect deceased, she did not rely upon his undertaking. He granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we hold that under the public duty doctrine, plaintiff owed no specific duty to deceased, unless he undertook to assume such duty. We hold that there is disputed material evidence as to whether he assumed such duty to deceased but discontinued his aid and protection to deceased which left her in a worse position than she was before he intervened. We reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/lynchb_101411.pdf
Wednesday, October 12, 2011
Court reviews claims of lost equity in a case involving a tractor trailer collision
LEROY JACKSON, JR. v. PURDY BROTHERS TRUCKING CO., INC., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 12, 2011)
This appeal arises from a tractor-trailer ("truck") collision involving two professional drivers, Leroy Jackson, Jr., who was driving as an owner operator for USA Trucking, and Blair B. Greene, who was employed by Purdy Brothers Trucking Company, Incorporated ("PBTCI") and Loudon County Trucking ("LCT"), both formerly doing business as Purdy Brothers Trucking ("PBT"). Mr. Jackson's truck was repossessed shortly after it was repaired, and he filed suit against Mr. Greene, PBTCI, and LCT (collectively "Trucking Company") for property damage, loss of income, lost equity in his truck, incidental expenses, and punitive damages. Trucking Company filed a motion for partial summary judgment.
The trial court granted the motion, in part, holding that Trucking Company was not liable for the lost equity in the truck but that the case could proceed on the remaining issues. Trucking Company made an offer of judgment, which was accepted by Mr. Jackson and set forth in the court's final order. Mr. Jackson appeals, contending that the court erred in granting partial summary judgment. We dismiss the appeal because Mr. Jackson accepted the offer of judgment without reserving the right to appeal.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/jacksonl_101211.pdf
This appeal arises from a tractor-trailer ("truck") collision involving two professional drivers, Leroy Jackson, Jr., who was driving as an owner operator for USA Trucking, and Blair B. Greene, who was employed by Purdy Brothers Trucking Company, Incorporated ("PBTCI") and Loudon County Trucking ("LCT"), both formerly doing business as Purdy Brothers Trucking ("PBT"). Mr. Jackson's truck was repossessed shortly after it was repaired, and he filed suit against Mr. Greene, PBTCI, and LCT (collectively "Trucking Company") for property damage, loss of income, lost equity in his truck, incidental expenses, and punitive damages. Trucking Company filed a motion for partial summary judgment.
The trial court granted the motion, in part, holding that Trucking Company was not liable for the lost equity in the truck but that the case could proceed on the remaining issues. Trucking Company made an offer of judgment, which was accepted by Mr. Jackson and set forth in the court's final order. Mr. Jackson appeals, contending that the court erred in granting partial summary judgment. We dismiss the appeal because Mr. Jackson accepted the offer of judgment without reserving the right to appeal.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/jacksonl_101211.pdf
Tuesday, October 4, 2011
Court reviews a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case.
KIMBERLY L. SMITH v. GARY E. MILLS, M.D., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 4, 2011)
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smithk_100411.pdf
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/smithk_100411.pdf
Saturday, October 1, 2011
Civil Justice Act effective today
The Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011 takes effect today. Legal actions for injuries, deaths and other losses that occur from today forward are subject to big changes in personal-injury and consumer-protection laws, including new caps on damage awards.
Read the full story at the Memphis Commercial Appeal.
Read the full story at the Memphis Commercial Appeal.
Thursday, September 29, 2011
TN Nursing Homes Get Early Christmas with New Tort "Reform"
On October 1, 2011, Tennessee's nursing homes get their first Christmas present of the year from the Republican-controlled Legislature and Governor Haslam. That's when the state's much-less-than-stellar nursing home industry will become protected by new limits on lawsuits by those injured or killed as result of nursing home neglect.
The Tennessean accurately reports that Tennessee nursing homes rank near the bottom nationally in many key areas ranked by both the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and the GAO. Despite these rankings, and despite recent suits highlighting substandard care for nursing home patients, Republicans pushed through limits on the amount of damages patients can recover in cases of nuring home neglect. The limits were part of Governor Haslam's "jobs-based" tort reform agenda. It remains unclear - in fact unimagineable - how making nursing homes less accountable for patient neglect will create jobs or improve care. But then jobs and better care for nursing home patients were not what the industry had in mind when it lobbied for the limits.
For more information on Tennessee's nursing homes and the new reforms see The Tennessean and GAO studies.
The Tennessean accurately reports that Tennessee nursing homes rank near the bottom nationally in many key areas ranked by both the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and the GAO. Despite these rankings, and despite recent suits highlighting substandard care for nursing home patients, Republicans pushed through limits on the amount of damages patients can recover in cases of nuring home neglect. The limits were part of Governor Haslam's "jobs-based" tort reform agenda. It remains unclear - in fact unimagineable - how making nursing homes less accountable for patient neglect will create jobs or improve care. But then jobs and better care for nursing home patients were not what the industry had in mind when it lobbied for the limits.
For more information on Tennessee's nursing homes and the new reforms see The Tennessean and GAO studies.
Wednesday, September 28, 2011
Court reviews a dismissal based on failure to comply with the requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act
ELIZABETH CUDE v. GILBERT E. HERREN, M.D., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. September 26, 2011)
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's re-filed suit for failure to comply with the 60-day notice and certificate of good faith requirements set out in the Medical Malpractice Act. Because we find such requirements applicable to Plaintiff's suit and no extraordinary cause to excuse her non-compliance, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/cudee_092611.pdf
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's re-filed suit for failure to comply with the 60-day notice and certificate of good faith requirements set out in the Medical Malpractice Act. Because we find such requirements applicable to Plaintiff's suit and no extraordinary cause to excuse her non-compliance, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/cudee_092611.pdf
Tuesday, September 27, 2011
Court reviews a motor vehicle accident case involving a professional driver hired to perform at an exhibition
GINNY BETH KING, ET AL. v. FLOWMASTER, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. September 27, 2011)
Flowmaster invited a professional driver to attend an exhibition in which such driver allegedly lost control of his vehicle, killing or injuring many spectators. The plaintiffs sued numerous defendants, including Flowmaster, and the trial court granted Flowmaster's motion for summary judgment.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Flowmaster was not a member of a joint venture. However, we find that Flowmaster failed to negate the duty element of the plaintiffs' negligence claim, and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Flowmaster "engaged" in an ultrahazardous activity or "participated" in a "drag race," and we remand on these issues.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/KingG_092711.pdf
Flowmaster invited a professional driver to attend an exhibition in which such driver allegedly lost control of his vehicle, killing or injuring many spectators. The plaintiffs sued numerous defendants, including Flowmaster, and the trial court granted Flowmaster's motion for summary judgment.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Flowmaster was not a member of a joint venture. However, we find that Flowmaster failed to negate the duty element of the plaintiffs' negligence claim, and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Flowmaster "engaged" in an ultrahazardous activity or "participated" in a "drag race," and we remand on these issues.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/KingG_092711.pdf
Friday, September 9, 2011
TWCA reviews whether a claim for death benefits is barred by the prior settlement of a benefits claim
NAOMI JEWELL KELLEY v. UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION (TWCA September 8, 2011)
This case involves a claim for workers' compensation benefits by the dependent spouse of a deceased employee. The decedent was exposed to asbestos in the course of his employment and contracted asbestosis as a result. His claim for benefits was settled in 1991. He died in December 2007, and his widow filed this action seeking death benefits under the workers' compensation law. The trial court awarded benefits, and the employer has appealed, contending that the widow's claim was barred by the terms of the 1991 settlement. The widow contends that the trial court incorrectly set the rate at which benefits are to be paid. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/kelleyn_090811.pdf
This case involves a claim for workers' compensation benefits by the dependent spouse of a deceased employee. The decedent was exposed to asbestos in the course of his employment and contracted asbestosis as a result. His claim for benefits was settled in 1991. He died in December 2007, and his widow filed this action seeking death benefits under the workers' compensation law. The trial court awarded benefits, and the employer has appealed, contending that the widow's claim was barred by the terms of the 1991 settlement. The widow contends that the trial court incorrectly set the rate at which benefits are to be paid. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/kelleyn_090811.pdf
Thursday, September 8, 2011
TWCA reviews whether employee suffered a compensable injury
SEAN L. JOHNSON v. RANDSTAD NORTH AMERICA, L.P. ET AL. (TWCA September 8, 2011)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee suffered an episode of serious breathing difficulty after work while at home. He was transported by ambulance to a hospital where an emergency tracheotomy was performed to allow him to breathe. He alleged that this episode was caused by exposure to airborne contaminants in his workplace. His employer denied the claim.
The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that employee had a compensable injury, and by finding him to be permanently and totally disabled. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/johnsons_090811.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee suffered an episode of serious breathing difficulty after work while at home. He was transported by ambulance to a hospital where an emergency tracheotomy was performed to allow him to breathe. He alleged that this episode was caused by exposure to airborne contaminants in his workplace. His employer denied the claim.
The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that employee had a compensable injury, and by finding him to be permanently and totally disabled. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/johnsons_090811.pdf
TWCA reviews whether both of employee's surgeries were caused by a work-related injury
MAXINE WATLEY v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION ET AL. (TWCA September 8, 2011)
In this workers' compensation case, the employee injured her lower back at work in May 2006. She received medical treatment for a short period of time and was then released by her doctor. In July 2007, she consulted a neurosurgeon for continuing lower back pain. Around the same time, she accepted a voluntary layoff from her employer, then retired. She later had two surgeries on her lower back: a discectomy in October 2007, and a fusion in April 2008.
She filed this action, alleging that the surgeries and resulting disability were caused by her employment. Her employer denied the claim. The trial court found that the October 2007 surgery was caused by her May 2006 injury, but the April 2008 surgery was not. It further found that her award of permanent disability benefits was "capped" at one and one-half times her anatomical impairment due to her voluntary retirement. Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding her claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, and by using an incorrect impairment rating as the basis of its award. Employee contends that the trial court erred by failing to find that she was permanently and totally disabled. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/watleym_090811.pdf
In this workers' compensation case, the employee injured her lower back at work in May 2006. She received medical treatment for a short period of time and was then released by her doctor. In July 2007, she consulted a neurosurgeon for continuing lower back pain. Around the same time, she accepted a voluntary layoff from her employer, then retired. She later had two surgeries on her lower back: a discectomy in October 2007, and a fusion in April 2008.
She filed this action, alleging that the surgeries and resulting disability were caused by her employment. Her employer denied the claim. The trial court found that the October 2007 surgery was caused by her May 2006 injury, but the April 2008 surgery was not. It further found that her award of permanent disability benefits was "capped" at one and one-half times her anatomical impairment due to her voluntary retirement. Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding her claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, and by using an incorrect impairment rating as the basis of its award. Employee contends that the trial court erred by failing to find that she was permanently and totally disabled. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/watleym_090811.pdf
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
TN Supreme Court reviews whether the Family Purpose Doctrine applies to a father who did not reside in the same household as his son
ARLENE R. STARR v. PAUL B. HILL, SR., ET AL. (Tenn. August 31, 2011)
A father and his sixteen-year-old son were sued after the son was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle owned, insured, and provided to him by his father. The basis for the suit against the father was the family purpose doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a family member.
Whether the family purpose doctrine applies to the father requires us to address these issues: (1) whether the father, who does not reside in the same household as the son, was a head of the household under the family purpose doctrine; (2) whether the vehicle was maintained for the comfort or pleasure of the family or solely for use by the son; and (3) whether the vehicle was being driven with the father's permission such that he had control over its use.
The essential elements of the family purpose doctrine are that the owner must be a head of the household who furnishes and maintains the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort for the family, and at the time of the injury, the vehicle must have been driven in furtherance of that purpose with the head of the household's express or implied permission.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the father, finding that the family purpose doctrine did not apply. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied to the father as a matter of law. We hold that the father was a head of the household because he had a family relationship with his son and a duty to support his son and the father furnished and maintained the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort to the family. However, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the father had sufficient control over the vehicle. We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/starra_083111.pdf
A father and his sixteen-year-old son were sued after the son was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle owned, insured, and provided to him by his father. The basis for the suit against the father was the family purpose doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a family member.
Whether the family purpose doctrine applies to the father requires us to address these issues: (1) whether the father, who does not reside in the same household as the son, was a head of the household under the family purpose doctrine; (2) whether the vehicle was maintained for the comfort or pleasure of the family or solely for use by the son; and (3) whether the vehicle was being driven with the father's permission such that he had control over its use.
The essential elements of the family purpose doctrine are that the owner must be a head of the household who furnishes and maintains the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort for the family, and at the time of the injury, the vehicle must have been driven in furtherance of that purpose with the head of the household's express or implied permission.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the father, finding that the family purpose doctrine did not apply. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied to the father as a matter of law. We hold that the father was a head of the household because he had a family relationship with his son and a duty to support his son and the father furnished and maintained the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort to the family. However, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the father had sufficient control over the vehicle. We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/starra_083111.pdf
TWCA reviews employee's motion to compel medical treatment
PAUL E. KENNEDY v. LAKEWAY AUTO SALES, INC. (TWCA August 31, 2011)
When the employer refused to provide another panel of physicians following the employee's negative drug screen result, the employee filed a motion to compel medical treatment. The trial court ordered the employer to provide a panel of three doctors for pain treatment and granted the employee's request for attorney's fees. The Supreme Court referred the employer's appeal to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the cause is remanded for modification of the trial court's order.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/kennedyp_083111.pdf
When the employer refused to provide another panel of physicians following the employee's negative drug screen result, the employee filed a motion to compel medical treatment. The trial court ordered the employer to provide a panel of three doctors for pain treatment and granted the employee's request for attorney's fees. The Supreme Court referred the employer's appeal to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the cause is remanded for modification of the trial court's order.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/kennedyp_083111.pdf
Monday, August 29, 2011
TWCA reviews an award of permanent partial disability
CHEROKEE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. RALPH MCNABB (TWCA August 29, 2011)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ralph McNabb ("Employee") sustained a right rotator cuff tear as the result of a motor vehicle collision while employed as a truck driver by Everhart Transportation ("Employer").
Employer was insured for workers' compensation by Cherokee Insurance Company, Inc. ("Insurer"). Employee underwent surgical repair of his right rotator cuff and was returned by Employer to a different, part-time position. Employee suffered a recurrent rotator cuff tear and thereafter retired. It is undisputed that Employee was not returned to employment at the same or greater wage than prior to his injury. Employee's treating physician and his evaluating physician both assigned him an anatomical impairment rating of 10% to the body as a whole, but with different restrictions. The trial court awarded 60% permanent partial disability ("PPD") to the body as a whole. Insurer has appealed, asserting that the award was excessive. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/cherokeeinsur_082911.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ralph McNabb ("Employee") sustained a right rotator cuff tear as the result of a motor vehicle collision while employed as a truck driver by Everhart Transportation ("Employer").
Employer was insured for workers' compensation by Cherokee Insurance Company, Inc. ("Insurer"). Employee underwent surgical repair of his right rotator cuff and was returned by Employer to a different, part-time position. Employee suffered a recurrent rotator cuff tear and thereafter retired. It is undisputed that Employee was not returned to employment at the same or greater wage than prior to his injury. Employee's treating physician and his evaluating physician both assigned him an anatomical impairment rating of 10% to the body as a whole, but with different restrictions. The trial court awarded 60% permanent partial disability ("PPD") to the body as a whole. Insurer has appealed, asserting that the award was excessive. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/cherokeeinsur_082911.pdf
TN Supreme Court reviews conflicting impairment ratings in a workers' compensation case.
WILLIAM H. MANSELL v. BRIDGESTONE FIRESTONE NORTH AMERICAN TIRE, LLC (Tenn. August 25, 2011)
In June of 2008, William Mansell (the "Employee") suffered a compensable injury to his right shoulder while working for Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC (the "Employer"). Dr. Sean Kaminsky, an orthopaedic surgeon, served as the authorized treating physician and assigned an impairment rating of 3% to the body as a whole. The Employee obtained an Independent Medical Evaluation from another orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Robert Landsberg, who assigned a 10% impairment rating. When the Benefit Review Conference at the Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("DOL") ended in an impasse, the Employee filed suit.
The judgment of the trial court is vacated. This cause is remanded to the trial court for a hearing and determination within ninety (90) days of the date of this order of the Employee’s motion to quash the Employer’s request for a designation of a physician from the MIR registry.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/mansellw_082511.pdf
In June of 2008, William Mansell (the "Employee") suffered a compensable injury to his right shoulder while working for Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC (the "Employer"). Dr. Sean Kaminsky, an orthopaedic surgeon, served as the authorized treating physician and assigned an impairment rating of 3% to the body as a whole. The Employee obtained an Independent Medical Evaluation from another orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Robert Landsberg, who assigned a 10% impairment rating. When the Benefit Review Conference at the Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("DOL") ended in an impasse, the Employee filed suit.
The judgment of the trial court is vacated. This cause is remanded to the trial court for a hearing and determination within ninety (90) days of the date of this order of the Employee’s motion to quash the Employer’s request for a designation of a physician from the MIR registry.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/mansellw_082511.pdf
Saturday, August 27, 2011
TN Supreme Court reviews an uninsured motorist policy with limits lower than the statutory amount
RANDALL D. KISER v. IAN J. WOLFE ET AL. (Tenn. August 24, 2011)
The plaintiff, an employee of the insured, was injured while driving the insured's tow truck. He filed suit against the defendant and later sought to invoke the insured's uninsured motorist policy in an amount equal to the liability coverage for bodily injury. The insurer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit uninsured motorist coverage to the amount listed on the first page of the policy rather than the amount otherwise fixed by statute. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the insured was entitled to a partial summary judgment. When the insured signs an application indicating the selection of uninsured motorist coverage lower than the liability limits, but neglects to initial a provision designed to confirm the selection of coverage less than the standard provided by statute, the "in writing" requirement under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201(a)(2) (2008) has been satisfied. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the entry of partial summary judgment and such other proceedings, as may be necessary.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/kiserr_082411.pdf
LEE concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/kiserr_CON_082411.pdf
The plaintiff, an employee of the insured, was injured while driving the insured's tow truck. He filed suit against the defendant and later sought to invoke the insured's uninsured motorist policy in an amount equal to the liability coverage for bodily injury. The insurer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit uninsured motorist coverage to the amount listed on the first page of the policy rather than the amount otherwise fixed by statute. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the insured was entitled to a partial summary judgment. When the insured signs an application indicating the selection of uninsured motorist coverage lower than the liability limits, but neglects to initial a provision designed to confirm the selection of coverage less than the standard provided by statute, the "in writing" requirement under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201(a)(2) (2008) has been satisfied. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the entry of partial summary judgment and such other proceedings, as may be necessary.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/kiserr_082411.pdf
LEE concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/kiserr_CON_082411.pdf
Friday, August 26, 2011
Court reviews whether an attorney's failure to substitute a party for the deceased plaintiff in an automobile accident case was excusable neglect
THOMAS PAUL SCOTT v. JAMES KEVIN ROBERSON (Tenn. Ct. App. August 25, 2011)
Plaintiff injured in automobile accident died while his negligence action was pending. Plaintiff's counsel filed a suggestion of death but neglected to move to substitute a party for the deceased plaintiff within 90 days, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01(1). Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which led plaintiff's estate to file a motion to enlarge time within which to move to substitute pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.02.
The trial court determined that plaintiff's counsel's neglect in moving to substitute within 90 days was not excusable and granted defendants' motions, dismissing the action. On appeal we affirm the trial court's judgment because we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the neglect was not excusable.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/scottt_082511.pdf
Plaintiff injured in automobile accident died while his negligence action was pending. Plaintiff's counsel filed a suggestion of death but neglected to move to substitute a party for the deceased plaintiff within 90 days, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01(1). Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which led plaintiff's estate to file a motion to enlarge time within which to move to substitute pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.02.
The trial court determined that plaintiff's counsel's neglect in moving to substitute within 90 days was not excusable and granted defendants' motions, dismissing the action. On appeal we affirm the trial court's judgment because we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the neglect was not excusable.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/scottt_082511.pdf
Tennessee Supreme Court Reviews Whether the Trial Court Properly Increased an Employee's Disability Benefits
ALICIA D. HOWELL v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., ET AL. (Tenn. August 11, 2011)
The issue presented in this workers' compensation case is whether the employee made a meaningful return to work. Upon being released by her physician to return to work, she resigned her employment after her employer told her that she would have to return to a production line job that, based on her work experience and personal knowledge of the work conditions and her physical abilities and limitations, she did not believe she could perform.
The trial court awarded her additional benefits, ruling that she did not have a meaningful return to work and was eligible for reconsideration of her earlier settlement for workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241 (Supp. 2010). The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed.
We hold that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work following her injuries and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's award of increased permanent partial disability benefits. The judgment of the Appeals Panel is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/howella_081111.pdf
The issue presented in this workers' compensation case is whether the employee made a meaningful return to work. Upon being released by her physician to return to work, she resigned her employment after her employer told her that she would have to return to a production line job that, based on her work experience and personal knowledge of the work conditions and her physical abilities and limitations, she did not believe she could perform.
The trial court awarded her additional benefits, ruling that she did not have a meaningful return to work and was eligible for reconsideration of her earlier settlement for workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241 (Supp. 2010). The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed.
We hold that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work following her injuries and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's award of increased permanent partial disability benefits. The judgment of the Appeals Panel is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/howella_081111.pdf
Thursday, August 25, 2011
Court reviews whether an agency relationship existed between a mother and her son for the purpose of enforcing an arbitration agreement
DENNIS W. BLACKMON, ET AL. v. LP PIGEON FORGE, LLC, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. August 25, 2011)
This is a nursing home negligence case involving an arbitration agreement. The son of the decedent signed documents admitting his mother to the defendant nursing home. The admission documents included an arbitration agreement. After his mother's death, the son filed a lawsuit on behalf of her estate against the defendant nursing home and others connected to its administration. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement signed by the son. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the son was not the decedent's agent and did not have authority to sign on her behalf. The defendants appeal. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/blackmond_082511.pdf
This is a nursing home negligence case involving an arbitration agreement. The son of the decedent signed documents admitting his mother to the defendant nursing home. The admission documents included an arbitration agreement. After his mother's death, the son filed a lawsuit on behalf of her estate against the defendant nursing home and others connected to its administration. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement signed by the son. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the son was not the decedent's agent and did not have authority to sign on her behalf. The defendants appeal. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/blackmond_082511.pdf
Court reviews whether the statute of limitations bars a plaintiff's claim for assault against security guards
HARRISON A. AZARI v. GREYHOUND BUS STATION, NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. August 25, 2011)
Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 against the owner of a bus line alleging security guards assaulted him while he was waiting for a bus in 2003. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court's judgment because Tenn. Code Ann. section 28-3-104(a)(1) requires a plaintiff suing for personal injuries to file his complaint within one year of the date of the alleged assault resulting in injuries.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/azarih_082511.pdf
Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 against the owner of a bus line alleging security guards assaulted him while he was waiting for a bus in 2003. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court's judgment because Tenn. Code Ann. section 28-3-104(a)(1) requires a plaintiff suing for personal injuries to file his complaint within one year of the date of the alleged assault resulting in injuries.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/azarih_082511.pdf
Tuesday, August 23, 2011
Court reviews whether a claim against an assisted living facility was a negligence or a medical malpractice claim.
CATHY VICE, ET AL. v. ELMCROFT OF HENDERSONVILLE, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. August 23, 2011)
The daughter of an eighty-seven year old woman was looking for an assisted living facility for her mother, who was suffering from dementia. Elmcroft of Hendersonville assured the daughter that it could care for her mother and admitted her after the daughter informed it of her concern about her mother's risk for falls. Three weeks following her admission the mother fell, and then fell three more times before the daughter moved her out of Elmcroft. The final fall resulted in a broken clavicle, which caused the mother pain and decreased mobility for the rest of her life.
The daughter, as her mother's representative, sued Elmcroft and its administrator for negligence and negligent admission and retention of her mother. A jury awarded a judgment against the defendants for $250,000. There was evidence the Elmcroft staff did not follow Elmcroft's fall prevention policies and procedures.
Elmcroft argued that all claims filed against it involved matters of medical science or art requiring specialized skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons, and, therefore, this was a medical malpractice which should have been dismissed since the statutory requirements for such a claim had not been met.
We conclude, based on the evidence herein, that the claims were ordinary negligence claims. Elmcroft also argued (1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the negligence of the daughter and a physician from another state who indicated the mother may be cared for by an assisted living facility and (2) that the jury award was excessive, contained a punitive component, and was the result of passion, prejudice and caprice.
We conclude the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the physician's comparative fault or the daughter's comparative negligence. We also conclude there was material evidence to support the jury's award of damages. Consequently, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/vicec_082311.pdf
The daughter of an eighty-seven year old woman was looking for an assisted living facility for her mother, who was suffering from dementia. Elmcroft of Hendersonville assured the daughter that it could care for her mother and admitted her after the daughter informed it of her concern about her mother's risk for falls. Three weeks following her admission the mother fell, and then fell three more times before the daughter moved her out of Elmcroft. The final fall resulted in a broken clavicle, which caused the mother pain and decreased mobility for the rest of her life.
The daughter, as her mother's representative, sued Elmcroft and its administrator for negligence and negligent admission and retention of her mother. A jury awarded a judgment against the defendants for $250,000. There was evidence the Elmcroft staff did not follow Elmcroft's fall prevention policies and procedures.
Elmcroft argued that all claims filed against it involved matters of medical science or art requiring specialized skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons, and, therefore, this was a medical malpractice which should have been dismissed since the statutory requirements for such a claim had not been met.
We conclude, based on the evidence herein, that the claims were ordinary negligence claims. Elmcroft also argued (1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the negligence of the daughter and a physician from another state who indicated the mother may be cared for by an assisted living facility and (2) that the jury award was excessive, contained a punitive component, and was the result of passion, prejudice and caprice.
We conclude the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the physician's comparative fault or the daughter's comparative negligence. We also conclude there was material evidence to support the jury's award of damages. Consequently, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/vicec_082311.pdf
Thursday, August 18, 2011
Court reviews the denial of a firefighter's on-the-job injury benefits for his hypertension and heart disease
PAUL PITTMAN v. CITY OF MEMPHIS (Tenn. Ct. App. August 18, 2011)
Petitioner firefighter appeals denial of on-the-job injury benefits by the City of Memphis. We affirm.
Background:
This dispute involves the application of the presumption contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-51-201 that hypertension and injury to the heart and/or lungs sustained by a police officer or firefighter is job-related.
Before joining the Memphis Fire Department in February 1995, Mr. Pittman underwent a preemployment physical examination that did not reveal signs of hypertension or heart disease. In 1996, he was diagnosed with hypertension and in April 1996 the City admitted Mr. Pittman into the Heart, Hypertension, Lung Program, which entitled him to benefits under the City’s On-the-Job-Injury (“OJI”) policy. He has been receiving OJI benefits for hypertension since April 25, 1996.
In July 2005, Mr. Pittman was hospitalized for chest pain afterfeeling fatigued at work. On July 15, 2005, he underwent a coronary angiography which revealed a 90 percent blockage of Mr. Pittman’s left anterior artery. Mr. Pittman was diagnosed with coronary artery disease and underwent surgery.
On July 22, 2005, Mr. Pittman filed an OJI report seeking admission into the HHL Program for heart disease. Pursuant to City policy, Mr. Pittman’s medical records were reviewed by three physicians. One of the physicians, Jesse. T. Davis, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Davis), stated that he found no causal connection between Mr. Pittman’s occupation as a firefighter and his coronary artery disease. Based on Dr. Davis’ statement, the City denied Mr. Pittman’s claim. Mr. Pittman appealed denial of his claim.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/pittmanp_081811.pdf
Petitioner firefighter appeals denial of on-the-job injury benefits by the City of Memphis. We affirm.
Background:
This dispute involves the application of the presumption contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-51-201 that hypertension and injury to the heart and/or lungs sustained by a police officer or firefighter is job-related.
Before joining the Memphis Fire Department in February 1995, Mr. Pittman underwent a preemployment physical examination that did not reveal signs of hypertension or heart disease. In 1996, he was diagnosed with hypertension and in April 1996 the City admitted Mr. Pittman into the Heart, Hypertension, Lung Program, which entitled him to benefits under the City’s On-the-Job-Injury (“OJI”) policy. He has been receiving OJI benefits for hypertension since April 25, 1996.
In July 2005, Mr. Pittman was hospitalized for chest pain afterfeeling fatigued at work. On July 15, 2005, he underwent a coronary angiography which revealed a 90 percent blockage of Mr. Pittman’s left anterior artery. Mr. Pittman was diagnosed with coronary artery disease and underwent surgery.
On July 22, 2005, Mr. Pittman filed an OJI report seeking admission into the HHL Program for heart disease. Pursuant to City policy, Mr. Pittman’s medical records were reviewed by three physicians. One of the physicians, Jesse. T. Davis, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Davis), stated that he found no causal connection between Mr. Pittman’s occupation as a firefighter and his coronary artery disease. Based on Dr. Davis’ statement, the City denied Mr. Pittman’s claim. Mr. Pittman appealed denial of his claim.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/pittmanp_081811.pdf
Monday, August 15, 2011
Court reviews whether employee's claim was barred by the statute of limitations of the GTLA
MONICA WHITMORE v. SHELBY COUNTY GOVERNMENT (Tenn. Ct. App. August 15, 2011)
The trial court granted the defendant, Shelby County Government, judgment on the pleadings as to multiple causes of action brought by a former county employee. The trial court found, inter alia, the one-year statute of limitations of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA") barred the plaintiff's claim. Applying well-settled law, the court concluded the general saving statute does not apply to a claim non-suited and re-filed against a governmental entity under the GTLA.
Although the trial court failed to address whether a different conclusion might apply to causes of action arising under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"), we hold the saving statute does not "save" a claim non-suited and refiled against a State entity under the THRA. The trial court therefore properly concluded the plaintiff's suit was time-barred. Because the trial court reviewed matters outside of the pleadings when deciding the defendant's motion, we grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/whitmorem_081511.pdf
The trial court granted the defendant, Shelby County Government, judgment on the pleadings as to multiple causes of action brought by a former county employee. The trial court found, inter alia, the one-year statute of limitations of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA") barred the plaintiff's claim. Applying well-settled law, the court concluded the general saving statute does not apply to a claim non-suited and re-filed against a governmental entity under the GTLA.
Although the trial court failed to address whether a different conclusion might apply to causes of action arising under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"), we hold the saving statute does not "save" a claim non-suited and refiled against a State entity under the THRA. The trial court therefore properly concluded the plaintiff's suit was time-barred. Because the trial court reviewed matters outside of the pleadings when deciding the defendant's motion, we grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/whitmorem_081511.pdf
Saturday, August 13, 2011
Court reviews a driver's post-judgment motions in an automobile accident case
BILLIE SEAY FUBO NATIONWIDE INSURANCE v. BETTY WALSH ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. August 11, 2011)
On or about May 28, 2005, Billie Seay was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by the defendant Thomas E. Walsh ("the Driver"), which vehicle was owned by the defendant Betty Walsh ("the Owner"). Seay's insurance company, Nationwide Insurance Company, settled her claim and filed this subrogation action in Seay's name for the use and benefit of Nationwide against the Driver and the Owner. The Driver and the Owner filed separate pro se answers. The Owner appeared at trial, but the Driver did not appear. The trial court entered a judgment against both defendants. Two and a half years later, the Driver filed a motion to set aside the judgment. It was denied. He then filed a series of similar unsuccessful post-judgment motions. The Driver appeals from the last order denying post-judgment relief. We affirm.
Opinion Available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/seayb_081111.pdf
On or about May 28, 2005, Billie Seay was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by the defendant Thomas E. Walsh ("the Driver"), which vehicle was owned by the defendant Betty Walsh ("the Owner"). Seay's insurance company, Nationwide Insurance Company, settled her claim and filed this subrogation action in Seay's name for the use and benefit of Nationwide against the Driver and the Owner. The Driver and the Owner filed separate pro se answers. The Owner appeared at trial, but the Driver did not appear. The trial court entered a judgment against both defendants. Two and a half years later, the Driver filed a motion to set aside the judgment. It was denied. He then filed a series of similar unsuccessful post-judgment motions. The Driver appeals from the last order denying post-judgment relief. We affirm.
Opinion Available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/seayb_081111.pdf
Thursday, August 11, 2011
TN Supreme Court clarifies the standards that apply to the locality rule for expert medical witnesses
DONNA FAYE SHIPLEY ET AL. v. ROBIN WILLIAMS (Tenn. August 11, 2011)
In medical malpractice actions, Tennessee adheres to a locality rule for expert medical witnesses. Claimants are required by statute to prove by expert testimony the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the community where the defendant medical provider practices or a similar community. Tenn. Code Ann. S 29-26-115 (2000 & Supp. 2010).
Since the locality rule was enacted in 1975, Tennessee courts have reached different conclusions in interpreting it. The rule does not define "similar community," nor does it provide guidance as to how a community is determined to be "similar" to the defendant's community.
In this case, we address and clarify the applicable standards that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Applying these standards, we hold that the trial court's exclusion of the claimant's two proffered medical experts under the locality rule was error. The trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/shipleyd_081111.pdf
KOCH concurring in part and dissenting in part
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/shipleyd_DIS_CORR_082911.pdf
In medical malpractice actions, Tennessee adheres to a locality rule for expert medical witnesses. Claimants are required by statute to prove by expert testimony the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the community where the defendant medical provider practices or a similar community. Tenn. Code Ann. S 29-26-115 (2000 & Supp. 2010).
Since the locality rule was enacted in 1975, Tennessee courts have reached different conclusions in interpreting it. The rule does not define "similar community," nor does it provide guidance as to how a community is determined to be "similar" to the defendant's community.
In this case, we address and clarify the applicable standards that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Applying these standards, we hold that the trial court's exclusion of the claimant's two proffered medical experts under the locality rule was error. The trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/shipleyd_081111.pdf
KOCH concurring in part and dissenting in part
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/shipleyd_DIS_CORR_082911.pdf
Wednesday, August 10, 2011
TWCA reviews the trial court's adoption of an evaluating physician's impairment rating as the basis for an award of permanent disability benefits
MICHAEL SCHWAMB v. BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE OPERATIONS, LLC (TWCA August 10, 2011)
In this workers' compensation case, the employee had a compensable back injury in 2008. His doctor assigned 19% permanent anatomical impairment for the injury, based upon the Sixth Edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
He had previously settled a claim for a compensable back injury in 1996. That injury resulted in a 15% permanent impairment according to the Fourth Edition of the Guides, then in effect.
Based upon those ratings, the treating physician for the 2008 injury apportioned 4% of the total 19% impairment to the more recent injury. An evaluating physician used the Sixth Edition to rate both injuries and opined that the impairment for the 2008 injury was 13% to the body as a whole.
The trial court adopted the evaluating physician's rating and based its award of permanent disability benefits on it. The employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by adopting the evaluating physician's rating. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/schwambm_081011.pdf
In this workers' compensation case, the employee had a compensable back injury in 2008. His doctor assigned 19% permanent anatomical impairment for the injury, based upon the Sixth Edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
He had previously settled a claim for a compensable back injury in 1996. That injury resulted in a 15% permanent impairment according to the Fourth Edition of the Guides, then in effect.
Based upon those ratings, the treating physician for the 2008 injury apportioned 4% of the total 19% impairment to the more recent injury. An evaluating physician used the Sixth Edition to rate both injuries and opined that the impairment for the 2008 injury was 13% to the body as a whole.
The trial court adopted the evaluating physician's rating and based its award of permanent disability benefits on it. The employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by adopting the evaluating physician's rating. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/schwambm_081011.pdf
Tuesday, August 9, 2011
Court reviews a claim against an employer for retaliatory discharge
FEDERATED RURAL ELECTRIC INSURANCE EXCHANGE, ET AL. v. WILLIAM R. HILL, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. August 9, 2011)
Defendant allegedly suffered an on-the-job injury to his knees over the course of several years, and Plaintiffs paid workers' compensation benefits on his behalf. However, after Defendant was videotaped building a barn, his employment was terminated and suit was filed against him for fraud. Defendant then filed a counter-complaint alleging, among other things, retaliatory discharge. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with regard to the retaliatory discharge claim, and we affirm and remand.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/federated_080911.pdf
Defendant allegedly suffered an on-the-job injury to his knees over the course of several years, and Plaintiffs paid workers' compensation benefits on his behalf. However, after Defendant was videotaped building a barn, his employment was terminated and suit was filed against him for fraud. Defendant then filed a counter-complaint alleging, among other things, retaliatory discharge. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with regard to the retaliatory discharge claim, and we affirm and remand.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/federated_080911.pdf
Sunday, July 31, 2011
TN Supreme Court Reviews a Workers' Compensation Award Based on a Rating Computed in a Settlement Agreement Rather than on a Physician's Assessment
ROBERT LAZAR v. J.W. ALUMINUM (Tenn. July 26, 2011)
An employee settled his claim for workers' compensation benefits. The settlement stated that the award of vocational disability benefits to which the parties agreed was not based on the medical impairment rating of either the treating physician or the employee's independent medical examiner.
After the employee was laid off, he sought reconsideration of his benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B)(iv) (2008). The chancery court declined to use the impairment rating of the treating physician or the independent medical examiner. The court further declined to base its increased award on a rating from an independent medical evaluation of the employee conducted after the settlement by a physician listed in the Medical Impairment Rating registry of the Tennessee Department of Labor. The chancery court instead awarded additional permanent partial disability benefits based on an impairment rating computed from the percentage of permanent partial disability reflected in the settlement. The employer appealed. We affirm the chancery court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lazarr_072611.pdf
An employee settled his claim for workers' compensation benefits. The settlement stated that the award of vocational disability benefits to which the parties agreed was not based on the medical impairment rating of either the treating physician or the employee's independent medical examiner.
After the employee was laid off, he sought reconsideration of his benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B)(iv) (2008). The chancery court declined to use the impairment rating of the treating physician or the independent medical examiner. The court further declined to base its increased award on a rating from an independent medical evaluation of the employee conducted after the settlement by a physician listed in the Medical Impairment Rating registry of the Tennessee Department of Labor. The chancery court instead awarded additional permanent partial disability benefits based on an impairment rating computed from the percentage of permanent partial disability reflected in the settlement. The employer appealed. We affirm the chancery court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lazarr_072611.pdf
Friday, July 29, 2011
Court reviews a negligence case involving multiple continuances and a subsequent ruling against the Plaintiff based on comparative fault
FREDDIE DAVIS v. SHELBY COUNTY GOVERNMENT (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2011)
This is a negligence action. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that Defendant/Appellee is liable for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he fell while walking down the steps at the Shelby County courthouse. Due to Appellant's incarceration, the trial court granted three continuances; however, Appellant's request for a fourth continuance was denied.
Following a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant had failed to meet his burden to show negligence on the part of the Appellee, and further concluded that, if there was negligence in the case, Appellant was at least fifty percent at fault so as to bar recovery. Appellant appeals both the denial of his fourth motion for a continuance and the trial court's ruling in favor of Appellee. Finding no error, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/davisf_072911.pdf
This is a negligence action. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that Defendant/Appellee is liable for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he fell while walking down the steps at the Shelby County courthouse. Due to Appellant's incarceration, the trial court granted three continuances; however, Appellant's request for a fourth continuance was denied.
Following a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant had failed to meet his burden to show negligence on the part of the Appellee, and further concluded that, if there was negligence in the case, Appellant was at least fifty percent at fault so as to bar recovery. Appellant appeals both the denial of his fourth motion for a continuance and the trial court's ruling in favor of Appellee. Finding no error, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/davisf_072911.pdf
Court reviews a wrongful death case involving a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
JERRY GARRISON, et al., v. ANDY E. BICKFORD, et al. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2011)
Plaintiffs brought this action for the wrongful death of their son, and also for their damages arising from "negligent infliction of emotional distress." State Farm Mutual Insurance Company filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that its policy afforded no coverage for a negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court overruled the Motion but proposed a Rule 9 appeal, which this Court granted. We reverse the Trial Court on this issue and grant the summary judgment motion.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/garrisonj_072911.pdf
Plaintiffs brought this action for the wrongful death of their son, and also for their damages arising from "negligent infliction of emotional distress." State Farm Mutual Insurance Company filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that its policy afforded no coverage for a negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court overruled the Motion but proposed a Rule 9 appeal, which this Court granted. We reverse the Trial Court on this issue and grant the summary judgment motion.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/garrisonj_072911.pdf
Thursday, July 28, 2011
Court Reviews Whether a Drainage Grate Created a Dangerous Condition on a Highway
BETH L. WINELAND v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, TENNESSEE ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2011)
Beth L. Wineland, the sole plaintiff, sustained serious injuries when the front wheel of her bicycle fell into the open slots of a metal drainage grate ("the subject grate" or "the old style grate") situated near a curb of State Highway 60. The slots on the subject grate run parallel with the direction of traffic. The subject grate is inside the municipal boundaries of the City of Cleveland. The plaintiff made a claim against the State of Tennessee in the Claims Commission and filed this action against the City of Cleveland in the trial court. The claim against the State was consolidated with this action for trial. The plaintiff alleges that the old style grate constitutes a dangerous condition on the highway and that both the City of Cleveland and the State were negligent in maintaining the highway. The trial court determined that neither defendant had a duty to change the grate and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals only as to the State. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of damages.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/winelandb_072811.pdf
Beth L. Wineland, the sole plaintiff, sustained serious injuries when the front wheel of her bicycle fell into the open slots of a metal drainage grate ("the subject grate" or "the old style grate") situated near a curb of State Highway 60. The slots on the subject grate run parallel with the direction of traffic. The subject grate is inside the municipal boundaries of the City of Cleveland. The plaintiff made a claim against the State of Tennessee in the Claims Commission and filed this action against the City of Cleveland in the trial court. The claim against the State was consolidated with this action for trial. The plaintiff alleges that the old style grate constitutes a dangerous condition on the highway and that both the City of Cleveland and the State were negligent in maintaining the highway. The trial court determined that neither defendant had a duty to change the grate and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals only as to the State. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of damages.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/winelandb_072811.pdf
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
TWCA Reviews Whether Employee is Entitled to Partial or Total Temporary Benefits
JAMES E. STEM v. THOMPSON SERVICES, INC. ET AL. (TWCA July 26, 2011)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(3)(3) (2008) for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The appeal involves a dispute regarding the type and amount of temporary benefits an employee working two jobs is entitled to following an injury at one of the employee's jobs. After sustaining a work-related injury that required the employee to discontinue one but not both of his jobs, the employee filed suit in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County.
After the trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits, the employer appealed and asserted that the employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits because he continued to work at his second job. We conclude that the employee is entitled to temporary partial, rather than temporary total, disability benefits and remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount of these benefits.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/stemj_072611.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(3)(3) (2008) for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The appeal involves a dispute regarding the type and amount of temporary benefits an employee working two jobs is entitled to following an injury at one of the employee's jobs. After sustaining a work-related injury that required the employee to discontinue one but not both of his jobs, the employee filed suit in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County.
After the trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits, the employer appealed and asserted that the employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits because he continued to work at his second job. We conclude that the employee is entitled to temporary partial, rather than temporary total, disability benefits and remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount of these benefits.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/stemj_072611.pdf
Monday, July 25, 2011
Court Reviews an Employee's Impairment Rating Based on His County-Employer's Workers' Compensation Plan
WILLIE J. HIGH v. SUMNER COUNTY, TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2011)
An employee of Sumner County was injured on the job and sought disability benefits pursuant to the Sumner County compensation plan. The employee's physicians initially gave him an anatomical impairment rating of 20%, but later determined that the employee was totally disabled and could not work. The County treated the employee's disability as a permanent partial disability and offered the employee a lower settlement than if the employee's disability were treated as a total permanent disability. The employee appealed the initial offer to the administrative review board, which upheld the initial offer of settlement.
The employee petitioned the chancery court for a writ of certiorari and asked the court to review the administrative decision and rule that it was arbitrary and capricious. The chancery court found the review board should have considered whether the employee was totally disabled based on the evidence in the record and remanded the case back to the review board for this purpose. The County appealed, and we affirm the trial court's decision. The plain language of the county plan does not support the administrative decision not to consider the employee's total disability in determining the compensation he is entitled to receive.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/highw_072511.pdf
An employee of Sumner County was injured on the job and sought disability benefits pursuant to the Sumner County compensation plan. The employee's physicians initially gave him an anatomical impairment rating of 20%, but later determined that the employee was totally disabled and could not work. The County treated the employee's disability as a permanent partial disability and offered the employee a lower settlement than if the employee's disability were treated as a total permanent disability. The employee appealed the initial offer to the administrative review board, which upheld the initial offer of settlement.
The employee petitioned the chancery court for a writ of certiorari and asked the court to review the administrative decision and rule that it was arbitrary and capricious. The chancery court found the review board should have considered whether the employee was totally disabled based on the evidence in the record and remanded the case back to the review board for this purpose. The County appealed, and we affirm the trial court's decision. The plain language of the county plan does not support the administrative decision not to consider the employee's total disability in determining the compensation he is entitled to receive.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/highw_072511.pdf
Thursday, July 21, 2011
TWCA Reviews an Award of Permanent Total Disability Benefits to an Employee Whose Physician Used the Medical Impairment Registry Process
COURIER PRINTING COMPANY ET AL. v. WANDA SIMS, EX REL ROBERT STEVE BLY ET AL. (TWCA July 21, 2011)
In this Workers' Compensation case, the trial court held that the employee had sustained a gradual injury to his lower back, and that he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of that injury. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by permitting the employee to use a physician who provided an impairment rating through the Medical Impairment Registry process as a medical expert on the issue of causation and by finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury. In the alternative, the employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding permanent total disability, and also in its alternative finding that the employee had proven three of the four elements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242, and was thereby able to recover a permanent partial disability award in excess of six times the medical impairment. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/courierprinting_072111.pdf
In this Workers' Compensation case, the trial court held that the employee had sustained a gradual injury to his lower back, and that he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of that injury. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by permitting the employee to use a physician who provided an impairment rating through the Medical Impairment Registry process as a medical expert on the issue of causation and by finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury. In the alternative, the employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding permanent total disability, and also in its alternative finding that the employee had proven three of the four elements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242, and was thereby able to recover a permanent partial disability award in excess of six times the medical impairment. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/courierprinting_072111.pdf
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
TWCA Reviews whether an employee failed to timely file a request for a benefit review conference
DARRYL J. MAYTON v. WACKENHUT SERVICES, INC. (TWCA July 19, 2011)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue presented in this case is whether the employee's request for a benefit review conference was filed more than one year after the employee had knowledge that his occupational disease was caused by his employment.
The trial court ruled that the employee's request was not timely and dismissed the case. After careful review, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that Employee had knowledge that his illness was related to his employment more than one year before the filing of his request for a benefit review conference. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/maytond_071911.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue presented in this case is whether the employee's request for a benefit review conference was filed more than one year after the employee had knowledge that his occupational disease was caused by his employment.
The trial court ruled that the employee's request was not timely and dismissed the case. After careful review, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that Employee had knowledge that his illness was related to his employment more than one year before the filing of his request for a benefit review conference. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/maytond_071911.pdf
TWCA Reviews whether a physician's rating failed to comply with the AMA Guidelines and whether, therefore, the employee's award was excessive
JACQUELINE MORRIS v. JACKSON CLINIC PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION (TWCA July 19, 2011)
In this workers' compensation action, the employee sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder. Her initial treating physician assigned a 9% impairment to the body as a whole. After additional surgery, her subsequent treating physician assigned a 6% impairment to the body as a whole. An evaluating physician assigned a 17% impairment. The trial court chose the evaluating physician's impairment, and awarded the employee 25.5% permanent partial disability ("PPD") to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, arguing that the evaluating physician's rating did not comply with the AMA Guides and that the award therefore is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/morrisj_071911.pdf
In this workers' compensation action, the employee sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder. Her initial treating physician assigned a 9% impairment to the body as a whole. After additional surgery, her subsequent treating physician assigned a 6% impairment to the body as a whole. An evaluating physician assigned a 17% impairment. The trial court chose the evaluating physician's impairment, and awarded the employee 25.5% permanent partial disability ("PPD") to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, arguing that the evaluating physician's rating did not comply with the AMA Guides and that the award therefore is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/morrisj_071911.pdf
Monday, July 18, 2011
'Due care' law went into effect July 1
A new state law that will levy penalties for failure to "exercise due care" while driving a motor vehicle went into effect July 1. According to the bill's sponsor, the law also makes it easier for those injured, or the survivors of those killed, to prevail in civil lawsuits by "making it clear that the law requires people in a car to exercise proper driving restraint around people on a bicycle and pedestrians."
The Murfreesboro Post has the full story, which you can read here: 'Sorry I Didn’t See You' is no longer a legal excuse
The Murfreesboro Post has the full story, which you can read here: 'Sorry I Didn’t See You' is no longer a legal excuse
DuPont Sued Over Imprelis
A Michigan golf course has sued DuPont over the herbicide Imprelis. The suit alleges that the herbicide kills mature trees in and around landscaping. If you have had a similar issue you believe is related to Imprelis, call The Adams Law Firm. The firm is following consumer complaints about Imprelis and the EPA's investigation of the herbicide.
Thursday, July 14, 2011
TWCA reviews whether an employer's motion for a medical examination is reasonable
PEFFERY IRONS v. K & K TRUCKING, INC. ET AL. (TWCA July 14, 2011)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained an injury which resulted in a court-approved workers' compensation settlement. His authorized physician later recommended medical treatment. The employer's utilization review provider denied approval of the proposed treatment. The employer filed a motion for a medical examination pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1) which is required if reasonable. The trial court found the employer's request to be unreasonable and denied the motion. The employer has appealed. We reverse the trial court's order and remand for entry of an order granting the motion.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/ironsj_071411.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained an injury which resulted in a court-approved workers' compensation settlement. His authorized physician later recommended medical treatment. The employer's utilization review provider denied approval of the proposed treatment. The employer filed a motion for a medical examination pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1) which is required if reasonable. The trial court found the employer's request to be unreasonable and denied the motion. The employer has appealed. We reverse the trial court's order and remand for entry of an order granting the motion.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/ironsj_071411.pdf
TWCA reviews whether an employer could receive reimbursement of payments made prior to the execution of a compromise & release agreement
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. ET AL. v. RICHARD WARNOCK ET AL. (TWCA July 14, 2011)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee suffered an injury which the employer denied was in the course of employment. The employee filed a request for assistance with the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development. The Department ordered the employer to pay temporary disability benefits and medical expenses for the employee's injury pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-238(a)(2)(3).
Subsequently the employer, its workers' compensation carrier and the employee entered into a compromise and release agreement in Pennsylvania pursuant to which the employee was paid $130,000. The employer filed this action against the employee and the Department of Labor requesting reimbursement of payments made pursuant to the Department's order, as permitted by section 50-6-238(b). The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/libertymutual_071411.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee suffered an injury which the employer denied was in the course of employment. The employee filed a request for assistance with the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development. The Department ordered the employer to pay temporary disability benefits and medical expenses for the employee's injury pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-238(a)(2)(3).
Subsequently the employer, its workers' compensation carrier and the employee entered into a compromise and release agreement in Pennsylvania pursuant to which the employee was paid $130,000. The employer filed this action against the employee and the Department of Labor requesting reimbursement of payments made pursuant to the Department's order, as permitted by section 50-6-238(b). The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/libertymutual_071411.pdf
Friday, July 8, 2011
Bryan L. Capps Voted Top Attorney for Motorcycle Personal Injury Cases Cityview Magazine 2011
Bryan L. Capps of Knoxville has been named by Cityview Magazine one of Knoxville's top attorneys representing injured motorcycle riders. Mr. Capps was recently named President-Elect of the Tennessee Association for Justice (formerly the Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association). He has spent his entire career representing seriously injured motorcycle riders from Tennessee and around the country.
Adams Law Firm Attorney Named President-Elect of Tennessee Association for Justice
Bryan L. Capps of the Knoxville-based Adams Law Firm has been named President-Elect of the Tennessee Association for Justice (formerly the Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association). He will serve his one year term along with the new TAJ President Keith Williams of Lebanon, Tennessee. TAJ
advocates for accountability and the constitutional rights of all citizens and works to protect civil justice in the state.
advocates for accountability and the constitutional rights of all citizens and works to protect civil justice in the state.
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
Court reviews whether employee's motion for medical treatment was reasonable under the circumstances
BARBARA ANN HARVILLE v. EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY (TWCA July 6, 2011)
The employee sustained a compensable injury to her arm in 2001. In 2003, she entered into a settlement with her employer that preserved her right to receive reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the injury. In April 2008, the employee's authorized treating physician recommended a diagnostic test. The employer submitted the recommendation to its utilization review provider, which declined to approve the recommended test. The employee and her physician were notified of the denial in May 2008.
In June 2009, the employee filed a petition for contempt seeking to have the trial court order the recommended test. The trial court treated the petition as a motion for medical treatment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(b)(2) (2008). The trial court found the recommended test to be reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injury, ordered the employer to authorize it, and awarded the employee attorney's fees. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/harvilleb_070611.pdf
The employee sustained a compensable injury to her arm in 2001. In 2003, she entered into a settlement with her employer that preserved her right to receive reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the injury. In April 2008, the employee's authorized treating physician recommended a diagnostic test. The employer submitted the recommendation to its utilization review provider, which declined to approve the recommended test. The employee and her physician were notified of the denial in May 2008.
In June 2009, the employee filed a petition for contempt seeking to have the trial court order the recommended test. The trial court treated the petition as a motion for medical treatment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(b)(2) (2008). The trial court found the recommended test to be reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injury, ordered the employer to authorize it, and awarded the employee attorney's fees. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/harvilleb_070611.pdf
Friday, July 1, 2011
Court reviews whether a school resource officer exercised reasonable care when displaying graphic pictures in a case involving emotional distress
MARLA H., individually and as next best friend to her daughter MORIAH F. H. v. KNOX COUNTY, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 1, 2011)
This is an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mother of a middle school student filed suit against Knox County, the Knox County Board of Education, and the City of Knoxville after her daughter viewed graphic photographs of her dead father during a presentation on the dangers of drunk driving.
The trial court found the City of Knoxville liable for the student's emotional injuries because the school resource officer who distributed the photographs intended to evoke an emotional response. We conclude it was generally foreseeable that providing graphic accident scene photographs to seventh grade students could cause serious or severe emotional harm in a student related to a victim depicted therein. Thus, the school resource officer owed a duty to exercise reasonable care when displaying the photographs to a class that potentially included students related to the victims. The evidence, however, preponderates against the trial court's finding that the school resource officer failed to exercise reasonable care. We reverse the decision of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/marlah_070111.pdf
This is an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mother of a middle school student filed suit against Knox County, the Knox County Board of Education, and the City of Knoxville after her daughter viewed graphic photographs of her dead father during a presentation on the dangers of drunk driving.
The trial court found the City of Knoxville liable for the student's emotional injuries because the school resource officer who distributed the photographs intended to evoke an emotional response. We conclude it was generally foreseeable that providing graphic accident scene photographs to seventh grade students could cause serious or severe emotional harm in a student related to a victim depicted therein. Thus, the school resource officer owed a duty to exercise reasonable care when displaying the photographs to a class that potentially included students related to the victims. The evidence, however, preponderates against the trial court's finding that the school resource officer failed to exercise reasonable care. We reverse the decision of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/marlah_070111.pdf
40 Wrong Site Surgeries Per Week in the US
According to doctors, hospitals and health agencies, wrong site surgeries should never occur. Yet an estimated 40 times per week a surgery occurs on the wrong limb, organ or other site in patients across the U.S. Read how surgeons, nurses and hospitals are working to eliminate these errors which are the most blatant and easily avoided form of medical malpractice.
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
TN Supreme Court Reviews the Jury Instructions in a Strict Products Liability Case Involving Asbestos
EVELYN NYE v. BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC., ET AL. (Tenn. June 7, 2011)
In this products liability case, a widow sought compensation for the death of her husband from mesothelioma allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos at his workplace. She sued the company that sold products containing asbestos to her husband's employer. She based her claim on strict liability and alleged that the seller sold defective products and failed to warn her husband of the products' health risks.
The jury found that the seller was at fault, but that her husband's employer was the sole cause of his injury and awarded her nothing. The widow appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions that more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury.
On review, we hold that the seller was subject to suit in strict liability, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106(b) (2000), because none of the products' manufacturers were subject to service of process. Further, we hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the seller could not be held liable for failure to warn if the jury found that the consumer, identified as the employer, was already aware of any danger in connection with the use of the products or if the employer had been given adequate warnings.
This jury instruction was erroneous for two reasons. First, it applied the learned intermediary doctrine, which the courts of this state have limited to medical products and pharmaceuticals. Second, the jury instruction misidentified the consumer as the employer, when the consumer who was required to be warned was the employee, Mr. Nye. Because the error more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/nye_correx_061511.pdf
HOLDER concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/nyee_DIS_060711.pdf
In this products liability case, a widow sought compensation for the death of her husband from mesothelioma allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos at his workplace. She sued the company that sold products containing asbestos to her husband's employer. She based her claim on strict liability and alleged that the seller sold defective products and failed to warn her husband of the products' health risks.
The jury found that the seller was at fault, but that her husband's employer was the sole cause of his injury and awarded her nothing. The widow appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions that more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury.
On review, we hold that the seller was subject to suit in strict liability, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106(b) (2000), because none of the products' manufacturers were subject to service of process. Further, we hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the seller could not be held liable for failure to warn if the jury found that the consumer, identified as the employer, was already aware of any danger in connection with the use of the products or if the employer had been given adequate warnings.
This jury instruction was erroneous for two reasons. First, it applied the learned intermediary doctrine, which the courts of this state have limited to medical products and pharmaceuticals. Second, the jury instruction misidentified the consumer as the employer, when the consumer who was required to be warned was the employee, Mr. Nye. Because the error more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/nye_correx_061511.pdf
HOLDER concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/nyee_DIS_060711.pdf
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
Court reviews the denial of TennCare coverage for orthodontic braces
RACHEL LEE EX REL. REBECCA LEE v. MARK EMKES, COMMISSIONER OF THE TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2011)
Petitioner, when she was thirteen years old, was having difficulty eating because of the position of her teeth, which also irritated her lips and cheeks. An orthodontist recommended braces to remedy the problem; however, the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration denied TennCare coverage for orthodontic braces.
Upon review by the Davidson County Chancery Court, the court found that the TennCare regulations impermissibly required both a Salzmann Index score of 28 and an abnormal dental development, i.e., a handicapping malocclusion, to qualify for orthodontic treatment, and that the Salzmann Index was an illegal utilization control because it nullified eligibility based upon an individualized review. The trial court also found that petitioner had not demonstrated a handicapping malocclusion, which is a valid utilization control under the regulations, therefore, she did not qualify for braces. Petitioner appealed.
We affirm the trial court's finding that the TennCare regulation in effect at the time impermissibly required a Salzmann Index score of at least 28 to qualify for orthodontic treatment. The record does, however, establish that an individualized assessment of Petitioner's condition to determine whether she had a handicapping malocclusion was conducted by a consulting dentist employed by the agency, which satisfies the federal requirements. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to affirm the agency's denial of orthodontic braces.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/leer_062811.pdf
Petitioner, when she was thirteen years old, was having difficulty eating because of the position of her teeth, which also irritated her lips and cheeks. An orthodontist recommended braces to remedy the problem; however, the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration denied TennCare coverage for orthodontic braces.
Upon review by the Davidson County Chancery Court, the court found that the TennCare regulations impermissibly required both a Salzmann Index score of 28 and an abnormal dental development, i.e., a handicapping malocclusion, to qualify for orthodontic treatment, and that the Salzmann Index was an illegal utilization control because it nullified eligibility based upon an individualized review. The trial court also found that petitioner had not demonstrated a handicapping malocclusion, which is a valid utilization control under the regulations, therefore, she did not qualify for braces. Petitioner appealed.
We affirm the trial court's finding that the TennCare regulation in effect at the time impermissibly required a Salzmann Index score of at least 28 to qualify for orthodontic treatment. The record does, however, establish that an individualized assessment of Petitioner's condition to determine whether she had a handicapping malocclusion was conducted by a consulting dentist employed by the agency, which satisfies the federal requirements. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to affirm the agency's denial of orthodontic braces.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/leer_062811.pdf
Court Reviews Whether the Statute of Limitations Barred the Transfer of a GTLA Claim to the Proper Venue
JOHN HAYNES v. RUTHERFORD COUNTY ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2011)
The issue in this matter is whether Tenn. Code Ann. section 16-1-116 ("the Transfer Statute") tolls the running of the statue of limitations when a claim under the Government Tort Liability Act is filed in a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the court transfers the case to a court with jurisdiction.
Acting pro se, the plaintiff filed a GTLA claim in the general sessions court of Rutherford County; the civil warrant was filed prior to the running of the one-year statute of limitations for a GTLA claim. Because subject matter jurisdiction over GTLA claims is limited to the circuit court, the sessions court transferred the case. The circuit court held that, because the sessions court lacked jurisdiction, the transfer itself was invalid; therefore, the action was not effectively filed until it was transferred to the circuit court. However, the date of transfer was beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations for GTLA claims; thus, the circuit court dismissed the case as time barred.
We have determined this case is not time barred because, under the Transfer Statute, the statute of limitations was tolled when the civil warrant was timely filed in sessions court and, because it was timely filed, the sessions court was authorized to transfer the case to the circuit court. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the case and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Full opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/haynesj_062811.pdf
The issue in this matter is whether Tenn. Code Ann. section 16-1-116 ("the Transfer Statute") tolls the running of the statue of limitations when a claim under the Government Tort Liability Act is filed in a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the court transfers the case to a court with jurisdiction.
Acting pro se, the plaintiff filed a GTLA claim in the general sessions court of Rutherford County; the civil warrant was filed prior to the running of the one-year statute of limitations for a GTLA claim. Because subject matter jurisdiction over GTLA claims is limited to the circuit court, the sessions court transferred the case. The circuit court held that, because the sessions court lacked jurisdiction, the transfer itself was invalid; therefore, the action was not effectively filed until it was transferred to the circuit court. However, the date of transfer was beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations for GTLA claims; thus, the circuit court dismissed the case as time barred.
We have determined this case is not time barred because, under the Transfer Statute, the statute of limitations was tolled when the civil warrant was timely filed in sessions court and, because it was timely filed, the sessions court was authorized to transfer the case to the circuit court. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the case and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Full opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/haynesj_062811.pdf
Court Reviews a Summary Judgment Motion in a Medical Malpractice Case Related to Treatment and Fraudulent Billing of a Patient
DEBORAH LYNN DAVIS v. JACK E. SCARIANO, JR., M.D. ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2011)
The plaintiff, Deborah Lynn Davis, appeals from a grant of summary judgment to the defendants, Dr. Jack E. Scariano, Jr., and his group, West Knoxville Neurological Associates. Except when the context requires otherwise, we will refer to the defendants collectively as "Dr. Scariano."
Davis sued Dr. Scariano alleging medical malpractice and fraud related to the doctor's treatment of her and to the billing of her account. Dr. Scariano moved for summary judgment. After granting Davis several continuances, the trial court heard the motion and granted it based on Dr. Scariano's filings and the plaintiff's failure to present evidence establishing a disputed issue of material fact. Davis appeals. We affirm.
Opinion available here:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/davisd_062811.pdf
The plaintiff, Deborah Lynn Davis, appeals from a grant of summary judgment to the defendants, Dr. Jack E. Scariano, Jr., and his group, West Knoxville Neurological Associates. Except when the context requires otherwise, we will refer to the defendants collectively as "Dr. Scariano."
Davis sued Dr. Scariano alleging medical malpractice and fraud related to the doctor's treatment of her and to the billing of her account. Dr. Scariano moved for summary judgment. After granting Davis several continuances, the trial court heard the motion and granted it based on Dr. Scariano's filings and the plaintiff's failure to present evidence establishing a disputed issue of material fact. Davis appeals. We affirm.
Opinion available here:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/davisd_062811.pdf
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Supreme Court gives drug companies two thumbs up
Supreme Court Sides with Pharmaceutical Industry in Two Cases (L.A. Times)
The U.S. Supreme Court gave the pharmaceutical industry a pair of victories, shielding the makers of generic drugs from most lawsuits by injured patients and declaring that drug makers have a free-speech right to buy private prescription records to boost their sales pitches to doctors.
Read the full story at the Los Angeles Times' Website
The U.S. Supreme Court gave the pharmaceutical industry a pair of victories, shielding the makers of generic drugs from most lawsuits by injured patients and declaring that drug makers have a free-speech right to buy private prescription records to boost their sales pitches to doctors.
Read the full story at the Los Angeles Times' Website
Friday, June 24, 2011
TN Supreme Court Reviews Whether a Construction-Related Injury was Negligence Subject to the Governmental Tort Liability Act
DALTON REB HUGHES ET AL. v. THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE ET AL. (Tenn. May 24, 2011)
After being injured when he jumped out of the path of a front-end loader owned by a governmental entity and operated by its employee, the plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the employee either was negligent in his operation of the equipment or had acted intentionally and that the governmental entity was liable under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff against the governmental entity and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The governmental entity sought permission to appeal, arguing first that the employee had acted outside the scope of his employment and, secondly, that he had committed an assault against the plaintiff, either of which would preclude liability under the Act. Although we hold that the employee's conduct fell within the scope of his employment, his operation of the equipment constituted the intentional tort of assault rather than negligence. The governmental entity cannot, therefore, be held liable under the Act absent proof of its negligent supervision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to the governmental entity, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment against the employee.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/hughesd_052411.pdf
After being injured when he jumped out of the path of a front-end loader owned by a governmental entity and operated by its employee, the plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the employee either was negligent in his operation of the equipment or had acted intentionally and that the governmental entity was liable under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff against the governmental entity and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The governmental entity sought permission to appeal, arguing first that the employee had acted outside the scope of his employment and, secondly, that he had committed an assault against the plaintiff, either of which would preclude liability under the Act. Although we hold that the employee's conduct fell within the scope of his employment, his operation of the equipment constituted the intentional tort of assault rather than negligence. The governmental entity cannot, therefore, be held liable under the Act absent proof of its negligent supervision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to the governmental entity, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment against the employee.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/hughesd_052411.pdf
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Tennessee Civil Justice Act 2011 - A High Price for Hollow Promises
Last week Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam signed into law the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011. The Act limits jury awards for non-economic damages in cases of injury or death to no more than $750,000 and limits punitive damages, intended to punish intentional or reckless behavior, to a maximum of $500,000. According to Governor Haslam, the Act will bring predictability and certainty to businesses calculating potential litigation costs thereby attracting new businesses and creating jobs.
The governors of Texas , Mississippi , Alabama and other states passed similar legislation by promising the same new businesses and new jobs. They failed. Time and truthful statistics will also prove Governor Haslam’s promises hollow. In the interim, Tennessee citizens have paid a very high price to make businesses and insurers feel more comfortable in projecting income and profits. That price includes having legislators they will never meet put a dollar value on their lives; losing the ability to punish and deter companies who act recklessly; and surrendering part of their 7th Amendment right to a civil jury trial. A recent tragedy to our north helps put the high cost of this Act in perspective.
On the morning of August 27, 2006, Delta’s Comair flight 191 prepared to depart from Bluegrass Airport in Lexington , Kentucky . The air traffic controller on duty cleared the Comair captain for take off on Runway 22. Instead the flight’s first officer mistakenly taxied the plane onto Runway 26 and hit the throttle. Seconds later the plane plowed into an embankment, rifled through a perimeter fence, and exploded killing 49 of the 50 passengers onboard.
To get comfortably airborne, Comair 191 needed nearly all 7,000 feet of Runway 22. Runway 26 was only 3,500 feet long. The sole FAA air traffic controller in the tower did not see the Comair pilot’s error as he taxied onto the fatally short runway. A second controller might have warned the pilot in time to avoid disaster. But, in violation of FAA rules, no other controller was on duty.
An NTSB investigation concluded that Comair and the FAA were negligent in causing the crash. It primarily determined that the Comair pilots completely disregarded their training in identifying the approved runway as they taxied onto Runway 26. As a result, the families of the passengers filed civil suits against Comair and the FAA for the wrongful death of their loved ones. The suits asked for punitive damages against Comair for what the presiding judge called reprehensible behavior by its pilots.
Faced with a jury trial and punitive damages, Comair settled nearly every case. It preferred not to have a jury carefully learn of and value all the lives of the passengers including a newly wed couple who never arrived at their honeymoon destination. In order to avoid future crashes and punitive damages, Comair then made significant changes in pilot and controller training and operational policies. In short, the civil justice system, with only the prospect of a jury verdict, worked in compensating the survivors and better protecting future airline passengers.
Now consider the Comair case if the victims families were subject to the new Tennessee Civil Justice Act. The value of each passenger’s life, irrespective of age, would be his or her lost earnings plus up to $750,000. If Comair was punished by the Act’s maximum $500,000 in punitive damages for every life lost, it would pay less than $25 million dollars. That would likely be no deterrent at all for a company which reported pre-tax profits of $1.8 billion in 2007. Comair would have no real financial motivation to make operational changes aimed at avoiding a similar crash and loss of life. The survivors would not be made whole and future passengers would remain at risk of the same fate.
The difference between the proper outcome in the Comair case and the outcome under the new Act is quite simply the jury’s unfettered judgment. In his 1789 speech to the first U.S. Congress, James Madison, the architect of the U.S. Constitution and champion of civil suits, said “trial by jury . . . is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature.” Madison and the other Founders, wanted to protect their lives, livelihoods and property. They feared arbitrary and capricious judgment, like that once imposed by the English monarchy, with regard to their affairs. Madison firmly believed the only acceptable method of justice involved a jury of peers.
Based on these convictions and Madison ’s proposal, Congress adopted and the states ratified the 7th Amendment which guarantees that “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”
By limiting the value of human life and the deterrent value of punitive damages, Tennessee legislators substituted their uninformed, arbitrary judgment for that of a jury.
In doing so, they subjected Tennesseans to Madison ’s greatest fear – arbitrary judgments concerning life and property. It was a high price indeed for a hollow promise.
Consumer Protection Laws Help Tennesseans Recover
Americans pursuing dreams and goals through education, work, or the growth of small and large businesses want to compete on a level playing field. They want to be treated honestly and fairly by competitors, insurers, state and local governments, vendors, and customers. Of course history informs us that not all individuals or companies play by the rules. Eventually every business faces the breach of an important contract, a bad debt, a denied insurance claim or some other legal matter.
Due to challenging economic times, many individuals and businesses are facing a more insidious threat than broken contracts. They are increasingly being damaged by unfair, deceptive and outright fraudulent practices by those with whom they do business. Fortunately, Tennessee law provides the legal weapons needed to combat reprehensible behavior by those who knowingly take advantage of consumers in the marketplace.
These weapons include the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and bad faith insurance laws. The TCPA is often misunderstood because it is entitled a “consumer” act. It is important to understand that the TCPA considers both individuals and businesses to be consumers. In fact, a large portion of all TCPA claims involve businesses suing businesses for unfair or deceptive practices. The Act is important because when a consumer has been damaged by the unfair, deceptive or fraudulent actions of another, a court may invoke it to award actual damages, punitive damages and attorneys fees. In the hands of a skilled attorney, the TCPA can be used to fully compensate a consumer and deter a bad actor from engaging in further deceptive behavior.
A recent case handled by my firm is an excellent example of how the TCPA might apply to you or your business. Our client was a young, aspiring country music singer. She paid a Nashville record producer for song production and further promotion of her career. He represented himself as an accomplished producer with good connections at the major records labels. The producer breached the contract by failing to produce the promised songs and results. However, we argued that the producer’s repeated and threatening requests for funds and his early and utter refusal to perform the contract suggested an intention to defraud our client from the outset. The court agreed and rendered a six figure verdict including punitive damages and attorney fees under the TCPA. A simple claim for breach would not have made the young woman whole or deterred the producer from such future conduct.
While aspiring artists cannot buy insurance against unscrupulous producers, many consumers buy insurance to protect themselves from life-altering events such as natural disasters, theft and fraud. The premiums are expensive, but consumers are willing to pay them for the promise of being covered for unexpected and potentially catastrophic losses.
Unfortunately, insurers sometimes place their economic interests ahead of their policyholders’ interests and wrongfully refuse to pay valid claims. When an insurer unjustifiably refuses to pay a valid claim it may be found to have breached the insurance policy or to have acted in bad faith
Another recent case handled by my firm is a good example of how you or your company could be affected by an insurer’s breach or bad faith. Our clients, the Fagans, were wrongfully accused by Allstate of burning down their own home.
In July 2005, Peter and Tracy Fagan awoke to smoke and flames in their Sevierville, Tennessee home. They lost everything they owned including their children's pets; clothing and toys; family photos; personal and business records; and an uninsured Corvette Stingray which was parked in the basement. The Fagans always contended that the fire was caused when Mrs. Fagan fell asleep while smoking on the first floor of the home.
After the fire, Mrs. Fagan, who was not just a policyholder but an Allstate insurance agent, filed a claim under her Allstate homeowner's policy for the insured contents of the home. Instead of paying the claim, Allstate immediately hired a fire origin expert and a private investigator. Allstate denied the claim alleging that the Fagans intentionally set the fire for financial gain due alleged financial and marital problems.
In reality, at the time of the fire, the Fagans owned approximately $1 million worth of real property and had near perfect credit. All their mortgages were current and they had recently been approved for purchase of another rental property.
When the Fagans sued Allstate for payment of their claim, Allstate counter-sued them for bringing the claim and requested that the Fagans be ordered to reimburse Allstate for the company's $40,000 in expert and litigation costs plus its attorney's fees.
After a 3 day trial in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the Fagans. The jury found that the Fagans did not set fire to their home and awarded them the full amount due under their homeowner's policy. The jury denied Allstate's counter suit against the Fagans.
The facts of Fagan v. Allstate are informative as to just how far an insurer may go in trying to avoid a valid claim. Hopefully you will never fall victim to such unscrupulous behavior. But always remember that Tennessee ’s civil justice system exists to help you prosecute those who would harm you and your business. If the case is pursued competently and aggressively, you may be able to recover not only your actual losses, but you may recover your litigation costs and have penalties imposed which deter a defendant from harming others.
Tennesseans Allege Scam by Big World Vacations
The Tennessean reports that many consumers in Tennessee and other states believe they may have been misled or outright scammed by Nashville-based vacation company Big World Vacations. The Adams Law Firm is investigationg such claims for Tennessee consumers. If you purchased a vacation package from Big World Vacations, now doing business as Big World/BTM, and need legal advice, call a consumer protection attorney with The Adams Law Firm at 865-531-6440 or 615-585-5415. Our attorneys are experienced in consumer protection law and can answer any questions you might have with regard to your Big World Vacations contract or purchase.
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Court Reviews a Finding of No Fault in a Case Involving a Motor Vehicle Accident
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. d/b/a AT&T (TN) v. SHUNDRA Y. YOUNG and MAUREEN F. KINSELLA (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2011)
Plaintiff sued Defendants for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The trial court struck, from Defendants' answers, allegations regarding the comparative fault of an unidentified nonparty. However, the trial court allowed references to such nonparty at trial, and the jury assigned no fault to Defendants. Finding no error in the trial court's allowance, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available here:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/bellsouth_062111.pdf
Plaintiff sued Defendants for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The trial court struck, from Defendants' answers, allegations regarding the comparative fault of an unidentified nonparty. However, the trial court allowed references to such nonparty at trial, and the jury assigned no fault to Defendants. Finding no error in the trial court's allowance, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available here:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/bellsouth_062111.pdf
Monday, June 20, 2011
TWCA Reviews Whether a Hydrotherapy Tub Falls Within the "Future Medical Treatment" Provision of a Workers' Compensation Settlement
JERRY LINDSEY v. TIM REEVES D/B/A TIM'S TREE SERVICE (TWCA June 16, 2011)
The employee suffered a compensable spinal cord injury. He settled his workers' compensation claim with his employer in 2007. The settlement provided for future medical treatment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a) (2008). In 2009, the employee sought authorization and payment for a hydrotherapy tub. His employer declined to authorize installation of the tub. The employee filed a motion for authorization of medical care in February 2010 and supported the motion by attaching a note from his authorized treating physician that he would "benefit" from use of the tub. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal, we reverse.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/lindseyj_061611.pdf
The employee suffered a compensable spinal cord injury. He settled his workers' compensation claim with his employer in 2007. The settlement provided for future medical treatment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a) (2008). In 2009, the employee sought authorization and payment for a hydrotherapy tub. His employer declined to authorize installation of the tub. The employee filed a motion for authorization of medical care in February 2010 and supported the motion by attaching a note from his authorized treating physician that he would "benefit" from use of the tub. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal, we reverse.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/lindseyj_061611.pdf
Thursday, June 9, 2011
Court Reviews a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim in a Case Involving a Hospital
MCCALL BRISTER v. HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF TENNESSEE, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2011)
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of a hospital's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court determined that plaintiff's claim sounded in medical malpractice and dismissed plaintiff's claim for failure to comply with the written notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. Finding that Plaintiff's complaint states claim for ordinary negligence and premises liability, we reverse the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/bristerm_060911.pdf
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of a hospital's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court determined that plaintiff's claim sounded in medical malpractice and dismissed plaintiff's claim for failure to comply with the written notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. Finding that Plaintiff's complaint states claim for ordinary negligence and premises liability, we reverse the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/bristerm_060911.pdf
Wednesday, June 8, 2011
TWCA reviews the percentage of permanent partial disability allocated by the trial court
DANIEL CLAY LEWIS v. DANA HOLDING CORPORATION (TWCA June 8, 2011)
An employee sustained an injury to his shoulder at work. After a surgical repair, he briefly returned to work but was laid off prior to reaching maximum medical improvement. He filed a complaint in chancery court seeking workers' compensation benefits from his employer. His treating physician assigned no impairment rating and placed no restrictions on his activities. An evaluating physician assigned 6% impairment to the body as a whole and recommended that Mr. Lewis avoid certain activities.
The trial court awarded 36% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the award is excessive. We modify the judgment to award 24% permanent partial disability to the employee. We also conclude that local Rule 17A of the Chancery Court of the 28th Judicial District of Tennessee conflicts with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/lewisd_060811.pdf
An employee sustained an injury to his shoulder at work. After a surgical repair, he briefly returned to work but was laid off prior to reaching maximum medical improvement. He filed a complaint in chancery court seeking workers' compensation benefits from his employer. His treating physician assigned no impairment rating and placed no restrictions on his activities. An evaluating physician assigned 6% impairment to the body as a whole and recommended that Mr. Lewis avoid certain activities.
The trial court awarded 36% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the award is excessive. We modify the judgment to award 24% permanent partial disability to the employee. We also conclude that local Rule 17A of the Chancery Court of the 28th Judicial District of Tennessee conflicts with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/lewisd_060811.pdf
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
TWCA reviews whether an employee was injured during the usual course of his employment
VICTOR POWELL ET AL. v. BRETT MARTER, INDIVIDUALLY and D/B/A QUALITY FLOOR COVERING (TWCA June 7, 2011)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a workers' compensation action contending his injury while cutting trees at his employer's home was in the usual course of his employment at his employer's floor covering business. The trial court held that employee's work was casual employment not in the usual course of his employer's business as defined by TCA section 50-6-106(2) and not covered by the workers' compensation statute. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/powellv_060711.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a workers' compensation action contending his injury while cutting trees at his employer's home was in the usual course of his employment at his employer's floor covering business. The trial court held that employee's work was casual employment not in the usual course of his employer's business as defined by TCA section 50-6-106(2) and not covered by the workers' compensation statute. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/powellv_060711.pdf
TWCA reviews a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute in a workers' compensation case
MASON FISCHER v. SVERDRUP TECHNOLOGY, INC. (TWCA June 7, 2011)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The employee filed a Worker's Compensation action on August 22, 2003 alleging a compensable injury in the course of his employment with his employer in December 1998. The employer filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02.
The trial court entered an order in September 2008, stating that the employer was withdrawing the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute based upon the employee's commitment to take a medical deposition within sixty days. A second motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute was filed and heard on March 15, 2010 because the medical deposition had not been taken. The trial court granted the motion with prejudice. The employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/fischerm_060711.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The employee filed a Worker's Compensation action on August 22, 2003 alleging a compensable injury in the course of his employment with his employer in December 1998. The employer filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02.
The trial court entered an order in September 2008, stating that the employer was withdrawing the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute based upon the employee's commitment to take a medical deposition within sixty days. A second motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute was filed and heard on March 15, 2010 because the medical deposition had not been taken. The trial court granted the motion with prejudice. The employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/fischerm_060711.pdf
Friday, June 3, 2011
Court reviews whether Plainiff's expert was qualified to testify in a case involving medical malpractice
BRANDE KIRK, ET AL. v. MICHAEL A. CHAVIN, M.D. (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2011)
Brande Kirk and Amanda Jordan, as children of Barbara Jordan, ("Plaintiffs") sued Michael A. Chavin, M.D. alleging medical malpractice in his treatment of Barbara Jordan. Dr. Chavin filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order on August 30, 2010 finding and holding that Plaintiffs' expert was not qualified to testify in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115, and granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/kirkb_060311.pdf
Brande Kirk and Amanda Jordan, as children of Barbara Jordan, ("Plaintiffs") sued Michael A. Chavin, M.D. alleging medical malpractice in his treatment of Barbara Jordan. Dr. Chavin filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order on August 30, 2010 finding and holding that Plaintiffs' expert was not qualified to testify in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115, and granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/kirkb_060311.pdf
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
Court reviews whether defendant negated causation in his motion for summary judgment in a wrongful death medical malpractice case
JEFFEREY D. KEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF RANDALL EUGENE KEY ET AL.v. BLOUNT MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2011)
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the defendant hospital in a medical malpractice wrongful death case. The trial court struck as untimely the materials filed by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The responsive materials were filed less than five days before the date originally scheduled for a hearing on the defendant's motion; however the hearing was continued for several months. Having struck the plaintiff's filings, the court held that the motion negated violation of the standard of care and causation and granted the motion as unopposed.
The plaintiff contends on appeal that the defendant did not negate either violation of the standard of care or causation; that the materials responsive to the motion should not have been stricken; and that, if the materials filed in opposition to the motion are considered, the plaintiff presented issues of material fact for trial. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/keyj_053111.pdf
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the defendant hospital in a medical malpractice wrongful death case. The trial court struck as untimely the materials filed by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The responsive materials were filed less than five days before the date originally scheduled for a hearing on the defendant's motion; however the hearing was continued for several months. Having struck the plaintiff's filings, the court held that the motion negated violation of the standard of care and causation and granted the motion as unopposed.
The plaintiff contends on appeal that the defendant did not negate either violation of the standard of care or causation; that the materials responsive to the motion should not have been stricken; and that, if the materials filed in opposition to the motion are considered, the plaintiff presented issues of material fact for trial. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/keyj_053111.pdf
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
TWCA Reviews a Finding of an Employee's Meaningful Return to Work
JOHN ERNEST HAYES v. AMERICAN ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL. (TWCA May 25, 2011)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury. In addition, it found that the employee had a meaningful return to work, and his award of permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits was limited to one and one-half times his anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1).
On appeal, the employee contends the trial court erred by finding that he had a meaningful return to work. The employer contends the trial court erred by admitting a discovery deposition of an expert into evidence over its objection based upon Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 32.01(3), and finding that the injury at issue was not concurrent with injuries which were the subject of a separate lawsuit. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/hayesj_052511.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury. In addition, it found that the employee had a meaningful return to work, and his award of permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits was limited to one and one-half times his anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1).
On appeal, the employee contends the trial court erred by finding that he had a meaningful return to work. The employer contends the trial court erred by admitting a discovery deposition of an expert into evidence over its objection based upon Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 32.01(3), and finding that the injury at issue was not concurrent with injuries which were the subject of a separate lawsuit. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/hayesj_052511.pdf
Friday, May 20, 2011
General Assembly passes major legislation, including the Civil Justice Act, and looks toward adjournment
The Tennessee General Assembly worked in marathon floor and committee sessions this week towards the conclusion of the 2011 legislative session. Among major legislation approved by the State Senate is a civil justice law sponsors say will establish a climate to help create jobs in Tennessee, several measures cracking down on child sex offenders and those who engage in human trafficking, and state's rights legislation.
According to its sponsors, the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011 is designed to provide certainty and predictability for businesses, while ensuring that injured plaintiffs receive all of the economic, quantifiable damages they suffer. The bill's sponsors say the state's current civil justice system puts the state at a competitive disadvantage when it comes to attracting new businesses and jobs. Opponents of the bill say it is harmful to injured plaintiffs by limiting the amount they can recover and that Tennessee has not seen runaway jury verdicts as in other states.
Key provisions of Senate Bill 1522 include:
- The bill limits the maximum appeal bond amount from $75 million to $25 million or 125 percent of the judgment amount.
- It defines two components of compensatory damages: economic and non-economic damages.
- The measure places a cap on non-economic damages, which are subjective damages like pain and suffering, at $750,000 per injured plaintiff for both healthcare liability action and other personal injury actions. However, if the harm suffered is intentional, the caps would not apply.
- As amended, the bill raises the cap to $1.0 million if the plaintiff becomes a paraplegic or quadriplegic because of spinal cord injury, sustains third degree burns over 40 percent or more of his or her body or face, has an amputation of a hand or foot, or wrongfully dies leaving one or more minor children.
- There is no cap, under the measure, on economic damages and any damages that can be objectively quantified may be recovered.
- Caps punitive damages, which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, at two times compensatory damage or $500,000, whichever is greater, unless the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff, was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or intentionally falsified records to avoid liability.
- Prevents punitive damages in products liability actions, unless the seller had substantial control over the design or manufacturing of the product or had actual knowledge of the defect in the product at the time it was sold.
The bill now goes back to the House of Representatives for approval of an amendment before it is sent to the governor for his signature. It will take effect October 1, 2011, and apply to all liability actions for injuries accruing after that date.
According to its sponsors, the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011 is designed to provide certainty and predictability for businesses, while ensuring that injured plaintiffs receive all of the economic, quantifiable damages they suffer. The bill's sponsors say the state's current civil justice system puts the state at a competitive disadvantage when it comes to attracting new businesses and jobs. Opponents of the bill say it is harmful to injured plaintiffs by limiting the amount they can recover and that Tennessee has not seen runaway jury verdicts as in other states.
Key provisions of Senate Bill 1522 include:
- The bill limits the maximum appeal bond amount from $75 million to $25 million or 125 percent of the judgment amount.
- It defines two components of compensatory damages: economic and non-economic damages.
- The measure places a cap on non-economic damages, which are subjective damages like pain and suffering, at $750,000 per injured plaintiff for both healthcare liability action and other personal injury actions. However, if the harm suffered is intentional, the caps would not apply.
- As amended, the bill raises the cap to $1.0 million if the plaintiff becomes a paraplegic or quadriplegic because of spinal cord injury, sustains third degree burns over 40 percent or more of his or her body or face, has an amputation of a hand or foot, or wrongfully dies leaving one or more minor children.
- There is no cap, under the measure, on economic damages and any damages that can be objectively quantified may be recovered.
- Caps punitive damages, which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, at two times compensatory damage or $500,000, whichever is greater, unless the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff, was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or intentionally falsified records to avoid liability.
- Prevents punitive damages in products liability actions, unless the seller had substantial control over the design or manufacturing of the product or had actual knowledge of the defect in the product at the time it was sold.
The bill now goes back to the House of Representatives for approval of an amendment before it is sent to the governor for his signature. It will take effect October 1, 2011, and apply to all liability actions for injuries accruing after that date.
Thursday, May 19, 2011
Court Reviews A Jury Verdict in a Medical Malpractice and Wrongful Death Action
PATTI ZAKOUR, DECEASED, BY NEXT OF KIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NATURAL CHILDREN, NEXT FRIEND AND ON BEHALF OF ANY AND ALL WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF PATTI ZAKOUR, DECEASED v. UT MEDICAL GROUP, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2011)
The trial court granted Defendant's motion to set aside the judgment arising from a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs in this medical malpractice/wrongful death action. It also conditionally granted Defendant's alternative motion for a new trial. In light of Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/zakourp_051911.pdf
The trial court granted Defendant's motion to set aside the judgment arising from a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs in this medical malpractice/wrongful death action. It also conditionally granted Defendant's alternative motion for a new trial. In light of Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/zakourp_051911.pdf
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
TWCA Reviews Whether Employee's Injury was Compensable
STEVE MCBROOM v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. ET AL. (TWCA May 10, 2011)
The employee alleged that he sustained a lower back injury as a result of his job. His employer denied the claim based upon findings by its work site medical staff. An evaluating physician opined that the employee's job had caused an aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative disc disease.
The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding. We affirm the judgment, but we decline the employee's request to find the appeal to be frivolous.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/mcbrooms_051011.pdf
The employee alleged that he sustained a lower back injury as a result of his job. His employer denied the claim based upon findings by its work site medical staff. An evaluating physician opined that the employee's job had caused an aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative disc disease.
The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding. We affirm the judgment, but we decline the employee's request to find the appeal to be frivolous.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/mcbrooms_051011.pdf
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Court Reviews a Summary Judgment Ruling in a Slip and Fall Case
DAVID MACKLIN v. DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION, d/b/a DOLLAR GENERAL STORE #2311 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2011)
This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff slipped and fell on a clear liquid at the defendant's store. The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing it did not have a reasonable opportunity to clean the floor, warn the customer of the clear liquid, or take adequate precautionary measures upon receiving notice of the dangerous condition.
The trial court granted the motion and the plaintiff appealed. Having determined the defendant effectively moved for and received only partial summary judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/macklind_050411.pdf
This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff slipped and fell on a clear liquid at the defendant's store. The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing it did not have a reasonable opportunity to clean the floor, warn the customer of the clear liquid, or take adequate precautionary measures upon receiving notice of the dangerous condition.
The trial court granted the motion and the plaintiff appealed. Having determined the defendant effectively moved for and received only partial summary judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/macklind_050411.pdf
Monday, May 2, 2011
TWCA Reviews Whether Employee Sustained any Permanent Impairment or Disability
BRENDA COLE v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY ET AL. (TWCA May 2, 2011)
An employee was struck in the back of the leg by a wooden pallet while at work. She alleged that she sustained permanent injuries to her neck, back, and foot as a result of that incident and filed a complaint against her employer in chancery court for workers' compensation benefits. Her employer denied that she had sustained any permanent impairment or disability. The chancery court held that the employee sustained a compensable injury and awarded 20% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/coleb_050211.pdf
An employee was struck in the back of the leg by a wooden pallet while at work. She alleged that she sustained permanent injuries to her neck, back, and foot as a result of that incident and filed a complaint against her employer in chancery court for workers' compensation benefits. Her employer denied that she had sustained any permanent impairment or disability. The chancery court held that the employee sustained a compensable injury and awarded 20% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/coleb_050211.pdf
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