Showing posts with label Product Liability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Product Liability. Show all posts
Friday, March 14, 2014
GEORGIA NURSE'S DEATH CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE GM INGNITION
GM knew as early as 2001 that its ignition switches could fail during normal operation. GM knew that when the ignition failed that the driver would lose the use of power steering, anti-lock brakes, and airbags. They investigated and found a "partial fix" leaving hundreds of thousands of GM owners unknowingly vulnerable to the defective ignition and associated dangers. It then knew of and failed to act on multiple deaths caused by the failures as it denied and defended against suits alleging the defect. GM now says it made a "business decision" not to act. Read the full story here.
Wednesday, March 12, 2014
GM Defective Ignition Key - 13 Wrongful Deaths To-Date
On February 13, 2014, General Motors (GM) recalled 780,000
Chevrolet Cobalts and various Pontiac models for repair of a faulty ignition
switch that has been found to cause the ignition key to slip out of the run
position. GM is aware of situations
where the key has slipped due to heavy key chains and due to the vehicles hitting
hard bumps in the road. When this
occurs, the engine can shut off leading to loss of power to vital systems such
as power steering, airbags and anti-lock brakes.
On February 25, 2014, GM expanded the recall to cover certain
Chevy, Pontiac, and Saturn cars, bringing the total recall to as high as 1.4
million vehicles.
GM has acknowledged the defect caused or contributed to 31
crashes involving airbags which did not deploy and the deaths of 13 motorists. Evidence
from civil lawsuits shows that GM knew about the Cobalt ignition defect as far
back as 2004, but GM issued no recall.
This and other evidence has led to the U.S. Attorney's Office in New
York opening a criminal investigation into GM’s knowledge of the ignition
defect.
If you or someone you know has been injured as a result of
this defect in a Chevy Cobalt, Pontiac G5, Saturn Ion, Chevy HHR, Pontiac
Solstice or Saturn Sky, please call the Law Office of Stephen A. Burroughs for a free consultation. GM may have culpability based on the defect
and the failure to warn consumers of the known danger.
Friday, April 13, 2012
Court reviews a jury award in a products liability case
AUNDREY MEALS, as Natural Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of WILLIAM MEALS v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY (Tenn. Ct. App. April 13, 2012)
Following a seven week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in this products liability action. The jury awarded compensatory damages in excess of $43 million, and assessed 15 percent fault against Defendant car manufacturer. Defendant appeals. We affirm the jury verdict with respect to liability but remand with a suggestion of remittitur.
Opinion is available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/mealsa_041312.pdf
Kirby's dissenting opinion is available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/meals_DIS_041312.pdf
Following a seven week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in this products liability action. The jury awarded compensatory damages in excess of $43 million, and assessed 15 percent fault against Defendant car manufacturer. Defendant appeals. We affirm the jury verdict with respect to liability but remand with a suggestion of remittitur.
Opinion is available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/mealsa_041312.pdf
Kirby's dissenting opinion is available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/meals_DIS_041312.pdf
Wednesday, January 4, 2012
TN Supreme Court reviews whether the statute of limitations bars negligence and strict liability claims in a products liability case
MICHAEL LIND v. BEAMAN DODGE, INC., d/b/a BEAMAN DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP ET AL. (Tenn. December 15, 2011)
The plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against not only the manufacturer, but also the dealership, as seller. Later, the plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to the seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer.
Over one year after the order granting nonsuit, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy, and, in 2009, the plaintiff again sued the seller, alleging both negligence and strict liability in tort. The seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion but granted an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal.
This Court granted the seller's application for permission to appeal to consider the application of the saving statute to these unique circumstances. We hold that the plaintiff may proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent. Because, however, the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of the seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations is a bar to recovery under that theory. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for trial.
Majority opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lindm_121511.pdf
Justice Clark's concurring opinion is available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lindm_CON_121511.pdf
The plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against not only the manufacturer, but also the dealership, as seller. Later, the plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to the seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer.
Over one year after the order granting nonsuit, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy, and, in 2009, the plaintiff again sued the seller, alleging both negligence and strict liability in tort. The seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion but granted an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal.
This Court granted the seller's application for permission to appeal to consider the application of the saving statute to these unique circumstances. We hold that the plaintiff may proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent. Because, however, the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of the seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations is a bar to recovery under that theory. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for trial.
Majority opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lindm_121511.pdf
Justice Clark's concurring opinion is available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lindm_CON_121511.pdf
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
TN Supreme Court Reviews the Jury Instructions in a Strict Products Liability Case Involving Asbestos
EVELYN NYE v. BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC., ET AL. (Tenn. June 7, 2011)
In this products liability case, a widow sought compensation for the death of her husband from mesothelioma allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos at his workplace. She sued the company that sold products containing asbestos to her husband's employer. She based her claim on strict liability and alleged that the seller sold defective products and failed to warn her husband of the products' health risks.
The jury found that the seller was at fault, but that her husband's employer was the sole cause of his injury and awarded her nothing. The widow appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions that more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury.
On review, we hold that the seller was subject to suit in strict liability, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106(b) (2000), because none of the products' manufacturers were subject to service of process. Further, we hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the seller could not be held liable for failure to warn if the jury found that the consumer, identified as the employer, was already aware of any danger in connection with the use of the products or if the employer had been given adequate warnings.
This jury instruction was erroneous for two reasons. First, it applied the learned intermediary doctrine, which the courts of this state have limited to medical products and pharmaceuticals. Second, the jury instruction misidentified the consumer as the employer, when the consumer who was required to be warned was the employee, Mr. Nye. Because the error more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/nye_correx_061511.pdf
HOLDER concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/nyee_DIS_060711.pdf
In this products liability case, a widow sought compensation for the death of her husband from mesothelioma allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos at his workplace. She sued the company that sold products containing asbestos to her husband's employer. She based her claim on strict liability and alleged that the seller sold defective products and failed to warn her husband of the products' health risks.
The jury found that the seller was at fault, but that her husband's employer was the sole cause of his injury and awarded her nothing. The widow appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions that more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury.
On review, we hold that the seller was subject to suit in strict liability, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106(b) (2000), because none of the products' manufacturers were subject to service of process. Further, we hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the seller could not be held liable for failure to warn if the jury found that the consumer, identified as the employer, was already aware of any danger in connection with the use of the products or if the employer had been given adequate warnings.
This jury instruction was erroneous for two reasons. First, it applied the learned intermediary doctrine, which the courts of this state have limited to medical products and pharmaceuticals. Second, the jury instruction misidentified the consumer as the employer, when the consumer who was required to be warned was the employee, Mr. Nye. Because the error more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/nye_correx_061511.pdf
HOLDER concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/nyee_DIS_060711.pdf
Monday, March 15, 2010
Court reviews products liability and negligence claims in a case about a bus accident
CLIFTON LAKE, ET AL. v. THE MEMPHIS LANDSMEN, L.L.C., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App March 15, 2010)
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a negligence and products liability case. Appellant-Husband was injured when the bus, on which he was a passenger, collided with a concrete truck. Appellant-Husband and Appellant-Wife filed suit against Appellees- the bus manufacturer, the bus owner, and the franchisor.
Following trial, the jury found that the Appellants had suffered $8,543,630.00 in damages, but found that none of the Appellees were at fault and apportioned one hundred percent of the fault to a non-party. Appellants appeal.
We find that Appellants' claims based on the use of tempered glass in the side windows of the bus, and the lack of passenger seatbelts in the bus are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. section 30101 et seq. Further, we find that the Appellants failed to present evidence that the use of perimeter seating in the bus caused the injuries. Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in not granting Appellees' motions for directed verdict on the Appellants' claims based on the use of perimeter seating. Reversed and remanded.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/lakec_031510.pdf
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a negligence and products liability case. Appellant-Husband was injured when the bus, on which he was a passenger, collided with a concrete truck. Appellant-Husband and Appellant-Wife filed suit against Appellees- the bus manufacturer, the bus owner, and the franchisor.
Following trial, the jury found that the Appellants had suffered $8,543,630.00 in damages, but found that none of the Appellees were at fault and apportioned one hundred percent of the fault to a non-party. Appellants appeal.
We find that Appellants' claims based on the use of tempered glass in the side windows of the bus, and the lack of passenger seatbelts in the bus are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. section 30101 et seq. Further, we find that the Appellants failed to present evidence that the use of perimeter seating in the bus caused the injuries. Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in not granting Appellees' motions for directed verdict on the Appellants' claims based on the use of perimeter seating. Reversed and remanded.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/lakec_031510.pdf
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