LARRY BESHIRES v. BERKLEY REGIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY (TWCA June 18, 2010)
These workers' compensation appeals were consolidated for hearing and disposition by order dated May 27, 2009. The employee, Larry Beshires, settled a claim for work-related injuries to his left knee and right shoulder, based upon the two and one-half times impairment cap in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1). The settlement was approved by the Chancery Court of Fayette County.
Mr. Beshires subsequently sustained a second injury, or aggravation of the previous injury, to his shoulder. He returned to work for a time, but then retired. He filed suit in the Chester County Chancery Court, seeking benefits for the new injury or, alternatively, reconsideration of his prior settlement. The reconsideration action was transferred to the Chancery Court of Fayette County. After a hearing on the merits, the Fayette County court declined to award additional benefits. The Chester County court awarded 48% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for the later injury.
Both sides have appealed, and the appeals have been consolidated by order of the Supreme Court. Mr. Beshires contends that the Fayette County court erred by failing to award additional benefits. The employer contends that the Chester County court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, because the benefit review conference process had not been exhausted. We affirm both judgments.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/beshiresl_061810.pdf
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Friday, June 18, 2010
Thursday, June 17, 2010
Court reviews whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in a medical malpractice case
NANCY LUNA v. ROGER DEVERSA, M.D. and HAMILTON COUNTY (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2010)
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim. A surgeon performed a procedure on the plaintiff at the defendant hospital. The defendant hospitalist physician monitored the plaintiff's post-surgery recovery. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting that the defendant hospitalist was negligent in releasing her from the hospital prematurely. The defendant hospitalist filed a motion for summary judgment, as did the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment to both. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/lunan_061710.pdf
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim. A surgeon performed a procedure on the plaintiff at the defendant hospital. The defendant hospitalist physician monitored the plaintiff's post-surgery recovery. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting that the defendant hospitalist was negligent in releasing her from the hospital prematurely. The defendant hospitalist filed a motion for summary judgment, as did the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment to both. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/lunan_061710.pdf
Monday, June 14, 2010
Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence in a case involving a hunting accident
BOBBY GERALD RILEY, and Wife, TANYA RILEY, Individually and as next of kin for HUNTER RILEY v. JAMES ORR (Tenn. Ct. App. June 14, 2010)
This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages.
The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals.
On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the awards for future medical expenses and for emotional injury, and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/rileyb_061410.pdf
This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages.
The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals.
On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the awards for future medical expenses and for emotional injury, and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/rileyb_061410.pdf
Court reviews allocation of liability in an automobile accident
PAMELA C. BESS v. PROPERTIES, L.P. ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. June 14, 2010)
Car A was traveling north on a two-lane highway. Car B, a city police vehicle with its lights and siren on, was also traveling north on the same highway to answer a call. Car A could not pull off the road to the right to yield to Car B and instead turned left as Car B was passing. A collision ensued in which the driver of Car A suffered serious injuries. The driver of Car A sued the city. The trial court found the city 75% liable for the accident. The city appealed. We reverse the trial court's judgment, finding the driver of Car A more than 50% responsible for the accident.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/bessp_061410.pdf
Car A was traveling north on a two-lane highway. Car B, a city police vehicle with its lights and siren on, was also traveling north on the same highway to answer a call. Car A could not pull off the road to the right to yield to Car B and instead turned left as Car B was passing. A collision ensued in which the driver of Car A suffered serious injuries. The driver of Car A sued the city. The trial court found the city 75% liable for the accident. The city appealed. We reverse the trial court's judgment, finding the driver of Car A more than 50% responsible for the accident.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/bessp_061410.pdf
Monday, June 7, 2010
Court reviews summary judgment ruling in dental malpractice case
CHRISTINE GREENWOOD v. KIRBY FAMILY DENTISTRY, P.C., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2010)
The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in this action for dental malpractice. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/greenwoodc_060710.pdf
The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in this action for dental malpractice. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/greenwoodc_060710.pdf
Friday, June 4, 2010
Court reviews denial of motion for directed verdict in medical malpractice case
TERESA LYNN STANFIELD, ET AL. v. JOHN NEBLETT, JR., M.D., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2010)
This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/stanfieldt_060410.pdf
This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/stanfieldt_060410.pdf
Friday, May 28, 2010
Court considers an issue of uninsured motorist coverage in an interlocutory appeal
RANDALL D. KISER v. IAN J. WOLFE & CONSUMERS INSURANCE COMPANY (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2010)
This interlocutory appeal considers an issue of uninsured motorist coverage following an automobile accident in which Plaintiff Randall D. Kiser was permanently injured. The plaintiff was working within the scope of his employment, driving for a towing company, when his truck was struck by Defendant Ian J. Wolfe's vehicle. The defendant driver tendered his liability policy limits to the plaintiff and is not a party to this appeal. The employer towing company was insured by Defendant Consumers Insurance Company. In anticipation of arbitration for determination of damages and liability, the insurance company moved for partial summary judgment.
The trial court denied summary judgment but granted the insurance company permission for an interlocutory appeal to determine two issues, on which we hold:
(1) On a policy of vehicle insurance, the statutory requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. section 56-7-1201(a)(2) for a written rejection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits or written selection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits lower than liability limits is met when the insured signs an application containing a lower selection but neglects to initial a block provided for that purpose; and
(2) the insurer bears the burden of proof to show that the insured signed an insurance contract application containing a stated limit of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, but once that burden has been met, the insured must raise any issue that the insurer obtained the insured's signature unlawfully under Tenn. Code Ann. section 56-7-1201(a)(2).
We vacate the trial court's denial of the insurance company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and remand for reconsideration in light of this holding.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/kiserr_052810.pdf
This interlocutory appeal considers an issue of uninsured motorist coverage following an automobile accident in which Plaintiff Randall D. Kiser was permanently injured. The plaintiff was working within the scope of his employment, driving for a towing company, when his truck was struck by Defendant Ian J. Wolfe's vehicle. The defendant driver tendered his liability policy limits to the plaintiff and is not a party to this appeal. The employer towing company was insured by Defendant Consumers Insurance Company. In anticipation of arbitration for determination of damages and liability, the insurance company moved for partial summary judgment.
The trial court denied summary judgment but granted the insurance company permission for an interlocutory appeal to determine two issues, on which we hold:
(1) On a policy of vehicle insurance, the statutory requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. section 56-7-1201(a)(2) for a written rejection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits or written selection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits lower than liability limits is met when the insured signs an application containing a lower selection but neglects to initial a block provided for that purpose; and
(2) the insurer bears the burden of proof to show that the insured signed an insurance contract application containing a stated limit of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, but once that burden has been met, the insured must raise any issue that the insurer obtained the insured's signature unlawfully under Tenn. Code Ann. section 56-7-1201(a)(2).
We vacate the trial court's denial of the insurance company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and remand for reconsideration in light of this holding.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/kiserr_052810.pdf
Court reviews whether the exclusive remedy rule barred an employee's negligence suit
JAMES P. GRIFFITH, ET AL. v. JELLICO COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2010)
Employee, whose employer provided services pursuant to a contract with hospital, sustained injuries from a fall while working on hospital’s premises. Employee subsequently filed a negligence action against hospital. The trial court permitted employer to intervene in the suit. Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that hospital was the principal contractor pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6- 113 and the exclusive remedy rule barred employee's negligence suit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of hospital, and employee appealed. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/griffithj_052810.pdf
Employee, whose employer provided services pursuant to a contract with hospital, sustained injuries from a fall while working on hospital’s premises. Employee subsequently filed a negligence action against hospital. The trial court permitted employer to intervene in the suit. Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that hospital was the principal contractor pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6- 113 and the exclusive remedy rule barred employee's negligence suit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of hospital, and employee appealed. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/griffithj_052810.pdf
Monday, May 24, 2010
Supreme Court reviews whether records made in the ordinary course of a hospital's business are covered by the peer review privilege
KIMBERLY POWELL v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC. ET AL. (Tenn. May 24, 2010)
This appeal involves the evidentiary privilege in the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)]. A former hospital employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County against the hospital and an orthopaedic surgeon on the hospital's medical staff. During discovery, the former employee sought to depose the hospital's infection control director regarding the details of an investigation into postoperative nosocomial infections and her knowledge of whether the defendant surgeon had tested positive for infectious diseases. The hospital moved for a protective order on the ground that the requested information was privileged under Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e).
The trial court declined to issue a protective order after determining that the information sought by the former employee was not privileged because it had been created in the regular course of the hospital's business and because the infection control director was the "original source" of the information. After granting the hospital an interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. E2008-00535-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 17850 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2009).
We granted the hospital's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that records received or made in the ordinary course of a hospital's business apart from the operation of a peer review committee are not protected by the peer review privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219. We have also determined that documents prepared by or at the request of a peer review committee exercising its peer review function and documents prepared by third parties as part of the work of a peer review committee performing its peer review function are privileged. Finally, we have determined that the hospital did not waive its right to invoke the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e) with regard to the work performed by its infection control director in the context of a peer review proceeding.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/powellk_052410.pdf
WADE concurring
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/powellk_CON_052410.pdf
This appeal involves the evidentiary privilege in the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)]. A former hospital employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County against the hospital and an orthopaedic surgeon on the hospital's medical staff. During discovery, the former employee sought to depose the hospital's infection control director regarding the details of an investigation into postoperative nosocomial infections and her knowledge of whether the defendant surgeon had tested positive for infectious diseases. The hospital moved for a protective order on the ground that the requested information was privileged under Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e).
The trial court declined to issue a protective order after determining that the information sought by the former employee was not privileged because it had been created in the regular course of the hospital's business and because the infection control director was the "original source" of the information. After granting the hospital an interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. E2008-00535-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 17850 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2009).
We granted the hospital's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that records received or made in the ordinary course of a hospital's business apart from the operation of a peer review committee are not protected by the peer review privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219. We have also determined that documents prepared by or at the request of a peer review committee exercising its peer review function and documents prepared by third parties as part of the work of a peer review committee performing its peer review function are privileged. Finally, we have determined that the hospital did not waive its right to invoke the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e) with regard to the work performed by its infection control director in the context of a peer review proceeding.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/powellk_052410.pdf
WADE concurring
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/powellk_CON_052410.pdf
TN Supreme Court reviews the Peer Review Law in a case involving services provided by various hospitals
LEE MEDICAL, INC. v. PAULA BEECHER ET AL. (Tenn. May 24, 2010)
This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)] to a hospital system's business decision regarding the provision of vascular access services to patients in its member hospitals. The hospital system had customarily outsourced these services at several of its hospitals, but, following an audit, it decided to discontinue outsourcing the services and to begin providing them using nurses employed by its own hospitals.
After several of the system's hospitals cancelled their vascular access services contracts, the vendor that had been providing the services filed two suits in the Circuit Court for Sumner County against the manufacturer of the catheters used to provide the services and one of its employees, a staffing affiliate of the hospital system and two of its employees, and the chief nursing officer at one of the system's hospitals.
These suits, which were eventually transferred to the Circuit Court for Williamson County and consolidated, sought damages under numerous theories based on the vendor's allegations that the defendants, all of whom had played a role in the audit, had disparaged the manner in which it had been providing the vascular access services and had improperly interfered with its contracts. During discovery, the vendor sought copies of various records relating to the audit of its services. The defendants claimed that these records were covered by the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e). After reviewing the disputed records in chambers, the trial court determined that most of the requested records were covered by the privilege. The trial court also granted the vendor permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals; however, the Court of Appeals declined to accept the appeal.
We granted the vendor's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application to address the trial court's interpretation and application of Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e). We have determined that the trial court interpreted the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e) too broadly. Therefore, we vacate the portions of the trial court's discovery orders applying the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e) and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/leemedical_052410.pdf
WADE dissenting
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/leemedical_DIS_052410.pdf
This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)] to a hospital system's business decision regarding the provision of vascular access services to patients in its member hospitals. The hospital system had customarily outsourced these services at several of its hospitals, but, following an audit, it decided to discontinue outsourcing the services and to begin providing them using nurses employed by its own hospitals.
After several of the system's hospitals cancelled their vascular access services contracts, the vendor that had been providing the services filed two suits in the Circuit Court for Sumner County against the manufacturer of the catheters used to provide the services and one of its employees, a staffing affiliate of the hospital system and two of its employees, and the chief nursing officer at one of the system's hospitals.
These suits, which were eventually transferred to the Circuit Court for Williamson County and consolidated, sought damages under numerous theories based on the vendor's allegations that the defendants, all of whom had played a role in the audit, had disparaged the manner in which it had been providing the vascular access services and had improperly interfered with its contracts. During discovery, the vendor sought copies of various records relating to the audit of its services. The defendants claimed that these records were covered by the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e). After reviewing the disputed records in chambers, the trial court determined that most of the requested records were covered by the privilege. The trial court also granted the vendor permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals; however, the Court of Appeals declined to accept the appeal.
We granted the vendor's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application to address the trial court's interpretation and application of Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e). We have determined that the trial court interpreted the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e) too broadly. Therefore, we vacate the portions of the trial court's discovery orders applying the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e) and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/leemedical_052410.pdf
WADE dissenting
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/leemedical_DIS_052410.pdf
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
TWCA reviews the limitation of permanent partial disability benefits where an employee chooses voluntary layoff
KIMBERLY WHEELER v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION (TWCA February 3, 2010)
In this workers' compensation action, the employee, Kimberly Wheeler, sustained repetitive trauma injuries to both arms. The injuries were accepted by her employer, Whirlpool Corporation, as compensable. After having surgery on both arms, she returned to work, initially in a light-duty status, and later to full duty. The product line on which she worked was then shut down and moved to another location. She was offered the option of accepting a voluntary layoff or moving to another product line. She chose the voluntary layoff. Under the terms of her employment contract, she continued to be an employee although she was not working. Eventually, the entire plant closed and Ms. Wheeler was terminated at that time. The trial court found that she had meaningful return to work and voluntarily left her employment. For that reason, it limited its award of permanent partial disability benefits to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B). The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by applying the one and one-half times impairment cap. We agree and modify the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/wheelerk_020310.pdf
In this workers' compensation action, the employee, Kimberly Wheeler, sustained repetitive trauma injuries to both arms. The injuries were accepted by her employer, Whirlpool Corporation, as compensable. After having surgery on both arms, she returned to work, initially in a light-duty status, and later to full duty. The product line on which she worked was then shut down and moved to another location. She was offered the option of accepting a voluntary layoff or moving to another product line. She chose the voluntary layoff. Under the terms of her employment contract, she continued to be an employee although she was not working. Eventually, the entire plant closed and Ms. Wheeler was terminated at that time. The trial court found that she had meaningful return to work and voluntarily left her employment. For that reason, it limited its award of permanent partial disability benefits to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B). The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by applying the one and one-half times impairment cap. We agree and modify the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/wheelerk_020310.pdf
Thursday, May 13, 2010
TWCA reviews whether the trial court properly dismissed claims against an Injury Fund
TIMOTHY TODD v. MTD CONSUMER GROUP ET AL. (TWCA May 13, 2010)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee fell from a platform at work. The injury was accepted by his employer as compensable. After a period of medical treatment, the authorized physicians released the employee to return to work with no permanent impairment or restrictions. The employee sought medical treatment on his own. Ultimately, he had surgery on his back and neck. He filed suit against his employer. Employee had two previous workers' compensation awards. Several months later, he amended his complaint to add the Second Injury Fund as a defendant.
After a trial on the merits, the trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury which resulted in an 85% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court apportioned the award according to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(b). It then dismissed all claims against the Second Injury Fund, based upon the statute of limitations. It awarded some medical expenses claimed by the employee, but denied others. On appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing the claim against the Fund, by incorrectly determining the percentage of disability represented by his earlier settlements, and by declining to award all requested medical expenses. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/toddt_051310.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee fell from a platform at work. The injury was accepted by his employer as compensable. After a period of medical treatment, the authorized physicians released the employee to return to work with no permanent impairment or restrictions. The employee sought medical treatment on his own. Ultimately, he had surgery on his back and neck. He filed suit against his employer. Employee had two previous workers' compensation awards. Several months later, he amended his complaint to add the Second Injury Fund as a defendant.
After a trial on the merits, the trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury which resulted in an 85% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court apportioned the award according to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(b). It then dismissed all claims against the Second Injury Fund, based upon the statute of limitations. It awarded some medical expenses claimed by the employee, but denied others. On appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing the claim against the Fund, by incorrectly determining the percentage of disability represented by his earlier settlements, and by declining to award all requested medical expenses. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/toddt_051310.pdf
Court reviews sufficiency of trial court's award in a case involving a partnership
JOSEPH M. HASKINS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF DREW E. HASKINS, JR., DECEASED v. DREW E. HASKINS, III (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2010)
This case is on appeal for the second time after remand for determination of the defendant's request for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's award. After reviewing the record, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/haskinsj_051310.pdf
This case is on appeal for the second time after remand for determination of the defendant's request for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's award. After reviewing the record, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/haskinsj_051310.pdf
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
TWCA reviews whether the trial court erred by failing to require an employee to submit to an independent medical examination
VICKIE J. MYERS v. VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY (TWCA May 11, 2010)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After developing an allergy to latex, a hospital employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. While the case was pending, the trial court declined to require the employee to submit to an independent medical examination in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-204(d)(1) (Supp. 2009). The trial court conducted a bench trial and determined that the employee's latex allergy was an occupational disease. The trial court also determined that the employee had a fifteen percent impairment to the body as a whole and awarded her permanent partial disability at fifty percent. The employer has appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by failing to require the employee to submit to an independent medical examination. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/myersv_051110.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After developing an allergy to latex, a hospital employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. While the case was pending, the trial court declined to require the employee to submit to an independent medical examination in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-204(d)(1) (Supp. 2009). The trial court conducted a bench trial and determined that the employee's latex allergy was an occupational disease. The trial court also determined that the employee had a fifteen percent impairment to the body as a whole and awarded her permanent partial disability at fifty percent. The employer has appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by failing to require the employee to submit to an independent medical examination. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/myersv_051110.pdf
Friday, May 7, 2010
Court reviews jurisdiction of a wrongful death case against a nursing home
ALLISON J. PERSON ET AL. v. KINDRED HEALTHCARE, INC., d/b/a PRIMACY HEALTHCARE AND REHABILITATION CENTER, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App May 7, 2010)
This is an action for negligence and wrongful death filed against a nursing home by the administrator of decedent patient's estate. The trial court denied Defendant nursing home's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment upon finding decedent patient was not competent to execute the power of attorney pursuant to which decedent's daughter had executed an arbitration agreement with Defendant. Defendant appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/persona_050710.pdf
This is an action for negligence and wrongful death filed against a nursing home by the administrator of decedent patient's estate. The trial court denied Defendant nursing home's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment upon finding decedent patient was not competent to execute the power of attorney pursuant to which decedent's daughter had executed an arbitration agreement with Defendant. Defendant appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/persona_050710.pdf
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Rule 60.02(1) relief denied for statute of limitations
WILLIAM JEFFREY WALKER v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. August 18, 2009)
This appeal involves the dismissal of a personal injury case arising from an accident that occurred at Defendant's automobile manufacturing plant. The suit was originally filed and then voluntarily dismissed for improper venue. The case was filed again and later dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal which was denied by the trial court. Plaintiff appeals. Finding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The full text of this decision may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/walkerw_082409.pdf
This appeal involves the dismissal of a personal injury case arising from an accident that occurred at Defendant's automobile manufacturing plant. The suit was originally filed and then voluntarily dismissed for improper venue. The case was filed again and later dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal which was denied by the trial court. Plaintiff appeals. Finding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The full text of this decision may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/walkerw_082409.pdf
Officer deposition of driver condition sufficient to exclude evidence of underage drinking in rear end collision
ELISHEA D. FISHER v. CHRISTINA M. JOHNSON (Tenn. Ct. App. August 18, 2009)
This is a personal injury suit arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal of her punitive damages claim, as well as its exclusion of evidence regarding Defendant's underage consumption of alcohol prior to the accident and leaving the scene of the accident. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Defendant's intoxication, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's punitive damages claim. Because liability has been stipulated in this matter, and the punitive damages claim properly dismissed, we find Defendant's underage consumption of alcohol and leaving the scene of the accident irrelevant. Thus, we affirm the exclusion of such evidence.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/fishere_082409.pdf
This is a personal injury suit arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal of her punitive damages claim, as well as its exclusion of evidence regarding Defendant's underage consumption of alcohol prior to the accident and leaving the scene of the accident. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Defendant's intoxication, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's punitive damages claim. Because liability has been stipulated in this matter, and the punitive damages claim properly dismissed, we find Defendant's underage consumption of alcohol and leaving the scene of the accident irrelevant. Thus, we affirm the exclusion of such evidence.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/fishere_082409.pdf
Friday, April 30, 2010
Court reviews summary judgment in wrongful death case regarding scope of employment
MICHAEL CLAWSON, ET AL. v. MICHAEL L. BURROW, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. April 30, 2010)
Rachel M. Clawson ("the Decedent") was an employee of Summers-Taylor, Inc. ("the Employer") when she was killed in a tragic automobile-pedestrian accident. A vehicle driven by Michael Burrow veered off Highway 91 in Carter County and struck her. She had concluded her job duties for the day and was at the rear of her personally-owned truck visiting with co-workers and talking on a cell phone. The Decedent's truck was parked on the side of Highway 91 in an area approved by the Employer for employee parking.
Michael Clawson and Sherry Clawson, the Decedent's parents ("the Parents"), filed this wrongful death action against Burrow and the Employer. The Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that on the undisputed facts the Decedent's death arose out of and occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The trial court agreed and entered an order granting the Employer summary judgment. The Parents appeal. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/clawsonm_043010.pdf
Rachel M. Clawson ("the Decedent") was an employee of Summers-Taylor, Inc. ("the Employer") when she was killed in a tragic automobile-pedestrian accident. A vehicle driven by Michael Burrow veered off Highway 91 in Carter County and struck her. She had concluded her job duties for the day and was at the rear of her personally-owned truck visiting with co-workers and talking on a cell phone. The Decedent's truck was parked on the side of Highway 91 in an area approved by the Employer for employee parking.
Michael Clawson and Sherry Clawson, the Decedent's parents ("the Parents"), filed this wrongful death action against Burrow and the Employer. The Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that on the undisputed facts the Decedent's death arose out of and occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The trial court agreed and entered an order granting the Employer summary judgment. The Parents appeal. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/clawsonm_043010.pdf
Thursday, April 29, 2010
Summary judgement remanded on attorney showing of detailed mail records, overcoming addressed-stamped-deposited mail presumption
AUBREY E. GIVENS, ADM. OF THE ESTATE OF JESSICA E. GIVENS, ET AL. v. THE VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. August 18, 2009)
Medical malpractice action was dismissed on summary judgment following plaintiffs' failure to oppose defendant's motion. Plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the judgment of the trial court based on mistake where plaintiffs did not receive service of defendant's summary judgment motion. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion; plaintiffs appeal. Finding that, under the facts of this case, the judgment should have been set aside, we reverse and remand.
The opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/givensa_081909.pdf
Medical malpractice action was dismissed on summary judgment following plaintiffs' failure to oppose defendant's motion. Plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the judgment of the trial court based on mistake where plaintiffs did not receive service of defendant's summary judgment motion. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion; plaintiffs appeal. Finding that, under the facts of this case, the judgment should have been set aside, we reverse and remand.
The opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/givensa_081909.pdf
Rear end collision plaintiff awarded zero, discretionary costs remanded for reconsideration
BERNARD HUGHES v. DEMAR HUDGINS (Tenn. Ct. App. August 17, 2009)
The plaintiff claimed that he suffered neck and back injuries after the automobile in which he was riding was rear-ended by the defendant's automobile. The defendant admitted breach of the standard of care, but the jury found that the plaintiff had suffered no damages as the result of the accident, and he was not awarded any recovery. The trial court awarded the defendant $645.95 in discretionary costs to cover the court reporter fees he incurred for depositions. The plaintiff argues on appeal that there was no material evidence to support the jury's verdict. For his part, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in declining to award him all of the discretionary costs he requested. We affirm the jury verdict, but we remand the issue of the award of discretionary costs.
The opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/hughesb_081709.pdf
CLEMENT concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/hughesb_CON_081709.pdf
"The basis for the trial court’s decision to award Mr. Hudgins some, but not all, of his discretionary costs is unclear from the record. Because of the discretion given to the trial court and its authority to apportion costs “as the equities demand,” we must remand this matter to the trial court for consideration of the award of discretionary costs." Id.
The plaintiff claimed that he suffered neck and back injuries after the automobile in which he was riding was rear-ended by the defendant's automobile. The defendant admitted breach of the standard of care, but the jury found that the plaintiff had suffered no damages as the result of the accident, and he was not awarded any recovery. The trial court awarded the defendant $645.95 in discretionary costs to cover the court reporter fees he incurred for depositions. The plaintiff argues on appeal that there was no material evidence to support the jury's verdict. For his part, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in declining to award him all of the discretionary costs he requested. We affirm the jury verdict, but we remand the issue of the award of discretionary costs.
The opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/hughesb_081709.pdf
CLEMENT concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/hughesb_CON_081709.pdf
"The basis for the trial court’s decision to award Mr. Hudgins some, but not all, of his discretionary costs is unclear from the record. Because of the discretion given to the trial court and its authority to apportion costs “as the equities demand,” we must remand this matter to the trial court for consideration of the award of discretionary costs." Id.
Summary Judgement Reversed Upon Disqualification of Medical Experts
DONNA FAYE SHIPLEY, ET AL. v. ROBIN WILLIAMS, M.D. (Tenn. Ct. App. August 14, 2009)
In reliance on plaintiff's experts, the trial court granted defendant doctor's motion for partial summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim pertaining to defendant's failure to admit plaintiff into the hospital. The trial court later granted the defendant doctor summary judgment on the remaining malpractice claims finding that the plaintiff's medical expert proof previously relied upon by defendant failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115. We reverse the grant of partial summary judgment on the failure to admit claim since the defendant doctor relied solely on plaintiff's experts, whose testimony was later found inadmissible. We also reverse the summary judgment of the remaining malpractice claims since the defendant doctor never presented proof to negate an element of those claims. Consequently, the plaintiff had no duty to create issues of fact at the summary judgment phase.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/shipleyd_081409.pdf
In reliance on plaintiff's experts, the trial court granted defendant doctor's motion for partial summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim pertaining to defendant's failure to admit plaintiff into the hospital. The trial court later granted the defendant doctor summary judgment on the remaining malpractice claims finding that the plaintiff's medical expert proof previously relied upon by defendant failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115. We reverse the grant of partial summary judgment on the failure to admit claim since the defendant doctor relied solely on plaintiff's experts, whose testimony was later found inadmissible. We also reverse the summary judgment of the remaining malpractice claims since the defendant doctor never presented proof to negate an element of those claims. Consequently, the plaintiff had no duty to create issues of fact at the summary judgment phase.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/shipleyd_081409.pdf
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Plaintiff successfully defends multiple challenges to experts, jurors, jury instructions and amount of damages awarded.
ROBIN FARLEY, ET AL. v. OAK RIDGE MEDICAL IMAGING, P.C., ET AL. CORRECTION (Tenn. Ct. App. August 13, 2009)
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in the amount of $2,780,000 in a medical malpractice action based upon a failure to detect and report an abnormality on a mammogram. Robin Farley ("the Patient") and her husband, Dennis Farley ("the Husband"), are the plaintiffs in this action; they are referred to collectively in this opinion as "the Plaintiffs." Dr. James Rouse and his employer, Oak Ridge Medical Imaging, P.C., dba Oak Ridge Breast Center, P.C. ("the Breast Center"), are the defendants, referenced collectively as "the Defendants." The Patient reported to the Breast Center on November 15, 2001, for a mammogram. Dr. Rouse read the mammogram and reported his findings as normal. In 2004, the Patient noticed an indentation in her right breast. Follow-up care revealed stage IV incurable breast cancer.
According to the Plaintiffs, the cancer was present in 2001, and was treatable and curable had it been properly detected and reported. The Defendants conceded very little and alleged, as an affirmative defense, that the Patient knew that repeat mammograms were needed but failed to come back until it was too late. The case was tried to a jury over four consecutive days. The jury began deliberations on a Friday and resumed and announced its verdict on the following Monday. It found the Defendants negligent, but apportioned 20% of the fault to the Plaintiffs, apparently based upon the Patient's failure to have a timely follow-up mammogram. The Defendants appeal, raising a host of issues. We affirm.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/farleyr_CORR_081409.pdf
"The points of contention in this case – which are initially less than clear – are, (1) whether, and if so, the extent to which the medical expert’s knowledge of the matters set out in subdivision (a) (1) must be “personal” knowledge , (2) whether an expert licensed in a contiguous state in the relevant time frame must also know the standard of care in a comparable community in order to qualify as a causation expert, and (3) the extent to which the contiguous state requirement can be established to the trial judge’s satisfaction through material not admitted or admissible into evidence." Id.
"We do not believe Eckler went so far as to hold that the bridge of similarity from the community where the expert practices to the community where the defendant doctor practices, must all be built on personal, firsthand knowledge." Id.
"We agree completely with the approach taken in Russell. The quoted language from Payne concerning the “entwined” nature of causation and standard of care testimony is true enough, but should not be read to impose requirements not imposed by the language of the statute. This is especially true given that Payne based its holding on the “clarity” of the statute. We hold that a causation expert who does not testify on the standard of care is not required to establish familiarity with the standard of care." Id. (Case citations omitted)
"To conclude the point, we agree with the trial court that for Dr. Mitchell to take the stand and testify that he reviewed the 2001 mammogram and read it as normal, with no indicators of cancer, was to indirectly comment on the standard of care. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so limiting the scope of Dr. Mitchell’s testimony." Id.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in the amount of $2,780,000 in a medical malpractice action based upon a failure to detect and report an abnormality on a mammogram. Robin Farley ("the Patient") and her husband, Dennis Farley ("the Husband"), are the plaintiffs in this action; they are referred to collectively in this opinion as "the Plaintiffs." Dr. James Rouse and his employer, Oak Ridge Medical Imaging, P.C., dba Oak Ridge Breast Center, P.C. ("the Breast Center"), are the defendants, referenced collectively as "the Defendants." The Patient reported to the Breast Center on November 15, 2001, for a mammogram. Dr. Rouse read the mammogram and reported his findings as normal. In 2004, the Patient noticed an indentation in her right breast. Follow-up care revealed stage IV incurable breast cancer.
According to the Plaintiffs, the cancer was present in 2001, and was treatable and curable had it been properly detected and reported. The Defendants conceded very little and alleged, as an affirmative defense, that the Patient knew that repeat mammograms were needed but failed to come back until it was too late. The case was tried to a jury over four consecutive days. The jury began deliberations on a Friday and resumed and announced its verdict on the following Monday. It found the Defendants negligent, but apportioned 20% of the fault to the Plaintiffs, apparently based upon the Patient's failure to have a timely follow-up mammogram. The Defendants appeal, raising a host of issues. We affirm.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/farleyr_CORR_081409.pdf
"The points of contention in this case – which are initially less than clear – are, (1) whether, and if so, the extent to which the medical expert’s knowledge of the matters set out in subdivision (a) (1) must be “personal” knowledge , (2) whether an expert licensed in a contiguous state in the relevant time frame must also know the standard of care in a comparable community in order to qualify as a causation expert, and (3) the extent to which the contiguous state requirement can be established to the trial judge’s satisfaction through material not admitted or admissible into evidence." Id.
"We do not believe Eckler went so far as to hold that the bridge of similarity from the community where the expert practices to the community where the defendant doctor practices, must all be built on personal, firsthand knowledge." Id.
"We agree completely with the approach taken in Russell. The quoted language from Payne concerning the “entwined” nature of causation and standard of care testimony is true enough, but should not be read to impose requirements not imposed by the language of the statute. This is especially true given that Payne based its holding on the “clarity” of the statute. We hold that a causation expert who does not testify on the standard of care is not required to establish familiarity with the standard of care." Id. (Case citations omitted)
"To conclude the point, we agree with the trial court that for Dr. Mitchell to take the stand and testify that he reviewed the 2001 mammogram and read it as normal, with no indicators of cancer, was to indirectly comment on the standard of care. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so limiting the scope of Dr. Mitchell’s testimony." Id.
Drug testing evidence allowed in motor vehicle accident to show causation and credibility, no relief for invited error
JOHN C. BLAIR v. ROBERT SULLIVAN, JR., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. April 22, 2009)
This appeal involves the plaintiff's negligence claim which arose from a motor vehicle accident with the defendant. Plaintiff first asserts that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff's positive drug test to be admitted as evidence. Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court's jury instructions were improper and that the jury's verdict is not supported by the evidence. Reviewing plaintiff's first assertion, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug test as evidence. Likewise, we find that the jury instructions were proper and that there is material evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/blairj_081309.pdf
“Here, Plaintiff does not explain how the introduction of the drug test result into evidence would result in unfair prejudice. Plaintiff’s sole complaint is that defendant’s attorney discussed the drug test’s effect on damages during closing argument. As mentioned above, plaintiff failed to object to these statements in the trial court. Because plaintiff does not point to any other prejudice, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the drug test result was not excluded under Tenn. R. Evid. 403.” Id.
“Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred by failing to explain the context of the statute and by failing to omit certain irrelevant provisions of the statute in its instruction. Parties, however, are not entitled to relief on appeal from invited error. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Plaintiff asked the trial court to read the entire statute as a jury instruction. Consequently, he is not entitled to relief on appeal on this issue.” Id.
This appeal involves the plaintiff's negligence claim which arose from a motor vehicle accident with the defendant. Plaintiff first asserts that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff's positive drug test to be admitted as evidence. Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court's jury instructions were improper and that the jury's verdict is not supported by the evidence. Reviewing plaintiff's first assertion, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug test as evidence. Likewise, we find that the jury instructions were proper and that there is material evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/blairj_081309.pdf
“Here, Plaintiff does not explain how the introduction of the drug test result into evidence would result in unfair prejudice. Plaintiff’s sole complaint is that defendant’s attorney discussed the drug test’s effect on damages during closing argument. As mentioned above, plaintiff failed to object to these statements in the trial court. Because plaintiff does not point to any other prejudice, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the drug test result was not excluded under Tenn. R. Evid. 403.” Id.
“Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred by failing to explain the context of the statute and by failing to omit certain irrelevant provisions of the statute in its instruction. Parties, however, are not entitled to relief on appeal from invited error. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Plaintiff asked the trial court to read the entire statute as a jury instruction. Consequently, he is not entitled to relief on appeal on this issue.” Id.
GTLA statutory cap on damages upheld in absence of express waiver from City of Memphis
FAYE BLACK v. CITY OF MEMPHIS (Tenn. Ct. App. April 22, 2009)
This is a wrongful death case against a municipality. In 1987, the plaintiff's teenage son was shot and killed by a police officer. The plaintiff sued the officer and the municipality, asserting claims under both federal and state law. Years of proceedings and delay ensued. By 2005, the only remaining claims were state law claims against the municipality. The parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed a motion for entry of judgment in the amount of $130,000, the maximum damage award under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The plaintiff filed separate motions for interest and costs. The municipality stipulated that if the court entered a judgment it should be in the amount of $130,000, but argued that the plaintiff was prohibited from recovering interest or costs in addition to the $130,000 judgment because such an award would exceed the statutory damage cap. The plaintiff argued that the municipality's misconduct prolonged the case and drove up costs, and that the court had authority to award costs in order to sanction the municipality for this misconduct.
The trial court entered a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $130,000, but denied the plaintiff's motions for interest and costs, finding that the Governmental Tort Liability Act precluded an award of discretionary costs in excess of the statutory cap on damages, and did not award sanctions. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the court has authority to award sanctions in excess of the statutory damage cap. We affirm, finding that the trial court’s order does not indicate a finding that sanctions against the municipality were warranted.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/blackf_081309.pdf
“The statute specifically requires an express waiver before a governmental entity can be held liable for damages in excess of the statutory cap. Ms. Black cites no authority to support her argument that a governmental entity can be deemed to have constructively waived its protection under the GTLA damage cap. This argument is without merit.” Id.
This is a wrongful death case against a municipality. In 1987, the plaintiff's teenage son was shot and killed by a police officer. The plaintiff sued the officer and the municipality, asserting claims under both federal and state law. Years of proceedings and delay ensued. By 2005, the only remaining claims were state law claims against the municipality. The parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed a motion for entry of judgment in the amount of $130,000, the maximum damage award under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The plaintiff filed separate motions for interest and costs. The municipality stipulated that if the court entered a judgment it should be in the amount of $130,000, but argued that the plaintiff was prohibited from recovering interest or costs in addition to the $130,000 judgment because such an award would exceed the statutory damage cap. The plaintiff argued that the municipality's misconduct prolonged the case and drove up costs, and that the court had authority to award costs in order to sanction the municipality for this misconduct.
The trial court entered a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $130,000, but denied the plaintiff's motions for interest and costs, finding that the Governmental Tort Liability Act precluded an award of discretionary costs in excess of the statutory cap on damages, and did not award sanctions. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the court has authority to award sanctions in excess of the statutory damage cap. We affirm, finding that the trial court’s order does not indicate a finding that sanctions against the municipality were warranted.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/blackf_081309.pdf
“The statute specifically requires an express waiver before a governmental entity can be held liable for damages in excess of the statutory cap. Ms. Black cites no authority to support her argument that a governmental entity can be deemed to have constructively waived its protection under the GTLA damage cap. This argument is without merit.” Id.
Arbitration Agreement within 11 page contract found enforcible due, in large part to signature
CORINE BROADNAX, Individually and as heir and on behalf of the Estate of Mary Alice Johnson v. QUINCE NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. April 22, 2009)
The parties to a nursing home Admission Agreement dispute the enforceability of its arbitration provision. The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration provision. The nursing home appealed. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration.
The entire text of this opinion can be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/broadnaxc_081009.pdf
“Although we agree that mutual assent is essential to the formation of a contract, mutual assent is gathered from the language of the contract rather than the unexpressed or undisclosed intentions of the parties. 'The law conclusively presumes that the parties to a contract understood its obligations, and evidence is not admissible to show that their understanding was in fact otherwise.’” Id. (Case Citations Omitted)
“Based on the cases cited above, we find it inappropriate to relieve Ms. Broadnax from the operation of the Arbitration Agreement, due to her failure to read the document before signing it. In so ruling, we note that Ms. Broadnax had the ability to ask questions concerning the documents, was free to seek independent legal advice, and was given ample time to review the documents.” Id.
“Moreover, the Arbitration Agreement expressly stated that by signing such, Ms. Broadnax was 'giving up and waiving [her] constitutional right to have any claim decided in a court of law before a judge and a jury,' that execution was not a precondition to admission or the furnishing of services, and that it could be rescinded within thirty days. We further note that although the Arbitration Agreement was attached to a somewhat lengthy document, the Admission Agreement contained a table of contents, which should have drawn Ms. Broadnax’s attention to the inclusion of the Arbitration Agreement, which was a separate exhibit. Because Ms. Broadnax has failed to prove that Nursing Home either misrepresented the terms of the Arbitration Agreement or acted fraudulently in inducing her to sign such, we find that Ms. Broadnax’s signature evidences her assent to be bound by the Arbitration Agreement’s terms.” Id.
The parties to a nursing home Admission Agreement dispute the enforceability of its arbitration provision. The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration provision. The nursing home appealed. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration.
The entire text of this opinion can be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/broadnaxc_081009.pdf
“Although we agree that mutual assent is essential to the formation of a contract, mutual assent is gathered from the language of the contract rather than the unexpressed or undisclosed intentions of the parties. 'The law conclusively presumes that the parties to a contract understood its obligations, and evidence is not admissible to show that their understanding was in fact otherwise.’” Id. (Case Citations Omitted)
“Based on the cases cited above, we find it inappropriate to relieve Ms. Broadnax from the operation of the Arbitration Agreement, due to her failure to read the document before signing it. In so ruling, we note that Ms. Broadnax had the ability to ask questions concerning the documents, was free to seek independent legal advice, and was given ample time to review the documents.” Id.
“Moreover, the Arbitration Agreement expressly stated that by signing such, Ms. Broadnax was 'giving up and waiving [her] constitutional right to have any claim decided in a court of law before a judge and a jury,' that execution was not a precondition to admission or the furnishing of services, and that it could be rescinded within thirty days. We further note that although the Arbitration Agreement was attached to a somewhat lengthy document, the Admission Agreement contained a table of contents, which should have drawn Ms. Broadnax’s attention to the inclusion of the Arbitration Agreement, which was a separate exhibit. Because Ms. Broadnax has failed to prove that Nursing Home either misrepresented the terms of the Arbitration Agreement or acted fraudulently in inducing her to sign such, we find that Ms. Broadnax’s signature evidences her assent to be bound by the Arbitration Agreement’s terms.” Id.
Intentional delay in advancing claim based on defendant health and misunderstanding of state intention to delay not sufficient to overcome statute of limitations.
HARRY SKIPPER, et ux v. STATE OF TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2009.)
Mr. Skipper filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission, alleging that Tennessee Department of Transportation snow plow operator Dennis Burns crossed the center line, striking him. Mr. Burns became ill with cancer, and his deposition was scheduled three times before it was successfully taken. Following Mr. Burns' deposition, Mr. Skipper failed to advance his claim for a period of one year, and the Claims Commission dismissed his claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(b). Mr. Skipper sought relief from the dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 6.02, 59, and 60.02. Mr. Skipper's counsel claimed that he failed to act in order to allow Mr. Burns time to recover, so that he could testify live at trial. He further stated that it was his understanding that the State would contact him once such recovery was made. The Claims Commission denied Mr. Skipper relief from the order of dismissal, and Mr. Skipper appealed to this Court. We affirm.
Full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/skipperh_080309.pdf
Mr. Skipper filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission, alleging that Tennessee Department of Transportation snow plow operator Dennis Burns crossed the center line, striking him. Mr. Burns became ill with cancer, and his deposition was scheduled three times before it was successfully taken. Following Mr. Burns' deposition, Mr. Skipper failed to advance his claim for a period of one year, and the Claims Commission dismissed his claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(b). Mr. Skipper sought relief from the dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 6.02, 59, and 60.02. Mr. Skipper's counsel claimed that he failed to act in order to allow Mr. Burns time to recover, so that he could testify live at trial. He further stated that it was his understanding that the State would contact him once such recovery was made. The Claims Commission denied Mr. Skipper relief from the order of dismissal, and Mr. Skipper appealed to this Court. We affirm.
Full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/skipperh_080309.pdf
Monday, April 26, 2010
Court reviews summary judgment ruling in a collision between an automobile and a pedestrian
DANNY J. PHILLIPS v. WILLIAM T. MULLINS (Tenn. Ct. App. April 26, 2010)
Danny J. Phillips ("Plaintiff") sued William T. Mullins ("Defendant") after a truck driven by Defendant struck and injured Plaintiff who was riding a bicycle. Defendant moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order granting Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reverse the grant of summary judgment finding that there are disputed issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/phillipsd_042610.pdf
Danny J. Phillips ("Plaintiff") sued William T. Mullins ("Defendant") after a truck driven by Defendant struck and injured Plaintiff who was riding a bicycle. Defendant moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order granting Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reverse the grant of summary judgment finding that there are disputed issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/phillipsd_042610.pdf
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Court reviews denial of motion for a new trial based on evidence that was not admitted during trial
DUANE MCCRORY v. ANTHONY TRIBBLE and CYNTHIA TRIBBLE (Tenn. Ct. App. April 22, 2010)
This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff worker allegedly injured his knee while in the defendants' home. The plaintiff visited a doctor the next day, and ultimately had surgery on the knee the next month. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging premises liability. A jury trial was held. After the testimony concluded, the trial court declined to include a jury instruction requested by the plaintiff.
During closing arguments, the plaintiff's attorney started to read from a deposition that had not been entered into evidence; the trial court sustained a timely objection. Also during closing argument, the closing remarks of the defendant's attorney alerted the plaintiff's attorney to the fact that a particular medical record was not a part of the evidence submitted to the jury. While the jury was deliberating, the plaintiff sought to reopen proof to admit into evidence the omitted medical record; the trial court declined to reopen the proof. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/mccroryd_042210.pdf
This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff worker allegedly injured his knee while in the defendants' home. The plaintiff visited a doctor the next day, and ultimately had surgery on the knee the next month. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging premises liability. A jury trial was held. After the testimony concluded, the trial court declined to include a jury instruction requested by the plaintiff.
During closing arguments, the plaintiff's attorney started to read from a deposition that had not been entered into evidence; the trial court sustained a timely objection. Also during closing argument, the closing remarks of the defendant's attorney alerted the plaintiff's attorney to the fact that a particular medical record was not a part of the evidence submitted to the jury. While the jury was deliberating, the plaintiff sought to reopen proof to admit into evidence the omitted medical record; the trial court declined to reopen the proof. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/mccroryd_042210.pdf
Court reviews sufficiency of service of process in a medical malpractice case
STEPHANIE JONES and HOWARD JONES v. RENGA I. VASU, M.D., THE NEUROLOGY CLINIC, and METHODIST LEBONHEUR HOSPITAL (Tenn. Ct. App. April 22, 2010)
This appeal involves delay of service of process. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging medical malpractice by the defendants almost a year earlier. The plaintiffs delayed service on the defendants until they had an expert witness review their claim. Summonses were issued to the defendants over eleven months after the complaint was filed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, alleging insufficiency of service of process, and asserting that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the defendants' motion. The defendants appeal. We reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing the complaint, finding that the delay of prompt service of process rendered the filing of the complaint ineffective to commence the action and stop the running of the statute of limitations.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/joness_042210.pdf
This appeal involves delay of service of process. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging medical malpractice by the defendants almost a year earlier. The plaintiffs delayed service on the defendants until they had an expert witness review their claim. Summonses were issued to the defendants over eleven months after the complaint was filed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, alleging insufficiency of service of process, and asserting that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the defendants' motion. The defendants appeal. We reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing the complaint, finding that the delay of prompt service of process rendered the filing of the complaint ineffective to commence the action and stop the running of the statute of limitations.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/joness_042210.pdf
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Court reviews breach of contract claim between insurance company and customer
JOHN COOK, JR. v. PERMANENT GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP. (Tenn. Ct. App. April 21, 2010)
This appeal involves the alleged breach of an insurance policy. The plaintiff insured had an automobile insurance policy with the defendant insurance company. The insured paid his insurance premium by check. He subsequently was involved in an automobile accident and notified the insurance company of the accident. The check was later returned for insufficient funds. The insurance company notified the insured that if he did not bring the premium current by a date certain, his insurance policy would be cancelled. The insured gave the insurance company a valid check for the premium, which was negotiated. The insurance company later cancelled the policy, retroactive to a date prior to the insured's automobile accident. The insured sued the insurance company for breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff insured. The insurance company appeals. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/cookj_042110.pdf
This appeal involves the alleged breach of an insurance policy. The plaintiff insured had an automobile insurance policy with the defendant insurance company. The insured paid his insurance premium by check. He subsequently was involved in an automobile accident and notified the insurance company of the accident. The check was later returned for insufficient funds. The insurance company notified the insured that if he did not bring the premium current by a date certain, his insurance policy would be cancelled. The insured gave the insurance company a valid check for the premium, which was negotiated. The insurance company later cancelled the policy, retroactive to a date prior to the insured's automobile accident. The insured sued the insurance company for breach of contract. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff insured. The insurance company appeals. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/cookj_042110.pdf
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
Court reviews jury verdict for hunting accident case involving claims of emotional distress
BOBBY GERALD RILEY ET. AL v. JAMES ORR (Tenn. Ct. App. April 20, 2010)
This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages.
The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the award for future medical expenses, and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/rileyb_042010.pdf
This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages.
The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the award for future medical expenses, and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/rileyb_042010.pdf
Monday, April 19, 2010
Court reviews trial court's determination that plaintiff's injury was the result of an automobile accident
EFFIE RIVERS v. NORTHWEST TENNESSEE HUMAN RESOURCE AGENCY (Tenn. Ct. App. April 19, 2010)
This is a personal injury case. The defendant's employee negligently backed the defendant's vehicle into the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had reported discomfort in her shoulders to her physician. At some point after the accident, the plaintiff reported to her physician that she had pain in her right shoulder. Ultimately, the plaintiff required shoulder replacement surgery. The plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The parties stipulated to the defendant's liability, and a bench trial was held on causation and damages. Based in part on deposition testimony of physicians, the trial court found that the accident caused the plaintiff's injury and the ensuing surgery and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/riverse_041910.pdf
This is a personal injury case. The defendant's employee negligently backed the defendant's vehicle into the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had reported discomfort in her shoulders to her physician. At some point after the accident, the plaintiff reported to her physician that she had pain in her right shoulder. Ultimately, the plaintiff required shoulder replacement surgery. The plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The parties stipulated to the defendant's liability, and a bench trial was held on causation and damages. Based in part on deposition testimony of physicians, the trial court found that the accident caused the plaintiff's injury and the ensuing surgery and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/riverse_041910.pdf
Thursday, April 15, 2010
Court reviews use of Family Purpose Doctrine in automobile accident case.
ROBERT STRINE, ET AL. v. JOSHUA WALTON, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. April 15, 2010)
On July 7, 2005, Ashley Strine (Plaintiff) was injured while riding in a vehicle being driven by Joshua Walton (Walton). The vehicle was owned by James Rice (Father), who had given the vehicle to his son, Kevin Rice (Son), for Son's personal use. On the day of the accident, Son had given Walton permission to use his vehicle to pick up Plaintiff. Walton and Plaintiff were planning on attending a birthday party later that day.
Plaintiff originally sued only Walton and Father. As to Father, Plaintiff asserted liability based on the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. Over two years later, Son was added as a defendant. An order of compromise and dismissal was entered as to Walton. Thereafter, Father and Son filed a joint motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Father summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. With regard to Son, the Trial Court concluded that all claims against him were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/striner_041510.pdf
On July 7, 2005, Ashley Strine (Plaintiff) was injured while riding in a vehicle being driven by Joshua Walton (Walton). The vehicle was owned by James Rice (Father), who had given the vehicle to his son, Kevin Rice (Son), for Son's personal use. On the day of the accident, Son had given Walton permission to use his vehicle to pick up Plaintiff. Walton and Plaintiff were planning on attending a birthday party later that day.
Plaintiff originally sued only Walton and Father. As to Father, Plaintiff asserted liability based on the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. Over two years later, Son was added as a defendant. An order of compromise and dismissal was entered as to Walton. Thereafter, Father and Son filed a joint motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Father summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. With regard to Son, the Trial Court concluded that all claims against him were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/striner_041510.pdf
TWCA reviews use of a physician's impairment rating in workers' compensation case.
ANNEMARIE TUBBS v. ST. THOMAS HOSPITAL (TWCA April 15, 2010)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee developed a latex allergy as a result of her employment at a hospital, and the hospital made certain accommodations that enabled the employee to continue working. However, the employee's sensitivity to latex increased over the years, and she eventually left her job.
The employee filed a petition seeking workers' compensation benefits in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the employee 60% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On this appeal, the employer contends that the treating physician's impairment rating should not have been admitted into evidence because it was not in accordance with the AMA Guides. The employer also argues that a lower impairment should have been used by the trial court and that the award should have been capped. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/tubbsa_041510.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee developed a latex allergy as a result of her employment at a hospital, and the hospital made certain accommodations that enabled the employee to continue working. However, the employee's sensitivity to latex increased over the years, and she eventually left her job.
The employee filed a petition seeking workers' compensation benefits in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the employee 60% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On this appeal, the employer contends that the treating physician's impairment rating should not have been admitted into evidence because it was not in accordance with the AMA Guides. The employer also argues that a lower impairment should have been used by the trial court and that the award should have been capped. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/tubbsa_041510.pdf
TWCA reviews petition to set aside settlement of a worker's compensation claim
WILLIAM DOWNEY v. GRIFFIN INDUSTRIES (TWCA April 15, 2010)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court approved a settlement of this workers' compensation claim. The settlement was presented to the court by means of an affidavit executed by the employee and a telephone conference between the court and the employee. Approximately six weeks later, the employee petitioned to set aside the settlement under Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-206(a) and alternatively, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The trial court dismissed the petition for relief from Judgment. The employee has appealed. We affirm the order dismissing the petition to set the settlement aside.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/downeyw_041510.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court approved a settlement of this workers' compensation claim. The settlement was presented to the court by means of an affidavit executed by the employee and a telephone conference between the court and the employee. Approximately six weeks later, the employee petitioned to set aside the settlement under Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-206(a) and alternatively, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The trial court dismissed the petition for relief from Judgment. The employee has appealed. We affirm the order dismissing the petition to set the settlement aside.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/downeyw_041510.pdf
TWCA reviews whether a permanent partial disability award was excessive
LARRY BAIN v. TRW, INC. ET AL. (TWCA April 15, 2010)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. An employee sustained a work-related repetitive exposure hearing loss injury. After he retired for reasons unrelated to the injury, he filed suit in the Criminal Court for Wilson County seeking workers' compensation benefits. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded 65% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears and set the date of injury as the date that the employee first learned of his hearing loss. The employer appealed arguing that the award was excessive and that the trial court erred in setting the date of injury. We find that the award was excessive and modify it to 15% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears. We have also determined that the trial court erred with regard to its determination of the date of the injury.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/bainl_041510.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. An employee sustained a work-related repetitive exposure hearing loss injury. After he retired for reasons unrelated to the injury, he filed suit in the Criminal Court for Wilson County seeking workers' compensation benefits. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded 65% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears and set the date of injury as the date that the employee first learned of his hearing loss. The employer appealed arguing that the award was excessive and that the trial court erred in setting the date of injury. We find that the award was excessive and modify it to 15% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears. We have also determined that the trial court erred with regard to its determination of the date of the injury.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/bainl_041510.pdf
Friday, April 9, 2010
Court reviews wrongful death award in automobile accident case
LAURA WILBURN, as the Personal Representative of SON JONES, Deceased v. CITY OF MEMPHIS (Tenn. Ct. App. April 9, 2010)
Decedent was struck and killed by an on-duty City of Memphis police officer while attempting to cross the street. The trial court awarded $7,500.00 in a wrongful death award. Decedent's personal representative appeals, seeking an increased award. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/wilburnl_040910.pdf
Decedent was struck and killed by an on-duty City of Memphis police officer while attempting to cross the street. The trial court awarded $7,500.00 in a wrongful death award. Decedent's personal representative appeals, seeking an increased award. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/wilburnl_040910.pdf
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Court reviews whether defendant properly showed that it met the standard of care in medical malpractice case
ALVIN FLATT v. CLAIBORNE COUNTY HOSPITAL AND NURSING HOME (Tenn. Ct. App. April 8, 2010)
In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff offered evidence of the standard of care required of defendant by an expert witness, and defendant offered evidence that it complied with the standard of care by an expert witness, who was accepted as an expert by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge ruled in favor of defendant, essentially accepting the defendant's evidence that it had met the standard of care for the deceased. Plaintiff appealed, insisting that the Trial Court did not "correctly weigh the conflicting expert testimony" in its ruling for the defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/flatta_040810.pdf
In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff offered evidence of the standard of care required of defendant by an expert witness, and defendant offered evidence that it complied with the standard of care by an expert witness, who was accepted as an expert by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge ruled in favor of defendant, essentially accepting the defendant's evidence that it had met the standard of care for the deceased. Plaintiff appealed, insisting that the Trial Court did not "correctly weigh the conflicting expert testimony" in its ruling for the defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/flatta_040810.pdf
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Court reviews denial of summary judgment and tolling of the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case
HARRISON KERR TIGRETT v. JOHN E. LINN, M. D, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. March 31, 2010)
This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal of the denial of a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case. The trial court denied Appellants/Defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann.section 29-26-116(a)(3), was tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment on the part of Appellants/Defendants. Finding that there are material issues of fact in dispute, we affirm the trial court's denial of Appellants' motions for summary judgment. We, however, vacate any decision that the statute of limitations was tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/tigretth_033110.pdf
This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal of the denial of a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case. The trial court denied Appellants/Defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann.section 29-26-116(a)(3), was tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment on the part of Appellants/Defendants. Finding that there are material issues of fact in dispute, we affirm the trial court's denial of Appellants' motions for summary judgment. We, however, vacate any decision that the statute of limitations was tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/tigretth_033110.pdf
TWCA reviews whether the trial court properly awarded permanent partial disability benefits where employee's employer was sold to another entity
REGINA DAY v. ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE (TWCA March 31, 2010)
In this workers' compensation action, the employee, Regina Day, sustained compensable injuries to both of her shoulders. She returned to her pre-injury job, but the holding company which owned her employer had been sold to another entity. The employer, which had been a corporation, became a limited liability company (LLC). The trial court, applying existing case law, held that she had not returned to work for her pre-injury employer and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the statutory cap contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by failing to apply the cap or, in the alternative, that the award is excessive. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/dayr_033110.pdf
In this workers' compensation action, the employee, Regina Day, sustained compensable injuries to both of her shoulders. She returned to her pre-injury job, but the holding company which owned her employer had been sold to another entity. The employer, which had been a corporation, became a limited liability company (LLC). The trial court, applying existing case law, held that she had not returned to work for her pre-injury employer and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the statutory cap contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by failing to apply the cap or, in the alternative, that the award is excessive. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/dayr_033110.pdf
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
Court reviews summary judgment ruling based on the Equine Activities Act
LOWELL SMITH ET AL. v. STEPHEN DOUGLAS PHILLIPS, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. March 30, 2010)
A man was bitten by a horse while on a trail ride with friends. He sued the owner of the horse that bit him, claiming that the owner had failed to properly restrain or control his animal. The trial court granted summary judgment to the owner, ruling that he was entitled to immunity under the Equine Activities Act, Tenn. Code Ann. section 44-20-101 et seq. The Act must be strictly construed, since it is in derogation of common law. We hold that under a strict construction of the act, the defendant is not entitled to immunity, and we accordingly reverse the trial court.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/smithl_033010.pdf
A man was bitten by a horse while on a trail ride with friends. He sued the owner of the horse that bit him, claiming that the owner had failed to properly restrain or control his animal. The trial court granted summary judgment to the owner, ruling that he was entitled to immunity under the Equine Activities Act, Tenn. Code Ann. section 44-20-101 et seq. The Act must be strictly construed, since it is in derogation of common law. We hold that under a strict construction of the act, the defendant is not entitled to immunity, and we accordingly reverse the trial court.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/smithl_033010.pdf
Friday, March 26, 2010
Memphis Daily News: Tenn. Doctors Continue Pursuit of Malpractice Caps
Tenn. doctors shift focus on malpractice caps (March 26, 2010)
Tennessee doctors pushed for Congress to cap malpractice awards in the new national health care law, but the final bill included no such limits. The Memphis Daily News reports they now are turning their attention to the next General Assembly. The incoming president of the Tennessee Medical Association says the group will poll state legislative candidates about their position on malpractice caps and post responses on its web site. While the association argues that Tennessee is losing talented doctors to states that have malpractice caps, a number of those states are dealing with court challenges to the laws, making the legal landscape uncertain for lawyers and physicians alike.
Tennessee doctors pushed for Congress to cap malpractice awards in the new national health care law, but the final bill included no such limits. The Memphis Daily News reports they now are turning their attention to the next General Assembly. The incoming president of the Tennessee Medical Association says the group will poll state legislative candidates about their position on malpractice caps and post responses on its web site. While the association argues that Tennessee is losing talented doctors to states that have malpractice caps, a number of those states are dealing with court challenges to the laws, making the legal landscape uncertain for lawyers and physicians alike.
Thursday, March 25, 2010
Court reviews an employer's petition to intervene in employee's tort case.
EDUARDO SANTANDER, Plaintiff-Appellee, AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO., Intervenor-Appellant, v. OSCAR R. LOPEZ, Defendant (Tenn. Ct. App. March 25, 2010)
Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident during the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff brought a tort action against the driver of the other vehicle, and subsequently entered into a settlement with his employer and the workers' compensation carrier. Plaintiff then reached a settlement in the tort case, but before Judgment was entered his employer filed a Petition to Intervene in that case, asserting a subrogation lien on the tort recovery. The Trial Judge refused to allow intervention on the grounds that the Petition to Intervene was not timely filed. On appeal, we reverse and remand.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/santandere_032510.pdf
Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident during the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff brought a tort action against the driver of the other vehicle, and subsequently entered into a settlement with his employer and the workers' compensation carrier. Plaintiff then reached a settlement in the tort case, but before Judgment was entered his employer filed a Petition to Intervene in that case, asserting a subrogation lien on the tort recovery. The Trial Judge refused to allow intervention on the grounds that the Petition to Intervene was not timely filed. On appeal, we reverse and remand.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/santandere_032510.pdf
Monday, March 15, 2010
Knoxville News Sentinel: Physicians, lawyers watching for law to impact premiums
Medical malpractice law has mixed results (March 15, 2010)
Changes in Tennessee's medical malpractice laws has produced a dramatic drop in the number of lawsuits filed according to data released by the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts. Anecdotal reports by doctors, however, indicate little relief in malpractice insurance premiums. Under legislation passed in 2008, patients must give a 60-day notice before filing a malpractice lawsuit and get documentation that the claim has merit. Data shows a 59 percent drop in suits since the law went into effect. By contrast, physicians report they have not seen a dramatic decrease in insurance premiums; but have not had dramatic increases either.
Changes in Tennessee's medical malpractice laws has produced a dramatic drop in the number of lawsuits filed according to data released by the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts. Anecdotal reports by doctors, however, indicate little relief in malpractice insurance premiums. Under legislation passed in 2008, patients must give a 60-day notice before filing a malpractice lawsuit and get documentation that the claim has merit. Data shows a 59 percent drop in suits since the law went into effect. By contrast, physicians report they have not seen a dramatic decrease in insurance premiums; but have not had dramatic increases either.
Court reviews trial court's rulings on the sufficiency of an amended complaint and its dismissal of wrongful death and loss of consortium claims in a medical malpractice case.
TINA TAYLOR, ET AL. v. LAKESIDE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM (Tenn. Ct. App. March 15, 2010)
This is a medical malpractice case. Appellant filed suit against Appellee Hospital after Appellant's decedent suffered several falls and a broken hip while a patient at Appellee Hospital.
The trial court granted Appellee Hospital's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion, thereby dismissing Appellant's amended complaint. Specifically, the trial court held: (1) that the amended complaint was ineffective to give notice to Appellee Hospital because it did not reference the date(s) of decedent's falls, (2) that the medical malpractice claim and hedonic damages of the widow arising therefrom were dismissed by previous orders of the court, and (3) that the proof did not support the averments made in the amended complaint.
After review, we conclude: (1) that the amended complaint is sufficiently specific to satisfy Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8, and to state a claim for medical malpractice against the Appellee Hospital, (2) that the previous orders of the trial court only dismissed the wrongful death claims and widow's loss of consortium claims arising therefrom, and not the medical malpractice claims, and (3) that the trial court reviewed matters outside the pleadings so as to trigger summary judgment analysis under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03, and (4) that there are disputes of material fact in this case so as to necessitate a full evidentiary hearing on the medical malpractice claim. Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the medical malpractice claim against Appellee Hospital and on the widow's loss of consortium claims arising from the alleged medical malpractice.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/taylort_031510.pdf
This is a medical malpractice case. Appellant filed suit against Appellee Hospital after Appellant's decedent suffered several falls and a broken hip while a patient at Appellee Hospital.
The trial court granted Appellee Hospital's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion, thereby dismissing Appellant's amended complaint. Specifically, the trial court held: (1) that the amended complaint was ineffective to give notice to Appellee Hospital because it did not reference the date(s) of decedent's falls, (2) that the medical malpractice claim and hedonic damages of the widow arising therefrom were dismissed by previous orders of the court, and (3) that the proof did not support the averments made in the amended complaint.
After review, we conclude: (1) that the amended complaint is sufficiently specific to satisfy Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8, and to state a claim for medical malpractice against the Appellee Hospital, (2) that the previous orders of the trial court only dismissed the wrongful death claims and widow's loss of consortium claims arising therefrom, and not the medical malpractice claims, and (3) that the trial court reviewed matters outside the pleadings so as to trigger summary judgment analysis under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03, and (4) that there are disputes of material fact in this case so as to necessitate a full evidentiary hearing on the medical malpractice claim. Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the medical malpractice claim against Appellee Hospital and on the widow's loss of consortium claims arising from the alleged medical malpractice.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/taylort_031510.pdf
Court reviews products liability and negligence claims in a case about a bus accident
CLIFTON LAKE, ET AL. v. THE MEMPHIS LANDSMEN, L.L.C., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App March 15, 2010)
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a negligence and products liability case. Appellant-Husband was injured when the bus, on which he was a passenger, collided with a concrete truck. Appellant-Husband and Appellant-Wife filed suit against Appellees- the bus manufacturer, the bus owner, and the franchisor.
Following trial, the jury found that the Appellants had suffered $8,543,630.00 in damages, but found that none of the Appellees were at fault and apportioned one hundred percent of the fault to a non-party. Appellants appeal.
We find that Appellants' claims based on the use of tempered glass in the side windows of the bus, and the lack of passenger seatbelts in the bus are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. section 30101 et seq. Further, we find that the Appellants failed to present evidence that the use of perimeter seating in the bus caused the injuries. Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in not granting Appellees' motions for directed verdict on the Appellants' claims based on the use of perimeter seating. Reversed and remanded.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/lakec_031510.pdf
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a negligence and products liability case. Appellant-Husband was injured when the bus, on which he was a passenger, collided with a concrete truck. Appellant-Husband and Appellant-Wife filed suit against Appellees- the bus manufacturer, the bus owner, and the franchisor.
Following trial, the jury found that the Appellants had suffered $8,543,630.00 in damages, but found that none of the Appellees were at fault and apportioned one hundred percent of the fault to a non-party. Appellants appeal.
We find that Appellants' claims based on the use of tempered glass in the side windows of the bus, and the lack of passenger seatbelts in the bus are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. section 30101 et seq. Further, we find that the Appellants failed to present evidence that the use of perimeter seating in the bus caused the injuries. Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in not granting Appellees' motions for directed verdict on the Appellants' claims based on the use of perimeter seating. Reversed and remanded.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/lakec_031510.pdf
Friday, March 12, 2010
Standards for Nursing Services in Residential Hospices
Standards for Nursing Services in Residential Hospices (TN Attorney General Opinions March 12, 2010)
In this opinion, the Attorney General examines whether a federal interpretive guideline contained in the recent interim final Hospice Program Interpretive Guidance preempts or modifies the applicable Tennessee Department of Health rule
regarding nursing services in residential hospices. He determined that the federal guideline does not modify the Tennessee rule because the federal guideline requires that hospice staff comply with both state and federal laws and that in the case of a difference in licensing requirements between the state law and federal law, the regulation requires the hospice to meet the more stringent of the two requirements.
The full opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/AG/2010/ag_10_32.pdf
In this opinion, the Attorney General examines whether a federal interpretive guideline contained in the recent interim final Hospice Program Interpretive Guidance preempts or modifies the applicable Tennessee Department of Health rule
regarding nursing services in residential hospices. He determined that the federal guideline does not modify the Tennessee rule because the federal guideline requires that hospice staff comply with both state and federal laws and that in the case of a difference in licensing requirements between the state law and federal law, the regulation requires the hospice to meet the more stringent of the two requirements.
The full opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/AG/2010/ag_10_32.pdf
TWCA reviews award of benefits for hearing loss in worker's compensation case
ARETIES McKAMEY v. LOCKHEED MARTIN ENERGY SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL. (TWCA March 12, 2010)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a hearing loss as a result of exposure to noise during her work from 1944 to 1989 as a telephone operator for her employer, and awarded 50% permanent partial disability ("PPD") of the hearing of both ears. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding on the issue of causation. Alternatively, it argues that the award is excessive. We reverse the judgment and dismiss the complaint.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/mckameya_031210.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a hearing loss as a result of exposure to noise during her work from 1944 to 1989 as a telephone operator for her employer, and awarded 50% permanent partial disability ("PPD") of the hearing of both ears. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding on the issue of causation. Alternatively, it argues that the award is excessive. We reverse the judgment and dismiss the complaint.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/mckameya_031210.pdf
TCA affirms Summary Judgment finding Plaintiff's expert witness did not meet statutory requirements
GEORGE H. BADGETT, ET AL. v. ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEMS SUNBELT, INC. d/b/a TENNESSEE CHRISTIAN MEDICAL CENTER (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2009)
In this action concerning alleged malpractice by hospital staff, the trial court found plaintiff's expert affidavit failed to meet the locality test of Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115 where the only similarities proven between the medical communities were population, existence of feeder hospitals and existence of medical school. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/badgettg_080309.pdf
In this action concerning alleged malpractice by hospital staff, the trial court found plaintiff's expert affidavit failed to meet the locality test of Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115 where the only similarities proven between the medical communities were population, existence of feeder hospitals and existence of medical school. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/badgettg_080309.pdf
Court holds that amended medical expert afffidavit met Tenn. Code requirements
NANCY L. LANE v. JODI D. MCCARTNEY, M.D., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2009)
Nancy L. Lane ("Plaintiff") sued Karen K. Lauer-Silva, M.D. and Medical Education Assistance Corporation d/b/a ETSU Physicians & Associates ("Defendants") alleging medical malpractice. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing on Defendants' motion, the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff's expert witness did not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115, and granting Defendants summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend along with a Second Supplemental Affidavit from Plaintiff's expert. The Trial Court considered the Second Supplemental Affidavit and found that Plaintiff's expert still did not satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115, and again granted Defendants summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reverse.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/lanen_073109.pdf
Nancy L. Lane ("Plaintiff") sued Karen K. Lauer-Silva, M.D. and Medical Education Assistance Corporation d/b/a ETSU Physicians & Associates ("Defendants") alleging medical malpractice. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing on Defendants' motion, the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff's expert witness did not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115, and granting Defendants summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend along with a Second Supplemental Affidavit from Plaintiff's expert. The Trial Court considered the Second Supplemental Affidavit and found that Plaintiff's expert still did not satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. section 29-26-115, and again granted Defendants summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reverse.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/lanen_073109.pdf
Michigan hospital reduces lawsuits by admitting mistakes
University of Michigan Hospital has reduced lawsuits by admitting mistakes.
Admitting mistakes reduces suits at Michigan hospital At the University of Michigan Health System, doctors and lawyers say admitting mistakes up front and offering compensation before being sued have brought about remarkable savings in money, time and feelings. "What we are doing is common decency," said Richard Boothman, a veteran malpractice defense lawyer and chief risk officer for a health system with 18,000 employees and a $1.5 billion annual budget.
The right of injured patients to sue health care providers and force them to open up their internal records is a crucial part of reducing medical mistakes and improving care, said Matthew Gaier, co-chairman of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association’s medical malpractice committee.
For “saying sorry” to work, doctors need protection from having their own honesty used against them in court, said Jim Copland, director of the Manhattan Institute’s Center for Legal Policy and an advocate of curbs on damage suits. Protection could take the form of a shield law that would exclude an apology from admission as evidence in a malpractice suit. A number of states have or are considering such laws.
“If you go out and say, ‘Oh, we messed up, are you going to lose the lawsuit? You need to give them some protection,” Copland said.
The full text of this article may be found by following the link below:
http://www.nwtntoday.com/news.php?viewStory=29312
Admitting mistakes reduces suits at Michigan hospital At the University of Michigan Health System, doctors and lawyers say admitting mistakes up front and offering compensation before being sued have brought about remarkable savings in money, time and feelings. "What we are doing is common decency," said Richard Boothman, a veteran malpractice defense lawyer and chief risk officer for a health system with 18,000 employees and a $1.5 billion annual budget.
The right of injured patients to sue health care providers and force them to open up their internal records is a crucial part of reducing medical mistakes and improving care, said Matthew Gaier, co-chairman of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association’s medical malpractice committee.
For “saying sorry” to work, doctors need protection from having their own honesty used against them in court, said Jim Copland, director of the Manhattan Institute’s Center for Legal Policy and an advocate of curbs on damage suits. Protection could take the form of a shield law that would exclude an apology from admission as evidence in a malpractice suit. A number of states have or are considering such laws.
“If you go out and say, ‘Oh, we messed up, are you going to lose the lawsuit? You need to give them some protection,” Copland said.
The full text of this article may be found by following the link below:
http://www.nwtntoday.com/news.php?viewStory=29312
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Court reviews summary judgment finding in alcohol-related wrongful death case
EDWARD P. LANDRY, et al., v. SOUTH CUMBERLAND AMOCO, et al. (Tenn. Ct. App. March 11, 2010)
Plaintiffs brought this wrongful death action against defendants for the wrongful death of Brandi Coyle, who died as a result of a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by an underage intoxicated driver who had purchased intoxicating beverages from South Cumberland Amoco. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs would be unable to prove essential elements of their claim. The Trial Court held that the alleged underage driver had stated initially that he was over the age of 21, but later, in another statement, represented that he was a minor at the time of the accident. The Trial Judge held that his statements cancelled each other and there was no evidence to establish that he was a minor at the time of the accident. The Court also held that plaintiffs could not prove that the South Cumberland Amoco cashier had "knowingly sold intoxicating beverages to a minor". On appeal, we vacate the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/landrye_031110.pdf
Plaintiffs brought this wrongful death action against defendants for the wrongful death of Brandi Coyle, who died as a result of a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by an underage intoxicated driver who had purchased intoxicating beverages from South Cumberland Amoco. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs would be unable to prove essential elements of their claim. The Trial Court held that the alleged underage driver had stated initially that he was over the age of 21, but later, in another statement, represented that he was a minor at the time of the accident. The Trial Judge held that his statements cancelled each other and there was no evidence to establish that he was a minor at the time of the accident. The Court also held that plaintiffs could not prove that the South Cumberland Amoco cashier had "knowingly sold intoxicating beverages to a minor". On appeal, we vacate the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/landrye_031110.pdf
Court reviews summary judgment ruling in invasion of privacy and defamation case.
TERESA GARD v. DENNIS HARRIS, M.D., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App March 11, 2010)
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging false light invasion of privacy and defamation after her physician sent a letter she considered defamatory. After finding that plaintiff consented to the disclosure by signing a consent form, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/gardt_031110.pdf
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging false light invasion of privacy and defamation after her physician sent a letter she considered defamatory. After finding that plaintiff consented to the disclosure by signing a consent form, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/gardt_031110.pdf
TWCA reviews finding of work-related cause of employee's hearing loss in worker's compensation case
GEORGE CECIL RESH v. BUILDING MATERIALS CORPORATION d/b/a GAF FIBERGLASS CORPORATION (TWCA March 11, 2010)
In this workers' compensation case, the employee, George Cecil Resh, alleged that he sustained hearing loss due to exposure to a harmful level of noise in his workplace. The employer, Building Materials Corporation, denied that the employee's hearing loss was work-related. The trial court found in favor of the employee and awarded 50% permanent partial disability of the hearing of both ears. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding. Because we find that the expert medical evidence failed to establish that Mr. Resh's hearing loss was work-related, we agree and reverse the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/reshg_031110.pdf
In this workers' compensation case, the employee, George Cecil Resh, alleged that he sustained hearing loss due to exposure to a harmful level of noise in his workplace. The employer, Building Materials Corporation, denied that the employee's hearing loss was work-related. The trial court found in favor of the employee and awarded 50% permanent partial disability of the hearing of both ears. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding. Because we find that the expert medical evidence failed to establish that Mr. Resh's hearing loss was work-related, we agree and reverse the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/reshg_031110.pdf
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
TCA examines insurer liability for uninsured motorist after automobile crash.
ANDREA S. MARTIN v. PATRICIA L. WILLIAMS, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2009)
The central issue in this case is which of two insurance companies is required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the Plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the company through which Plaintiff had automobile insurance, finding that the company insuring the automobile in which Plaintiff was a passenger held the primary policy. We reverse and remand.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/martina_073009.pdf
The central issue in this case is which of two insurance companies is required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the Plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the company through which Plaintiff had automobile insurance, finding that the company insuring the automobile in which Plaintiff was a passenger held the primary policy. We reverse and remand.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/martina_073009.pdf
Court reviews whether an expert witness cured a deficiency in order to satisfy the locality rule
SAMANTHA NABORS v. WILLIAM M. ADAMS, M.D., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2009)
This appeal involves a medical malpractice action. In a motion for summary judgment, defendant physician asserted that plaintiff's expert witness failed to satisfy the requirements of the locality rule. The trial court granted the motion finding that plaintiff's expert failed to demonstrate a familiarity with the standard of care in defendant's community or a similar community. In a motion to alter or amend the judgment, plaintiff attached a supplemental affidavit of the same expert in order to cure the deficiency. The trial court considered the expert's supplemental affidavit and denied the motion because the new affidavit still failed to satisfy the locality rule. Plaintiff appeals. Reviewing the record, we find that the expert's supplemental affidavit cured the initial deficiency by relating facts which showed the similarity of the two communities. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/naborss_072309.pdf
This appeal involves a medical malpractice action. In a motion for summary judgment, defendant physician asserted that plaintiff's expert witness failed to satisfy the requirements of the locality rule. The trial court granted the motion finding that plaintiff's expert failed to demonstrate a familiarity with the standard of care in defendant's community or a similar community. In a motion to alter or amend the judgment, plaintiff attached a supplemental affidavit of the same expert in order to cure the deficiency. The trial court considered the expert's supplemental affidavit and denied the motion because the new affidavit still failed to satisfy the locality rule. Plaintiff appeals. Reviewing the record, we find that the expert's supplemental affidavit cured the initial deficiency by relating facts which showed the similarity of the two communities. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/naborss_072309.pdf
Court upholds lower court verdict and judgment award
ROBERT NICELY v. BERKLINE, LLC. (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2009)
Robert Nicely ("Plaintiff") was employed as a truck driver for Evinco Professional Services, Inc. ("Evinco"). Evinco contracted with Blue Mountain Trucking Corporation for the delivery of various goods. In March 2004, Plaintiff was injured while unloading furniture that had been loaded onto his truck by employees of Berkline, LLC. Plaintiff sued Berkline, LLC, ("Defendant") for personal injuries. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that an employment agreement signed by Plaintiff barred this lawsuit. The Trial Court disagreed and allowed the case to go to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $500,000. Because the jury found Plaintiff 20 percent at fault for his own injuries, the judgment was reduced to $400,000. Defendant thereafter filed a motion for a new trial or for a remittitur, both of which the Trial Court denied. Defendant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/nicelyr_070709.pdf
Robert Nicely ("Plaintiff") was employed as a truck driver for Evinco Professional Services, Inc. ("Evinco"). Evinco contracted with Blue Mountain Trucking Corporation for the delivery of various goods. In March 2004, Plaintiff was injured while unloading furniture that had been loaded onto his truck by employees of Berkline, LLC. Plaintiff sued Berkline, LLC, ("Defendant") for personal injuries. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that an employment agreement signed by Plaintiff barred this lawsuit. The Trial Court disagreed and allowed the case to go to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $500,000. Because the jury found Plaintiff 20 percent at fault for his own injuries, the judgment was reduced to $400,000. Defendant thereafter filed a motion for a new trial or for a remittitur, both of which the Trial Court denied. Defendant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/nicelyr_070709.pdf
TCA reverses Trial Court in wrongful death action
KAMARJAH GORDON, DECEASED, BY AND THROUGH HER NEXT OF KIN, TOSHA GORDON AND TOSHA GORDON, INDIVIDUALLY v. JEFFREY D. DRAUGHN, M.D.; TENNESSEE WOMAN'S CARE, P.C.; AND HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF TENNESSEE D/B/A CENTENNIAL MEDICAL CENTER (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2009)
The parents of a deceased child and the mother's trustee in bankruptcy appeal rulings of the trial court in this medical malpractice and wrongful death action which (1) found that the mother was judicially estopped from pursuing the action; (2) denied the father's motion to substitute as plaintiff; and (3) limited the bankruptcy trustee's recoverable damages to the amount of debts listed on the mother's bankruptcy petition. Finding that the mother was not judicially estopped from pursuing her claims and that the trustee in bankruptcy succeeded to her claims, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of her medical malpractice claim and the limitation of recoverable damages on the wrongful death claim. Further, we reverse the trial court's holding that father's action is barred by the statute of limitations, vacate the denial of the father's motion to substitute and remand the case to allow the father to file a motion to intervene and intervening complaint.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/gordonk_061709.pdf
The parents of a deceased child and the mother's trustee in bankruptcy appeal rulings of the trial court in this medical malpractice and wrongful death action which (1) found that the mother was judicially estopped from pursuing the action; (2) denied the father's motion to substitute as plaintiff; and (3) limited the bankruptcy trustee's recoverable damages to the amount of debts listed on the mother's bankruptcy petition. Finding that the mother was not judicially estopped from pursuing her claims and that the trustee in bankruptcy succeeded to her claims, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of her medical malpractice claim and the limitation of recoverable damages on the wrongful death claim. Further, we reverse the trial court's holding that father's action is barred by the statute of limitations, vacate the denial of the father's motion to substitute and remand the case to allow the father to file a motion to intervene and intervening complaint.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/gordonk_061709.pdf
TCA examines issues regarding the Govenrmental Tort Liability Act
RONALD TIMMONS v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2009)
Plaintiff filed this Governmental Tort Liability Act action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for injuries sustained during his arrest for driving under the influence following a vehicular accident. Plaintiff contends the police officers who arrested him were negligent in failing to recognize that he was not intoxicated but in diabetic shock, in failing to recognize that he could be restrained and handcuffed while standing, instead of in the prone position, and that he sustained a spiral, comminuted fracture of the humerus while an officer was pulling his right arm behind his back in an effort to cuff his hands.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found the officers were negligent in the manner in which they assessed the threat posed by Plaintiff and were negligent in the decision to handcuff him in the prone position, which caused his injuries. The trial court, therefore, held the Metropolitan Government liable for the officers negligence, assessed 100% of the fault to the officers, and awarded Plaintiff $140,000 in damages. On appeal, the Metropolitan Government insists it is immune from liability because the officers' actions were not the result of negligence but, it contends, the officers consciously and volitionally used an excessive amount of force that constituted the intentional tort of battery. Alternatively, the Government contends, if it is liable under a negligence theory, the trial court erred by apportioning no fault to Plaintiff.
We have determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that Plaintiff's injuries resulted from the officers' negligent acts and omissions, that the Metropolitan Government is liable for the officers' negligence, that Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, and that Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in the amount of $140,000. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/timmonsr_061609.pdf
Plaintiff filed this Governmental Tort Liability Act action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for injuries sustained during his arrest for driving under the influence following a vehicular accident. Plaintiff contends the police officers who arrested him were negligent in failing to recognize that he was not intoxicated but in diabetic shock, in failing to recognize that he could be restrained and handcuffed while standing, instead of in the prone position, and that he sustained a spiral, comminuted fracture of the humerus while an officer was pulling his right arm behind his back in an effort to cuff his hands.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found the officers were negligent in the manner in which they assessed the threat posed by Plaintiff and were negligent in the decision to handcuff him in the prone position, which caused his injuries. The trial court, therefore, held the Metropolitan Government liable for the officers negligence, assessed 100% of the fault to the officers, and awarded Plaintiff $140,000 in damages. On appeal, the Metropolitan Government insists it is immune from liability because the officers' actions were not the result of negligence but, it contends, the officers consciously and volitionally used an excessive amount of force that constituted the intentional tort of battery. Alternatively, the Government contends, if it is liable under a negligence theory, the trial court erred by apportioning no fault to Plaintiff.
We have determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that Plaintiff's injuries resulted from the officers' negligent acts and omissions, that the Metropolitan Government is liable for the officers' negligence, that Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, and that Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in the amount of $140,000. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/timmonsr_061609.pdf
Court looks at insurance policy exclusions for liability
TENNESSEE FARMERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MICHAEL NEILL (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2009)
Insurance company filed suit for a declaration that the policy exclusion for intentional acts applied to an injury arising from a paintball game. The trial court ruled for the insured. We affirm.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/neillm_060309.pdf
Insurance company filed suit for a declaration that the policy exclusion for intentional acts applied to an injury arising from a paintball game. The trial court ruled for the insured. We affirm.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/neillm_060309.pdf
TWCA affirms lower court ruling that employee did not sustain his burden of proof
WALTER WIGGINS, JR. v. DAL-TILE CORPORATION (Tenn. SWCAP, May 28, 2009)
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought benefits for a right shoulder injury, which occurred after he had ceased working for Employer. He contended that his employment had caused a weakening of the structures of his shoulder, which contributed to his eventual injury. The trial court ruled that he did not sustain his burden of proof and entered judgment for Employer. On appeal, Employee asserts that the trial court erred in its ruling. We affirm the judgment.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2009/wigginsw_052809.pdf
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought benefits for a right shoulder injury, which occurred after he had ceased working for Employer. He contended that his employment had caused a weakening of the structures of his shoulder, which contributed to his eventual injury. The trial court ruled that he did not sustain his burden of proof and entered judgment for Employer. On appeal, Employee asserts that the trial court erred in its ruling. We affirm the judgment.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2009/wigginsw_052809.pdf
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
TCA looks at issues determining permanent total disability
CHARLIE D. EVANS, JR. v. CHEROKEE INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2009)
In 2005, the employee, a truck driver, sustained a compensable injury to his right leg that also aggravated a pre-existing low back condition. As a result of childhood polio, the employee's left leg and foot were substantially smaller and weaker than his right leg and foot. The employee reported this pre-existing condition to the employer when hired in 2003. Medical proof established the employee's combined anatomical impairment at 14% to the body as a whole. The trial court found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court assigned 84% of the award to the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier, Cherokee Insurance Company, and 16% to the Second Injury Fund. The employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding the employee to be permanently and totally disabled. The Second Injury Fund appealed, arguing that it is without liability because the employee performed his truck-driving duties without restrictions or accommodations, thus, the employer did not have "actual knowledge" of the employee's prior disability. Alternatively, the Second Injury Fund contends that the trial court's award of permanent and total disability is not supported by the evidence. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2009/evansc_052809.pdf
In 2005, the employee, a truck driver, sustained a compensable injury to his right leg that also aggravated a pre-existing low back condition. As a result of childhood polio, the employee's left leg and foot were substantially smaller and weaker than his right leg and foot. The employee reported this pre-existing condition to the employer when hired in 2003. Medical proof established the employee's combined anatomical impairment at 14% to the body as a whole. The trial court found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court assigned 84% of the award to the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier, Cherokee Insurance Company, and 16% to the Second Injury Fund. The employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding the employee to be permanently and totally disabled. The Second Injury Fund appealed, arguing that it is without liability because the employee performed his truck-driving duties without restrictions or accommodations, thus, the employer did not have "actual knowledge" of the employee's prior disability. Alternatively, the Second Injury Fund contends that the trial court's award of permanent and total disability is not supported by the evidence. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2009/evansc_052809.pdf
Friday, March 5, 2010
TWCA reviews award of benefits for mental injuries in worker's compensation case
JOE TURNER v. BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE NORTH AMERICAN TIRE, LLC, ET AL. (TWCA March 5, 2010)
Employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back. He alleged that he also sustained a mental injury as a result of chronic pain. His employer contended that the chronic pain and any mental conditions arising from it were the result of several previous injuries and surgeries. The trial court awarded benefits for the mental injury. The employer contends that the trial court erred by doing so. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/turnerj_030510.pdf
Employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back. He alleged that he also sustained a mental injury as a result of chronic pain. His employer contended that the chronic pain and any mental conditions arising from it were the result of several previous injuries and surgeries. The trial court awarded benefits for the mental injury. The employer contends that the trial court erred by doing so. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/turnerj_030510.pdf
TWCA reviews findings of causation and compliance with the notice statute in worker's compensation case
KATHY MELISSA CANTRELL v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., ET AL. (TWCA March 5, 2010)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The trial court awarded workers' compensation benefits for gradual injuries to the employee's hands, arms, shoulders and left knee. On appeal, her employer asserts that the trial court erred by finding that she had complied with the notice statute, Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-201(b), and also by finding that she had sustained her burden of proof on the issue of causation.
We conclude that sufficient notice was given. In addition, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of a causal relationship between the employee's work and her left knee injury. We affirm the findings of causation concerning her other injuries.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/cantrellk_030510.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The trial court awarded workers' compensation benefits for gradual injuries to the employee's hands, arms, shoulders and left knee. On appeal, her employer asserts that the trial court erred by finding that she had complied with the notice statute, Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-201(b), and also by finding that she had sustained her burden of proof on the issue of causation.
We conclude that sufficient notice was given. In addition, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of a causal relationship between the employee's work and her left knee injury. We affirm the findings of causation concerning her other injuries.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/cantrellk_030510.pdf
Thursday, March 4, 2010
Appeal denied as frivolous based on TN Rules of Civil Procedure 41.01, Voluntary Dismissals
RICK PETERS, ET AL. v. RAY LAMB, M.D., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2009)
This is a medical malpractice action by Rick Peters and Rob Watts ("Plaintiffs"), the surviving spouse and child respectively of Elizabeth Peters, deceased, filed against Dr. Ray Lamb and his practice group, McLeod Cancer and Blood Center of East Tennessee (collectively "Defendants"). Mrs. Peters unexpectedly died shortly after Defendants began treating her for her recently-diagnosed anal cancer. Pre-trial, Plaintiffs lodged a proposed motion and order of nonsuit by placing it in the trial judge's "in-box." By the time the judge discovered the document, a motion for summary judgment had been filed by Defendants and was pending. The trial court did not sign the order of nonsuit. Following a summary judgment hearing seven months later, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for nonsuit and granting Defendants summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. The sole question Plaintiffs raise is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the lodging of the motion and order for nonsuit was ineffectual to dismiss their action without prejudice. Defendants claim this appeal is frivolous and seek an award of damages pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. section 27-1-122 (2000).
We conclude that the appeal is frivolous because the issue Plaintiffs raised had no reasonable chance of success. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for a determination as to the damages due Defendants.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/petersr_052709.pdf
This is a medical malpractice action by Rick Peters and Rob Watts ("Plaintiffs"), the surviving spouse and child respectively of Elizabeth Peters, deceased, filed against Dr. Ray Lamb and his practice group, McLeod Cancer and Blood Center of East Tennessee (collectively "Defendants"). Mrs. Peters unexpectedly died shortly after Defendants began treating her for her recently-diagnosed anal cancer. Pre-trial, Plaintiffs lodged a proposed motion and order of nonsuit by placing it in the trial judge's "in-box." By the time the judge discovered the document, a motion for summary judgment had been filed by Defendants and was pending. The trial court did not sign the order of nonsuit. Following a summary judgment hearing seven months later, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for nonsuit and granting Defendants summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. The sole question Plaintiffs raise is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the lodging of the motion and order for nonsuit was ineffectual to dismiss their action without prejudice. Defendants claim this appeal is frivolous and seek an award of damages pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. section 27-1-122 (2000).
We conclude that the appeal is frivolous because the issue Plaintiffs raised had no reasonable chance of success. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for a determination as to the damages due Defendants.
The full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/petersr_052709.pdf
Case remanded to determine if employer is entitled to subrogation when beneficiary settles with third party for identical expenses
GARY HARRIS v. ALCOA, INC., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2009).
The plaintiff, Gary Harris, was injured in a work-related accident. As a result of the accident, his right arm was amputated below the elbow. His employer, the defendant Alcoa, Inc., paid workers' compensation benefits to and for the plaintiff, including a payment of $33,776.83 to the co-defendant, Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc., for a prosthetic arm known as a "myoelectric arm." Following a jury trial in federal court, the plaintiff entered into a confidential settlement of his claim against a third party which arose out of the accident. Thereafter, he filed a complaint, as amended, against the two defendants, averring that, out of the settlement proceeds, he had escrowed with his attorney the sum of $33,776.83. He claims that he did not receive the prosthetic arm for which Alcoa paid. He seeks a declaratory judgment that the escrowed funds rightfully belong to him and not his employer. Alcoa filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website.
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/harrisg_052709.pdf
The plaintiff, Gary Harris, was injured in a work-related accident. As a result of the accident, his right arm was amputated below the elbow. His employer, the defendant Alcoa, Inc., paid workers' compensation benefits to and for the plaintiff, including a payment of $33,776.83 to the co-defendant, Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc., for a prosthetic arm known as a "myoelectric arm." Following a jury trial in federal court, the plaintiff entered into a confidential settlement of his claim against a third party which arose out of the accident. Thereafter, he filed a complaint, as amended, against the two defendants, averring that, out of the settlement proceeds, he had escrowed with his attorney the sum of $33,776.83. He claims that he did not receive the prosthetic arm for which Alcoa paid. He seeks a declaratory judgment that the escrowed funds rightfully belong to him and not his employer. Alcoa filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Full text of this opinion is available at the TBA website.
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/harrisg_052709.pdf
Court reviews summary judgment ruling in medical malpractice and ordinary negligence case
SANDRA YEVETTE TURNER v. STERILTEK, INC. ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. March 4, 2010)
Mother of deceased patient brought suit for ordinary negligence and medical malpractice against hospital and company that sterilized its surgical instruments and equipment. In this second appeal, the issue is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of both defendants. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to the sterilization company, but we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the hospital because the hospital failed to negate an element of the plaintiff's negligence claim.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/turners_030410.pdf
Mother of deceased patient brought suit for ordinary negligence and medical malpractice against hospital and company that sterilized its surgical instruments and equipment. In this second appeal, the issue is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of both defendants. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to the sterilization company, but we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the hospital because the hospital failed to negate an element of the plaintiff's negligence claim.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/turners_030410.pdf
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
Court reviews jury verdict in case based on the Federal Employer's Liability Act
LAURA JAN MELTON v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY (Tenn. Ct. App. March 3, 2010)
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the Appellee in a case based on the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. section 51 et seq. Appellee filed this case as the widow and personal representative of her husband, who died as a result of injuries he sustained while working for the Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not granting it a directed verdict, in not granting its motion for new trial, in making several evidentiary rulings during the trial, and in not granting its motions for mistrial.
We affirm the trial court's denial of the Appellant's motions for directed verdict, finding that the Appellee presented sufficient proof to create a question for the jury. However, finding that the trial court erred in allowing the Appellant's expert to be questioned on a non-testifying expert's deposition, and that the jury was more likely than not guided by prejudice, passion, and bias, we reverse the trial court's decision denying Appellant's motion for new trial. Further, finding material facts in dispute, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's decision on Appellant's motion for summary judgment. Reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded.
Full opinion is available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/meltonl_CORR_030310.pdf
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the Appellee in a case based on the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. section 51 et seq. Appellee filed this case as the widow and personal representative of her husband, who died as a result of injuries he sustained while working for the Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not granting it a directed verdict, in not granting its motion for new trial, in making several evidentiary rulings during the trial, and in not granting its motions for mistrial.
We affirm the trial court's denial of the Appellant's motions for directed verdict, finding that the Appellee presented sufficient proof to create a question for the jury. However, finding that the trial court erred in allowing the Appellant's expert to be questioned on a non-testifying expert's deposition, and that the jury was more likely than not guided by prejudice, passion, and bias, we reverse the trial court's decision denying Appellant's motion for new trial. Further, finding material facts in dispute, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's decision on Appellant's motion for summary judgment. Reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded.
Full opinion is available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/meltonl_CORR_030310.pdf
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
TSC reviews Tenn. Code Ann. 24-5-113(a) plaintiff's presumption of necessary and reasonable medical bills in complaint
HELEN M. BORNER ET AL. v. DANNY R. AUTRY (Tenn. May 26, 2009)
This case involves the interpretation and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-5-113(a), which provides a rebuttable presumption that medical bills itemized in and attached to the complaint are necessary and reasonable if the "total amount of such bills" does not exceed $4,000. We hold that a plaintiff may rely on section 24-5-113(a) if the total amount of the medical bills that are itemized and attached does not exceed $4,000, regardless of the total amount of medical expenses that may have been incurred. A plaintiff is not entitled to the presumption, however, if the plaintiff relies on medical bills that have been redacted to reflect a total of $4,000 or less. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2009/bornerh_052609.pdf
This case involves the interpretation and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-5-113(a), which provides a rebuttable presumption that medical bills itemized in and attached to the complaint are necessary and reasonable if the "total amount of such bills" does not exceed $4,000. We hold that a plaintiff may rely on section 24-5-113(a) if the total amount of the medical bills that are itemized and attached does not exceed $4,000, regardless of the total amount of medical expenses that may have been incurred. A plaintiff is not entitled to the presumption, however, if the plaintiff relies on medical bills that have been redacted to reflect a total of $4,000 or less. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2009/bornerh_052609.pdf
Court reviews the standards for allowing a party to amend a claim or answer
ROBERT DANIELS and PEGGY DANIELS, v. MICHAEL D. WRAY (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2009)
Plaintiff filed this action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant answered, denying liability, and subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend and make claim for personal injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Trial Court allowed the amendment as to property damages, but refused to allow defendant to assert the claim for personal injuries on the grounds inter alia that the statute of limitations had run on the personal injury claim prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The property damage claim was settled, but the refusal to allow the amendment has been appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment.
The Full text of this appeal may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/danielsr_05209.pdf
The court here reviewed the standards for reversing a trial court for abuse of discretion for disallowing a party to amend its answer and make a counterclaim. the factors to be considered when deciding whether to allow a party to amend its claim include, "undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith of the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment." Id. (citations omitted). The court here found that the factors the trial court relied on--undue delay and prejudice to the opposing parties--were not supported by the record. Therefore the trial court had abused its discretion and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Plaintiff filed this action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant answered, denying liability, and subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend and make claim for personal injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Trial Court allowed the amendment as to property damages, but refused to allow defendant to assert the claim for personal injuries on the grounds inter alia that the statute of limitations had run on the personal injury claim prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The property damage claim was settled, but the refusal to allow the amendment has been appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment.
The Full text of this appeal may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/danielsr_05209.pdf
The court here reviewed the standards for reversing a trial court for abuse of discretion for disallowing a party to amend its answer and make a counterclaim. the factors to be considered when deciding whether to allow a party to amend its claim include, "undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith of the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment." Id. (citations omitted). The court here found that the factors the trial court relied on--undue delay and prejudice to the opposing parties--were not supported by the record. Therefore the trial court had abused its discretion and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
TCA examines insufficiency of medical expert's affidavit
REBECCA METTES v. J. THOMAS JOHN, JR., M.D. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2009)
In this medical malpractice action, patient appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of physician based on the insufficiency of the affidavit of the patient's expert. We affirm.
"Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115(a)expert testimony must establish the recognized standard of medical practice, the defendant's breach of that standard, and causation. This was necessary in this case to rebut the Defendant's self-serving affidavit and motion for summary judgment which the trial court held was sufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiff." Id.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/mettesr_052109.pdf
In this medical malpractice action, patient appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of physician based on the insufficiency of the affidavit of the patient's expert. We affirm.
"Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115(a)expert testimony must establish the recognized standard of medical practice, the defendant's breach of that standard, and causation. This was necessary in this case to rebut the Defendant's self-serving affidavit and motion for summary judgment which the trial court held was sufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiff." Id.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/mettesr_052109.pdf
TCA examines the issue of superceding cause in wrongful death action
DORIS G. HOWELL, as Next of Kin and as Guardian of JESSIE J. WILLIAMS, a minor child of GINGER WILLIAMS, deceased, ET AL. v. DAVID M. TURNER, M.D., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2009)
This appeal arises out of the death of Ginger Williams after she sought medical treatment from the various Defendants. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, Defendant Doctor moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that the doctrine of an independent, intervening cause precluded his liability. We affirm the trial court's decision to deny Defendant's motion.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/howelld_052109.pdf
This appeal arises out of the death of Ginger Williams after she sought medical treatment from the various Defendants. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, Defendant Doctor moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that the doctrine of an independent, intervening cause precluded his liability. We affirm the trial court's decision to deny Defendant's motion.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/howelld_052109.pdf
TCA affirms dismissal because there was no offer of proof
HOPE DENTON v. JAMES G. HAGGARD (Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2009)
Evidence of defendant's prior traffic violations was excluded by the trial court in an automobile accident case. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm due to plaintiff's failure to make an offer of proof.
At trial the jury found both parties equally at fault and the case was dismissed. The Plaintiff moved for a new trial which was denied. Plaintiff appealed based on disallowed evidence of defendant's driving record. TCA finds that no offer of proof was made, thus the issue of excluded evidence is waived.
The full text of this appeal may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/dentonh_052109.pdf
Evidence of defendant's prior traffic violations was excluded by the trial court in an automobile accident case. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm due to plaintiff's failure to make an offer of proof.
At trial the jury found both parties equally at fault and the case was dismissed. The Plaintiff moved for a new trial which was denied. Plaintiff appealed based on disallowed evidence of defendant's driving record. TCA finds that no offer of proof was made, thus the issue of excluded evidence is waived.
The full text of this appeal may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/dentonh_052109.pdf
Court reverses summary judgment in negligence/medical malpractice case
ROSE JOHNSEY, Widow of Frederick Johnsey v. NORTHBROOKE (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2009)
The plaintiff filed suit against a nursing home after her husband allegedly suffered a broken hip while he was a resident there. The nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her claim. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff''s claims were for medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence, but the court found that under either theory summary judgment was appropriate. We agree with the court's conclusion that the plaintiff's claims sound in medical malpractice, but we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/johnseyr_051409.pdf
The plaintiff filed suit against a nursing home after her husband allegedly suffered a broken hip while he was a resident there. The nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her claim. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff''s claims were for medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence, but the court found that under either theory summary judgment was appropriate. We agree with the court's conclusion that the plaintiff's claims sound in medical malpractice, but we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/johnseyr_051409.pdf
Court finds defendant did not have constructive notice of dangerous condition
LEITHA C. PERKINS and ROBERT L. PERKINS v. BIG LOTS STORES, INC.(Tenn. Ct. App. May 20, 2009)
This is a slip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped on a floor mat and fell as she was entering the defendant's store. A store security video showed that the corner of the floor mat was overturned by another customer twenty-one seconds before the plaintiff fell. At the time that the corner of the mat became furled, the assistant store manager was at the service desk several feet from the entrance. He denied seeing the overturned mat.
The plaintiff sued the store, alleging negligence in allowing a dangerous condition to persist and in failing to warn the plaintiff of it. After the trial, the jury found that the defendant store was eighty percent at fault and that the plaintiff was twenty percent at fault. The defendant store filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct based on comments by jurors to the attorneys. The store also contended that the evidence showed that it did not have actual or constructive notice that the corner of the mat had become folded over. Finally, the store maintained that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was less than fifty percent at fault for her own injuries. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant appeals. We reverse, finding no material evidence to support the jury's verdict, and dismiss the case.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/perkinsl_052009.pdf
This is a slip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped on a floor mat and fell as she was entering the defendant's store. A store security video showed that the corner of the floor mat was overturned by another customer twenty-one seconds before the plaintiff fell. At the time that the corner of the mat became furled, the assistant store manager was at the service desk several feet from the entrance. He denied seeing the overturned mat.
The plaintiff sued the store, alleging negligence in allowing a dangerous condition to persist and in failing to warn the plaintiff of it. After the trial, the jury found that the defendant store was eighty percent at fault and that the plaintiff was twenty percent at fault. The defendant store filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct based on comments by jurors to the attorneys. The store also contended that the evidence showed that it did not have actual or constructive notice that the corner of the mat had become folded over. Finally, the store maintained that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was less than fifty percent at fault for her own injuries. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant appeals. We reverse, finding no material evidence to support the jury's verdict, and dismiss the case.
The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/perkinsl_052009.pdf
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