SARAH HURST v. COLMAN S. HOCHMAN, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. December 14, 2012)
Sarah Hurst ("Hurst") sued Colman S. Hochman ("Hochman") and Hochman Family Partners, L.P. ("the Partnership") alleging that Hochman had committed a battery upon her, and seeking damages for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress among other things.
After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree that, inter alia, awarded Hurst damages of $2,500 against Hochman for battery; denied Hurst's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, and punitive damages; and dismissed Hurst's claims against the Partnership. Hurst appeals raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in denying her claim of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act and in dismissing her claims against the Partnership. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/hursts_121412.pdf
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Showing posts with label Battery. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Battery. Show all posts
Monday, December 17, 2012
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
TCA examines issues regarding the Govenrmental Tort Liability Act
RONALD TIMMONS v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2009)
Plaintiff filed this Governmental Tort Liability Act action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for injuries sustained during his arrest for driving under the influence following a vehicular accident. Plaintiff contends the police officers who arrested him were negligent in failing to recognize that he was not intoxicated but in diabetic shock, in failing to recognize that he could be restrained and handcuffed while standing, instead of in the prone position, and that he sustained a spiral, comminuted fracture of the humerus while an officer was pulling his right arm behind his back in an effort to cuff his hands.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found the officers were negligent in the manner in which they assessed the threat posed by Plaintiff and were negligent in the decision to handcuff him in the prone position, which caused his injuries. The trial court, therefore, held the Metropolitan Government liable for the officers negligence, assessed 100% of the fault to the officers, and awarded Plaintiff $140,000 in damages. On appeal, the Metropolitan Government insists it is immune from liability because the officers' actions were not the result of negligence but, it contends, the officers consciously and volitionally used an excessive amount of force that constituted the intentional tort of battery. Alternatively, the Government contends, if it is liable under a negligence theory, the trial court erred by apportioning no fault to Plaintiff.
We have determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that Plaintiff's injuries resulted from the officers' negligent acts and omissions, that the Metropolitan Government is liable for the officers' negligence, that Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, and that Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in the amount of $140,000. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/timmonsr_061609.pdf
Plaintiff filed this Governmental Tort Liability Act action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for injuries sustained during his arrest for driving under the influence following a vehicular accident. Plaintiff contends the police officers who arrested him were negligent in failing to recognize that he was not intoxicated but in diabetic shock, in failing to recognize that he could be restrained and handcuffed while standing, instead of in the prone position, and that he sustained a spiral, comminuted fracture of the humerus while an officer was pulling his right arm behind his back in an effort to cuff his hands.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found the officers were negligent in the manner in which they assessed the threat posed by Plaintiff and were negligent in the decision to handcuff him in the prone position, which caused his injuries. The trial court, therefore, held the Metropolitan Government liable for the officers negligence, assessed 100% of the fault to the officers, and awarded Plaintiff $140,000 in damages. On appeal, the Metropolitan Government insists it is immune from liability because the officers' actions were not the result of negligence but, it contends, the officers consciously and volitionally used an excessive amount of force that constituted the intentional tort of battery. Alternatively, the Government contends, if it is liable under a negligence theory, the trial court erred by apportioning no fault to Plaintiff.
We have determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that Plaintiff's injuries resulted from the officers' negligent acts and omissions, that the Metropolitan Government is liable for the officers' negligence, that Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, and that Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in the amount of $140,000. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/timmonsr_061609.pdf
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Court reviews whether a general consent to medical care covers dental work performed without obtaining consent from a patient or patient's attorney-in-fact
KATHERINE RANGE, ET AL. v. C. M. SOWELL, JR., D.D.S. (Tenn. Ct. App. December 22, 2009)
The son of a nursing home patient claimed that the defendant dentist committed battery against his mother by performing dental work on her without obtaining proper consent from either the mother or from the son in his capacity as her attorney-in-fact. The dentist argued that he had operated under a general consent to medical care that the son executed at the time of his mother's admission to the nursing home, that the mother was not injured by the care he provided, and that the statute of limitations barred the son's claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dentist. We affirm the summary judgment, but modify that part of the trial court's award of discretionary costs which held the son personally liable for those costs.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/rangek_corr_122209.pdf
The son of a nursing home patient claimed that the defendant dentist committed battery against his mother by performing dental work on her without obtaining proper consent from either the mother or from the son in his capacity as her attorney-in-fact. The dentist argued that he had operated under a general consent to medical care that the son executed at the time of his mother's admission to the nursing home, that the mother was not injured by the care he provided, and that the statute of limitations barred the son's claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dentist. We affirm the summary judgment, but modify that part of the trial court's award of discretionary costs which held the son personally liable for those costs.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/rangek_corr_122209.pdf
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