TN COA REVERSES DISMISSAL OF SLIP AND FALL CASE INVOLVING INADEQUATE LIGHTING

On November 30, 2010, Plaintiff Cynthia Christian was an invited guest for a function at Ms. Lassie's Lodge in Campbell County, Tennessee.  The Lodge was regularly rented for parties and other functions via the nearby Hampton Inn.  Ms. Christian arrived when it was still daylight, and the function ended after dark.

Before or during the function, an owner of The Lodge in charge of the event turned on some exterior lights.  However, the lights installed and  intended to illuminate the parking area and walkway leading to The Lodge were not operative.  As Ms. Christian walked from The Lodge to her car she stepped into a hole in the parking area which could not be seen in the dark.  She suffered personal injuries which resulted in more than $50,000 in medical expenses.  She later sued The Lodge for its negligence in failing to provide adequate lighting on the walkway and parking area for guests.

The Lodge asked the Circuit Court for Campbell County to dismiss the case claiming that: (1) it had no notice that the lights in question were out and (2) despite the lack of lighting Ms. Christian was more than 50 percent at fault for her fall and injuries.  In other words, the company who operated The Lodge for profit claimed that it had no idea its lights did not work and that if Ms. Christian could not see in the dark that was her problem.  The Lodge maintained this disingenuous defense even after The Lodge staff testified that: 1) the owner was in fact aware that the lights for the walkway and parking area were inoperative before the evening function; 2) they had no procedure for the inspection and maintenance of the exterior lights; and 3) the day after the fall and injury The Lodge staff inspected the lights and found as many as 14 exterior flood lights inoperative including those for the walkway and parking area.

Despite The Lodge's clear and actual notice of its inoperable lights, its failure to inspect or replace the lights, and the danger created by the lack of lighting, the Circuit Court inexplicably dismissed the case.  The Circuit Court found that there was insufficient evidence to show that The Lodge had notice of the lighting issue prior to Ms. Christian's fall - despite The Lodge's own apparent admission to the contrary.

Ms. Christian appealed, and on March 28, 2014, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Circuit Court properly finding that a jury could reasonably find that : 1) The Lodge had actual notice of the inoperative lights, the associated danger and a duty to act reasonably to remedy the issue; and/or 2) the lighting problem existed long enough that The Lodge through reasonable care and diligence should have discovered the danger and replaced the lights.  The case was remanded for trial by jury on all issues. Read the full opinion here.

Court reviews whether a medical malpractice claim is time barred by the GTLA or was timely filed under the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act

WALTON CUNNINGHAM & PHYLLIS CUNNINGHAM EX REL. PHILLIP WALTON CUNNINGHAM v. WILLIAMSON COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. December 1, 2011)

Defendants, Williamson Medical Center and five of its employees, appeal from the denial of their motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action. They contend the action is time barred because it was filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued, in violation of the one year statute of limitations applicable to Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act actions, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-305(b).

The trial court, however, found that the action was timely filed because it was commenced within the 120-day extension afforded to the plaintiffs pursuant to an amendment to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) (2009).

We have determined that the amendment codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)-(c) applies, notwithstanding the one-year statute of limitations provision under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, that the plaintiffs' compliance with the pre-suit notification provision in Tennessee Code Annotate section 29-26-121(a) extended the statute of limitations by 120 days, and that this action was timely filed within the 120-day extension. Therefore, were affirm.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/cunninghamw_120111.pdf

Court reviews whether the statute of limitations bars a plaintiff's claim for assault against security guards

HARRISON A. AZARI v. GREYHOUND BUS STATION, NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. August 25, 2011)

Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 against the owner of a bus line alleging security guards assaulted him while he was waiting for a bus in 2003. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court's judgment because Tenn. Code Ann. section 28-3-104(a)(1) requires a plaintiff suing for personal injuries to file his complaint within one year of the date of the alleged assault resulting in injuries.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/azarih_082511.pdf

Court Reviews Denial of Motion to Dismiss in a Medical Malpractice Case

CURTIS MYERS v. AMISUB (SFH), INC., d/b/a ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. February 24, 2011)

The trial court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss in a medical malpractice action initially filed prior to the effective date of the notice and certificate of good faith provisions subsequently codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 29-26-122, and nonsuited and re-commenced after the effective date of the provisions despite Plaintiff's failure to fulfill the statutory requisites. We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse and remand for dismissal.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/myersc_022411.pdf

Court Reviews Whether Plaintiff, a Customer and Employee of Defendant, Can Recover Damages Outside Workers’ Compensation Law

JANE DOE and JOHN DOE v. WALGREENS COMPANY, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. November 24, 2010)

This is an appeal from the grant of Appellees/Defendants' Tenn. R Civ. P 12.02 motion to dismiss. Appellant Jane Doe, who is HIV positive, was employed by Appellee Walgreens. In an effort to keep her medical condition private, Ms. Doe had her prescriptions filled at a Walgreens location other than the one at which she worked; therefore, Ms. Doe was also a customer of Walgreens.

A co-worker of Ms. Doe's accessed Ms. Doe's prescription history in the Walgreens' database, and then disseminated her medical information to other coworkers and to Ms. Doe's fiance. Ms. Doe and her fiance filed suit.

The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the Does' exclusive remedy was under the workers' compensation act. Finding that the injuries sustained by Ms. Doe do not arise out of her employment with Walgreens, and that she has sufficiently pled causes of action outside workers' compensation law, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/walgreens_112410.pdf

Court Reviews Whether Defendant’s Failure to Respond to a Motion to Dismiss was Proper

SHEMAIN SHERILLE RILEY, ET AL. v. EDITH SWIFT (Tenn. Ct. App. November 30, 2010)

The General Sessions Court awarded the plaintiffs an $8,500 judgment for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The pro se defendant attempted to appeal the judgment to the Circuit Court, but failed to have the case docketed within 45 days after filing the notice of appeal, as is required by Davidson County Local Rule 20(b).

The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of untimeliness and to enforce the order of the General Sessions Court. The defendant did not respond to the motion, nor did she appear for the motion hearing. The Circuit Court granted the plaintiffs' motion and made the judgment of the General Sessions Court the judgment of the Circuit Court. The defendant then retained counsel, who filed a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment eight months after it was rendered. The Circuit Court denied the motion. We affirm.

Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/rileys_113010.pdf

Court reviews the dismissal of a motor vehicle-related personal injury suit based on the failure to provide prompt service of process to the Defendant.

ROBERT G. CRABTREE, JR., ET AL. v. JENNIFER L. LUND (Tenn. Ct. App. October 28, 2010)

Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., and Bonnie K. Hakey (collectively "the plaintiffs") filed suit against Jennifer L. Lund ("the defendant") seeking compensation for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a April 22, 2005, multiple-vehicle accident in Carter County.

With her answer, the defendant coupled a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 "on the basis of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process." Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with prejudice finding "that the Plaintiffs have not provided to the Court any valid reason for the delay in obtaining prompt service of process upon the Defendant." Plaintiffs appeal. We (1) vacate the trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and (2) remand for further proceedings.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/crabtreer_102810.pdf

SWINEY concurring
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/crabtreer_CON_102810.pdf

TWCA Reviews a Motion to Dismiss a Workers’ Compensation Claim

WAYNE MORAN v. FULTON BELLOWS & COMPONENTS, INC. (TWCA August 17, 2010)

Employee alleged that he sustained hearing loss as a result of his work for employer. He filed a civil action 94 days after an impasse was reached at a benefit review conference. The trial court granted employer's motion to dismiss on the basis of the 90-day statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-203(g)(1) (2008). On appeal, employee contends that the report of the benefit review conference was never "filed with the commissioner" of Labor and Workforce Development as required by the statute and that the 90-day limitation period therefore never began to run. We affirm the judgment.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/moranw_0801710.pdf