ELISHEA D. FISHER v. CHRISTINA M. JOHNSON (Tenn. Ct. App. August 18, 2009)
This is a personal injury suit arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal of her punitive damages claim, as well as its exclusion of evidence regarding Defendant's underage consumption of alcohol prior to the accident and leaving the scene of the accident. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Defendant's intoxication, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's punitive damages claim. Because liability has been stipulated in this matter, and the punitive damages claim properly dismissed, we find Defendant's underage consumption of alcohol and leaving the scene of the accident irrelevant. Thus, we affirm the exclusion of such evidence.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/fishere_082409.pdf
Showing posts with label Accident. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Accident. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
TCA examines insurer liability for uninsured motorist after automobile crash.
ANDREA S. MARTIN v. PATRICIA L. WILLIAMS, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2009)
The central issue in this case is which of two insurance companies is required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the Plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the company through which Plaintiff had automobile insurance, finding that the company insuring the automobile in which Plaintiff was a passenger held the primary policy. We reverse and remand.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/martina_073009.pdf
The central issue in this case is which of two insurance companies is required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the Plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the company through which Plaintiff had automobile insurance, finding that the company insuring the automobile in which Plaintiff was a passenger held the primary policy. We reverse and remand.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/martina_073009.pdf
Labels:
Accident,
Insurance Coverage,
Insurer Liability,
Negligence
Court looks at insurance policy exclusions for liability
TENNESSEE FARMERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MICHAEL NEILL (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2009)
Insurance company filed suit for a declaration that the policy exclusion for intentional acts applied to an injury arising from a paintball game. The trial court ruled for the insured. We affirm.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/neillm_060309.pdf
Insurance company filed suit for a declaration that the policy exclusion for intentional acts applied to an injury arising from a paintball game. The trial court ruled for the insured. We affirm.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/neillm_060309.pdf
Labels:
Accident,
Insurer Liability,
TN Court of Appeals
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Court reviews the standards for allowing a party to amend a claim or answer
ROBERT DANIELS and PEGGY DANIELS, v. MICHAEL D. WRAY (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2009)
Plaintiff filed this action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant answered, denying liability, and subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend and make claim for personal injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Trial Court allowed the amendment as to property damages, but refused to allow defendant to assert the claim for personal injuries on the grounds inter alia that the statute of limitations had run on the personal injury claim prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The property damage claim was settled, but the refusal to allow the amendment has been appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment.
The Full text of this appeal may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/danielsr_05209.pdf
The court here reviewed the standards for reversing a trial court for abuse of discretion for disallowing a party to amend its answer and make a counterclaim. the factors to be considered when deciding whether to allow a party to amend its claim include, "undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith of the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment." Id. (citations omitted). The court here found that the factors the trial court relied on--undue delay and prejudice to the opposing parties--were not supported by the record. Therefore the trial court had abused its discretion and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Plaintiff filed this action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant answered, denying liability, and subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend and make claim for personal injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Trial Court allowed the amendment as to property damages, but refused to allow defendant to assert the claim for personal injuries on the grounds inter alia that the statute of limitations had run on the personal injury claim prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The property damage claim was settled, but the refusal to allow the amendment has been appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment.
The Full text of this appeal may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/danielsr_05209.pdf
The court here reviewed the standards for reversing a trial court for abuse of discretion for disallowing a party to amend its answer and make a counterclaim. the factors to be considered when deciding whether to allow a party to amend its claim include, "undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith of the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment." Id. (citations omitted). The court here found that the factors the trial court relied on--undue delay and prejudice to the opposing parties--were not supported by the record. Therefore the trial court had abused its discretion and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Labels:
Abuse of Discretion,
Accident,
Automobile,
Comparative Fault
TCA affirms dismissal because there was no offer of proof
HOPE DENTON v. JAMES G. HAGGARD (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2009)
Evidence of defendant's prior traffic violations was excluded by the trial court in an automobile accident case. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm due to plaintiff's failure to make an offer of proof.
At trial the jury found both parties equally at fault and the case was dismissed. The Plaintiff moved for a new trial which was denied. Plaintiff appealed based on disallowed evidence of defendant's driving record. TCA finds that no offer of proof was made, thus the issue of excluded evidence is waived.
The full text of this appeal may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/dentonh_052109.pdf
Evidence of defendant's prior traffic violations was excluded by the trial court in an automobile accident case. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm due to plaintiff's failure to make an offer of proof.
At trial the jury found both parties equally at fault and the case was dismissed. The Plaintiff moved for a new trial which was denied. Plaintiff appealed based on disallowed evidence of defendant's driving record. TCA finds that no offer of proof was made, thus the issue of excluded evidence is waived.
The full text of this appeal may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/dentonh_052109.pdf
Labels:
Accident,
Automobile,
Comparative Fault,
Offer of proof
Friday, February 26, 2010
Court holds Defendant had no duty of care in wrongful death action
JOHNNY R. OWNBY ET AL. v. TENNESSEE FARMERS COOPERATIVE CORPORATION, U.S.A. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2009)
This wrongful death action arises out of an accident at an agricultural facility: a worker fell through a skylight on the roof while employed by a company hired by the agricultural facility owner to do work on the roof. The trial court denied the owner's motion for a directed verdict on the question of whether the owner owed a duty of care to the injured worker. We reverse the decision of the trial court because we have concluded that this case falls within an exception to the general duty of a landowner to provide a reasonably safe workplace.
The full text of this opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/ownbyj_051909.pdf
This wrongful death action arises out of an accident at an agricultural facility: a worker fell through a skylight on the roof while employed by a company hired by the agricultural facility owner to do work on the roof. The trial court denied the owner's motion for a directed verdict on the question of whether the owner owed a duty of care to the injured worker. We reverse the decision of the trial court because we have concluded that this case falls within an exception to the general duty of a landowner to provide a reasonably safe workplace.
The full text of this opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/ownbyj_051909.pdf
Labels:
Accident,
Construction,
Contractor,
Negligence,
OSHA,
Slip and Fall,
TN Court of Appeals,
Wrongful Death
Court affirms city's immunity was not waived under Governmental Tort Liability Act
GARY L. WATTS AND JANET WATTS, Parents And Next Friends of CLINTON D. WATTS, Deceased v. EARNESTINE J. MORRIS, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2009)
This case arises from the death of a graduate student near the University of Memphis. while crossing the street, decedent was struck by a vehicle. Decedent's parents, on his behalf, have sued the City of Memphis, pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging that the City negligently maintained the defective, unsafe, or dangerous street that decedent was crossing. The trial court held that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Governmental Tort Liability Act waived the City of Memphis' immunity from suit or that the City of Memphis was negligent. In addition, the court found that both the decedent and the driver of the automobile that struck decedent were negligent and were each 50% at fault for the accident. We affirm on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the street was a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition for which the City's immunity was waived.
"In its answer to the suit filed by Plaintiffs, the City asserted several affirmative defenses, including that it was immune from suit pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) and the comparative fault of the driver. City failed to assert that the decedent or the University of Memphis were comparatively negligent. The parties stipulated that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-37 the City of Memphis is not subject to trial by jury for actions brought under the GTLA. The City moved to amend its original answer to plead the comparative fault of the University of Memphis which the trial court denied. the City also filed a post-trial motion to amend its original answer seeking to include the comparative fault of the decedent. Because it was found that the fault of the decedent was at issue during pre-trial discovery and was tried by the parties without objection, the trial court granted this motion to amend pusuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.02" Id.
"Subsequently the trial court entered its findings of facts and conclusions of law. First, it held that the GTLA did not waive the City's governmental immunity. In addition, the trial court determined that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that the City was negligent because there was insufficient evidence 1) that the City breached it's duty of care, 2) that "but for" the City's action or inaction the decedent's injuries would not have occurred, and 3) that the City's action or inaction was the legal cause of the decedent's injuries. The trial court also opined that the City had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that both the driver of the vehicle and the decedent were negligent and found that each were 50% at fault for the accident." Id.
"Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-201, government entities are immune from liability unless a plaintiff demonstrates that his claim is one of the specific causes of action for which the legislature removes immunity. Here Plaintiffs specifically allege that the City is liable pursuant to GTLA Section 203, which removes governmental immunity for "any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any sgtreet, alley, sidewalk, of highway." TCA section 29-20-203(a) (2000). The trial court held and the Court of Appeals affirmed that the section of roadway at issue was not in a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition on the date of the accident, therefore the City had not breached it's duty of care." Id.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/wattsg_050609.pdf
A concurring opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/wattsg_con_050609.pdf
This case arises from the death of a graduate student near the University of Memphis. while crossing the street, decedent was struck by a vehicle. Decedent's parents, on his behalf, have sued the City of Memphis, pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging that the City negligently maintained the defective, unsafe, or dangerous street that decedent was crossing. The trial court held that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Governmental Tort Liability Act waived the City of Memphis' immunity from suit or that the City of Memphis was negligent. In addition, the court found that both the decedent and the driver of the automobile that struck decedent were negligent and were each 50% at fault for the accident. We affirm on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the street was a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition for which the City's immunity was waived.
"In its answer to the suit filed by Plaintiffs, the City asserted several affirmative defenses, including that it was immune from suit pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) and the comparative fault of the driver. City failed to assert that the decedent or the University of Memphis were comparatively negligent. The parties stipulated that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-37 the City of Memphis is not subject to trial by jury for actions brought under the GTLA. The City moved to amend its original answer to plead the comparative fault of the University of Memphis which the trial court denied. the City also filed a post-trial motion to amend its original answer seeking to include the comparative fault of the decedent. Because it was found that the fault of the decedent was at issue during pre-trial discovery and was tried by the parties without objection, the trial court granted this motion to amend pusuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.02" Id.
"Subsequently the trial court entered its findings of facts and conclusions of law. First, it held that the GTLA did not waive the City's governmental immunity. In addition, the trial court determined that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that the City was negligent because there was insufficient evidence 1) that the City breached it's duty of care, 2) that "but for" the City's action or inaction the decedent's injuries would not have occurred, and 3) that the City's action or inaction was the legal cause of the decedent's injuries. The trial court also opined that the City had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that both the driver of the vehicle and the decedent were negligent and found that each were 50% at fault for the accident." Id.
"Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-201, government entities are immune from liability unless a plaintiff demonstrates that his claim is one of the specific causes of action for which the legislature removes immunity. Here Plaintiffs specifically allege that the City is liable pursuant to GTLA Section 203, which removes governmental immunity for "any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any sgtreet, alley, sidewalk, of highway." TCA section 29-20-203(a) (2000). The trial court held and the Court of Appeals affirmed that the section of roadway at issue was not in a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition on the date of the accident, therefore the City had not breached it's duty of care." Id.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/wattsg_050609.pdf
A concurring opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/wattsg_con_050609.pdf
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
Court reverses lower court refusal to allow defendant’s amendment after statute of limitations had run
ROBERT DANIELS and PEGGY DANIELS, v. MICHAEL D. WRAY (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2009)
Plaintiff filed this action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant answered, denying liability, and subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend and make claim for personal injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Trial Court allowed theamendment as to property damages, but refused to allow defendant to assert the claim for personal injuries on the grounds inter alia that the statute of limitations had run on the personal injury claim prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The property damage claim was settled, but the refusal to allow the amendment has been appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment.
"Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's ruling “will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to propriety of the decision made.” A trial court abuses its discretion only when it “applie[s] an incorrect legal standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining.” The abuse of discretion standard does not permit the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court." Id.
"Although permission to amend should be liberally granted, the decision 'will not be reversed unless abuse of discretion has been shown.' Factors the Trial Court should consider when deciding whether to allow amendments include '[u]ndue delay in filing; lack of notice to the opposing party; bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.'” Id.
"The record does not demonstrate that plaintiffs were prejudiced in a “wasted” discovery or preparations for depositions, or that they would have prepared differently if the counterclaim had been filed." Id.
"There was also no showing that plaintiffs were prejudiced by the delay of defendant’s sought amendment, as discovery was still going on, and the case had not yet been set for trial." Id. (Case citations omitted)
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/danielsr_05209.pdf
Plaintiff filed this action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant answered, denying liability, and subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend and make claim for personal injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Trial Court allowed theamendment as to property damages, but refused to allow defendant to assert the claim for personal injuries on the grounds inter alia that the statute of limitations had run on the personal injury claim prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The property damage claim was settled, but the refusal to allow the amendment has been appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment.
"Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's ruling “will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to propriety of the decision made.” A trial court abuses its discretion only when it “applie[s] an incorrect legal standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining.” The abuse of discretion standard does not permit the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court." Id.
"Although permission to amend should be liberally granted, the decision 'will not be reversed unless abuse of discretion has been shown.' Factors the Trial Court should consider when deciding whether to allow amendments include '[u]ndue delay in filing; lack of notice to the opposing party; bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.'” Id.
"The record does not demonstrate that plaintiffs were prejudiced in a “wasted” discovery or preparations for depositions, or that they would have prepared differently if the counterclaim had been filed." Id.
"There was also no showing that plaintiffs were prejudiced by the delay of defendant’s sought amendment, as discovery was still going on, and the case had not yet been set for trial." Id. (Case citations omitted)
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/danielsr_05209.pdf
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