Court reviews a case involving an automobile accident

EDNA H. IRWIN, v. CHRISTOPHER MARTIN ANDERSON (Tenn. Ct. App. December 18, 2012)

Plaintiff received serious injuries in an automobile accident, when she turned left in front of the oncoming vehicle operated by defendant. The suit resulted in a jury trial wherein the jury returned a verdict for defendant, which was approved by the Trial Judge. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Judge's Judgment.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/irwine_121812.pdf

Court reviews whether a collision occurred between the Plaintiff and a tractor-trailer

SHERRY HUTSON v. SAFE STAR TRUCKING ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 31, 2012)

In this case, Sherry Hutson filed a complaint in which she alleged her vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer (“the tractor”) that left the scene of the accident. She seeks to recover under the uninsured motorist (“UM”) provisions of a policy providing coverage to the vehicle she was driving. The jury found that no “actual physical contact ha[d] occurred between” the plaintiff’s vehicle and the vehicle that left the scene. She appeals. We affirm.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/hutsons_103112.pdf

Court reviews whether a municipality's 911 operator negligently failed to summon emergency personnel from a neighboring county

LORI GREGORY, IN HER CAPACITY AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES BALLENTINE v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY (Tenn. Ct. App. October 29, 2012)

This is a negligence claim under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. The decedent was involved in a serious vehicular accident. A witness called the defendant municipality’s 911 emergency communications center for help. The 911 responders went to the accident scene and transported the decedent to a local hospital, where he died.

The decedent’s mother filed this lawsuit against the municipality, alleging that the 911 operator was negligent in failing to summon emergency personnel from a neighboring county, because those responders were closer to the scene of the accident and could have provided aid to the decedent sooner. The municipality filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing inter alia that it owed no duty to summon aid outside of its jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/gregoryl_102912.pdf

Court reviews whether an auto insurance policy covers damages resulting from a car owner's independent acts of negligence in a case involving a car accident

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL. v. SOUTHERN TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY (Tenn. Ct. App. October 24, 2012)

This is a dispute between insurance companies over coverage related to a car accident. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the driver’s auto policy covered damages resulting from the independent acts of negligence of the car owner.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/statefarm_102412.pdf

Court reviews an allocation of fault in a case involving a motor vehicle accident

REBECCA W. FORD v. STATE OF TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2012)

Rebecca W. Ford (“Plaintiff”) sued the State of Tennessee (“State”) regarding a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Plaintiff’s daughter, Lynsey M. Ford.

After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that the State had not violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) or § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that the actions of Zachary L. Robinson were the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reversed the Trial Court’s judgment as to Zachary L. Robinson being solely at fault, and held that the State was 50% at fault for the Accident in our Opinion in Robinson v. State, docket No. E2011-01540-COA-R3-CV (“Robinson v. State”), released contemporaneously with this Opinion. We, therefore, remand this case to the Trial Court for the calculation of damages awarded to Plaintiff from the State for the death of Lynsey M. Ford.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/fordr_073112.pdf

Court allocates the fault in a case involving a motor vehicle accident

WADE ROBINSON, ET AL. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2012)

Wade Robinson and Melanie Robinson (“Plaintiffs”) sued the State of Tennessee (“State”) regarding a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Plaintiffs’ son, Zachary L. Robinson. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that the State had not violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) or § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that the actions of Zachary L. Robinson were the sole proximate cause of the accident.

We find and hold that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s findings that the State did not violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I), that the State did not violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that Zachary L. Robinson was the sole proximate cause of the accident. We find and hold that Zachary L. Robinson was 50% at fault for the accident and that the State was 50% at fault for the accident.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/robinsonw_073112.pdf

Court reviews a remittitur in a case involving an automobile accident

KAREN JOHNSON v. BEVERLY NUNIS AND FARMER’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE (Tenn. Ct. App. April 27, 2012)

This appeal involves remittitur of a jury verdict. The defendant driver caused a vehicular accident that resulted in substantial personal injuries to the plaintiff. At trial, several witnesses testified to the amount of the plaintiff’s economic damages as well as the noneconomic impact of her injuries. After a trial, the jury returned a special verdict with awards for various categories of economic and non-economic damages.

The trial court denied the defendant insurance company’s motion for a new trial but suggested an overall remittitur as to the total verdict. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest and filed this appeal. We affirm the denial of a new trial, reverse the suggestion of remittitur, and reinstate the original jury verdict.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/johnsonk_042712.pdf

TN Supreme Court reviews whether an insurer properly changed a policy from a commercial policy to a personal policy

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY v. DIANA LYNN TARRANT ET AL. (Tenn. March 26, 2012)

After an automobile accident between the insured’s van and a motorcycle, the insurer filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the van was covered under a commercial policy with a liability limit of $500,000 or a personal policy with liability limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. The insurer alleged that before the accident the insured had instructed his insurance agent to transfer the van from the commercial policy to the personal policy. The insured denied this and alleged that he had instructed the agent to retain the van on the commercial policy.

The trial court ruled that because the insurer had sent the insured a letter and premium bills showing the change in coverage and the insured had paid the bills without objection, he had ratified the transfer and the van was covered under the personal policy. The Court of Appeals reversed.

We hold that the action of the insurance agent in transferring the van to the personal policy was not subject to ratification by the insured because the insurance agent was not acting in the insured’s stead or for his benefit when it made the transfer. We further hold that the insurer is estopped from denying coverage under the commercial policy. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, although on different grounds.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/allstate_032612.pdf

Koch, dissenting opinion:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/allstate_DIS_032612.pdf

Court reviews whether a decedent's insurer could be sued in a case involving an automobile accident

OSCAR H. VAUGHN v. JAMES D. MORTON (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 2012)

This is a personal injury action filed by Oscar H. Vaughn (“the Plaintiff”) against James D. Morton (“the Deceased”) that arose out of an automobile accident. The Deceased died within a year of the accident. The Deceased’s insurer, acting pursuant to its rights under the policy to “defend” an action against its insured, filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the only proper defendant was the personal representative of the Deceased and that the statute of limitations had expired prior to any attempt to make the representative a party to this litigation.

The trial court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to amend to add the personal representative as a defendant, which motion was filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion to dismiss. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/vaughno_032812.pdf

TWCA reviews whether a taxi driver was an employee or an independent contractor

MOHAMUD HIRSI MOHAMED v. TAXI USA OF TENNESSEE, LLC d/b/a ALLIED CAR COMPANY ET AL. (TWCA February 10, 2012)



In this case, the plaintiff, a taxi driver injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought workers' compensation benefits from the taxi company that he alleged employed him. The trial court held that he was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the judgment.

Opinion available at:

http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/mohamedm_021012.pdf

Court reviews whether the trial court properly dismissed an uninsured motorist claim

SHAVON HURT v. JOHN DOE, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. January 17, 2012)

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action arising out of a pedestrian-vehicle collision, naming as defendant the owner of the car that allegedly struck the plaintiff. After discovery, plaintiff amended the complaint to add "John Doe/Jane Doe" as a defendant and served process on her uninsured motorist carrier. Plaintiff subsequently settled with the named defendant and dismissed the action against that defendant; the uninsured motorist insurance carrier then filed a motion to dismiss the uninsured motorist claim. The trial court granted the motion, holding that, in light of the settlement, the uninsured motorist claim no longer existed and dismissed the case. We find that the court erred in dismissing the case.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/hurts_011712.pdf

Court reviews whether plaintiff properly alleged his breach of contract, misrepresentation, and TN Consumer Act violation claims

JAMES WATRY v. ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CAUSALITY INSURANCE COMPANY, AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION (Tenn. Ct. App. December 29, 2011)

Insured was injured by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. Insured filed a claim with Insurer seeking uninsured motorist coverage benefits and settled for an amount that was less than his actual damages. Insured then sued Insurer seeking damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Act. Insurer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court's judgment because Insured failed to allege sufficient facts to support any of his causes of action.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/watry_122911.pdf

Court reviews whether the city of Murfreesboro had notice of unsafe road conditions based on records of previous accidents

JENNIFER BIVINS, as next of kin and natural parent of BRANDON BIVINS, deceased v. CITY OF MURFREESBORO (Tenn. Ct. App. December 29, 2011)

Plaintiff filed an action against the City of Murfreesboro pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, claiming a dangerous and unsafe roadway caused an automobile accident in which her son was killed. The trial court determined the City had no notice of an unsafe or dangerous condition, and entered judgment in favor of the City.

Upon appeal, we reversed on the issue of notice, holding that previous accidents on adjacent areas of the roadway provided sufficient notice to the City of a potentially dangerous condition. Upon remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and assessed 60% fault to the City. We vacate and remand for further findings consistent with Rule 52 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/bivinsj_122911.pdf

Court reviews whether a construction company can be held liable to a driver who had an accident on a road on which the company performed work

JOSHUA N. LEE, v. LYONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. December 20, 2011)

Plaintiff and others sustained injuries in a single car accident and sued defendant construction company and the Tennessee Department of Transportation, alleging that defendant construction company had recently completed work on that section of the highway where the accident occurred, and that a low point in the pavement caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and wreck.

Defendant answered, stating that they had completed the required construction on that section of the highway, and the State had accepted its work pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 12-4-501 et seq. which provides upon proper completion of the work the contractor "is discharged from all liability to any party". Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court granted and plaintiff appealed. We hold that summary judgment for the defendant in this case was proper, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/leej_122011.pdf

Court reviews a claim for uninsured motorist benefits

REYNALDO COLLAZO ET AL. v. JOE HAAS D/B/A HAAS CONSTRUCTION ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. December 16, 2011)

This is an action to recover uninsured motorist benefits following a motor vehicle collision involving the plaintiff and another vehicle. The driver of the defendant vehicle left the scene and has not been identified. The owner of the vehicle was subsequently identified, but denied knowing the identity of the driver and claimed no one had permission to operate the vehicle at the time of the accident.

The named defendants in this action are the owner of the vehicle and John Doe, the unknown driver. Plaintiffs' uninsured motorist insurance carrier, Nationwide Insurance Co., is an unnamed defendant. The defendant owner has liability insurance coverage through State Farm Insurance Co.

The plaintiffs settled all claims against the defendant-owner and State Farm for $90,000, $10,000 less than the uninsured motorist limits with Nationwide. Thereafter, the plaintiffs continued to pursue their claims against Nationwide for uninsured motorist benefits, insisting the settlement with the owner of the vehicle did not bar their claims against the uninsured John Doe driver. Upon motion for summary judgment by Nationwide, the trial court found that because the owner of the vehicle had $100,000 of liability insurance, there was not an "uninsured motor vehicle." Based on this finding, the trial court summarily dismissed the plaintiffs' uninsured motorist claim against Nationwide. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/collazor_121611.pdf

Court reviews whether the trial court properly ruled that defendant negated the element of proximate cause in an automobile accident case

TIMOTHY A. MOORE v. HUGH A. BUTLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AGENT AND SERVANT OF ANTHONY WOMMACK d/b/a WOMMACK TRUCKING, AND ANTHONY WOMMACK d/b/a WOMMACK TRUCKING, AND McCOY'S HEATING & AIR, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. December 1, 2011)

This appeal involves summary judgment in a vehicular accident case. In a line of vehicles, the defendant service vehicle was first, followed by the plaintiff's tractor-trailer, and then by the co-defendant's tractor-trailer. The defendant's service vehicle allegedly made a left turn without braking or using a turn signal, forcing the plaintiff's tractor-trailer to brake quickly. This resulted in the co-defendant's tractor-trailer rear-ending the plaintiff's tractor-trailer.

The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant tractor-trailer for rear-ending him, and against the defendant service vehicle that turned in front of him. The defendant service vehicle owner filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the defendant service vehicle owner had negated the element of proximate cause. The defendant tractor-trailer owner appeals. We reverse under the summary judgment standard in Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008).

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/mooret_.pdf

TWCA reviews whether an accidental overdose can be compensable in a workers' compensation case.

JUDY KILBURN EX REL ESTATE OF CHARLES KILBURN v. GRANITE STATE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL. (TWCA November 30, 2011)

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was seriously injured in the course of his employment in an automobile accident in November 2008. He suffered fractures of his neck and back and underwent a surgical fusion of his neck.

Over the course of the next year, he suffered severe pain and was eventually referred to a pain management physician, who prescribed oxycodone. He filed suit against his employer for workers' compensation benefits. He died in January of 2010 of an accidental overdose of oxycodone over 14 months after his injuries. His widow was substituted as plaintiff in his workers' compensation suit and filed a motion to amend the complaint to allege that his death was related to his work injury and that she was entitled to death benefits.

The employer opposed the motion to amend, contending the death was not compensable because it was not the "direct and natural result of a compensable injury" but rather, the result of an intervening cause, i.e., the employee's negligence in consuming an overdose of medicine. The trial court denied the motion to amend. The parties entered into a series of stipulations concerning the remaining issues in the case, and judgment was entered. The widow has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint. We agree, reverse the judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/kilburnj_113011.pdf

Court reviews the application of an offset provision in an uninsured motorist policy

BECKY COOPER v. JASON POWERS ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. November 29, 2011)

At its core, this case is about the application of an offset provision in an uninsured motorist ("UM") policy to an individual's claim for damages arising out of an automobile accident in the course and scope of her employment.

The plaintiff Becky Cooper's workers' compensation claim arising out of the accident, along with another workers' compensation claim, this one for injuries sustained by the plaintiff "while getting a briefcase from her car," were settled and approved by the Chancery Court for Hamilton County. The "final order" of that court recites that the court acted upon the "joint petition of the employer, ... the insurer, ... and the employee, ...for the approval of a proposed settlement under the ...Workers' Compensation [Law]." The order does not expressly state that the plaintiff was paid any benefits for the injuries sustained in the automobile accident; but it does recite that she received all of the benefits to which she was due with respect to the two claims.

The plaintiff filed the present action against the driver and owner of the other vehicle involved in the accident and served a copy of the complaint on Pacific Employers Insurance Company, the UM carrier of the company whose automobile the plaintiff was driving at the time of the accident. The UM carrier filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting that it is entitled to an offset corresponding to the workers' compensation benefits to which the plaintiff was entitled under the Workers' Compensation Law with respect to the automobile accident.

The trial court granted the UM carrier partial summary judgment in an order that states simply, without further elaboration, "[t]his is a final order." For several reasons, we hold that the court's order is not a final order under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. However, in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, see Tenn. R. App. P. 1, we exercise our discretion to treat this appeal as if it were before us pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. With respect to the merits of this case, we affirm the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Full opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/cooperb_112911.pdf

FRANKS dissenting:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/cooper_DIS_112911.pdf

Court reviews a claim against an uninsured motorist carrier.

ALAN HOWARD PETERS ET AL. v. CASEY BURGESS ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 24, 2011)

Alan Howard Peters was seriously injured when his vehicle collided with logs that had rolled off a truck. He and his wife filed this personal injury action and thereafter settled their claims against the defendant tortfeasors for policy limits of $1 million. In doing so, they reserved their claim against the uninsured motorist ("UM") carrier, Cincinnati Insurance Company ("CIC").

The UM provisions in effect with CIC were set forth in an endorsement to a 2005 renewal of an umbrella policy. The UM endorsement to the original policy issued in 1999 and to the first renewal issued in 2002 expressly limited UM coverage to $1 million. A space in the 2005 renewal endorsement form that was intended for insertion of the UM policy limits was left blank, which, by default, rendered the limits of the UM endorsement equal to the $2 million liability limits of the umbrella policy. After the dismissal of the claims against the tortfeasors, CIC amended its answer to include a counterclaim asking the court to reform the policy to make the UM limits equal to the $1 million limits of the previous policies. The trial court entered an order reforming the policy. Subsequently the court entered an order dismissing the remaining claim against CIC. Mr. and Mrs. Peters appeal. We affirm.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/petersa_102411.pdf

Court reviews whether the public duty doctrine applied in a wrongful death case

BARBARA A. LYNCH, deceased, by her sister and next of kin, CELINE HAYES, and CELINE HAYES as an individual, v. LOUDON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 14, 2011)

Joseph R. Ford and Ashley Harrison Shudan, Loudon, Tennessee, for the appellants, Barbara A. Lynch, deceased, by her sister and next of kin, Celine Hayes.

Arthur F. Knight, III., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Loudon County, Tennessee and Bryan Blakney.

In this wrongful death action, plaintiff alleged that deceased was involved in a one car accident and the investigating officer, after her car was removed from the guardrail by the wrecker, allowed her to continue driving when he knew or should have known that she was impaired and was a danger to herself, and he violated his duties to her and shortly thereafter she had yet another one-vehicle accident which resulted in her death.

The Trial Court, responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment, found that the public duty doctrine applied and if the officer did undertake to protect deceased, she did not rely upon his undertaking. He granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we hold that under the public duty doctrine, plaintiff owed no specific duty to deceased, unless he undertook to assume such duty. We hold that there is disputed material evidence as to whether he assumed such duty to deceased but discontinued his aid and protection to deceased which left her in a worse position than she was before he intervened. We reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/lynchb_101411.pdf