ROGER DALE WILLIAMSON v. BAPTIST HOSPITAL OF COCKE COUNTY, INC. (Tenn. February 28, 2012)
The employee, a certified nursing assistant, sustained an injury to his shoulder while moving a patient. Six months later, the employee returned to work with significant restrictions on the use of his right arm. After two weeks of on-the-job training as a phlebotomist, which offered a higher pay grade, the employee notified the employer of his resignation, believing that he would be unable to handle the duties associated with his new position.
When he made a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, the trial court, accrediting the testimony of the employee, held that he did not have a meaningful return to work and applied a multiplier of six to the assigned impairment rating.
A special workers’ compensation panel reversed, concluding that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s ruling that the employee had not made a meaningful return to work and reducing the award to one-and-one-half times the impairment rating. Because the evidence demonstrates that the employee did have a meaningful return to work, the judgment of the panel is affirmed.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/williamsonrd_022812.pdf
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
TWCA reviews when an employee's heart attack began and whether it was causally related to his employment
TIMOTHY D. CUNNINGHAM v. CITY OF SAVANNAH, TENNESSEE ET AL. (TWCA February 28, 2012)
The employee, an undercover drug investigator for the City of Savannah, alleged that he sustained a heart attack as a result of a physical confrontation with a suspect on March 2, 2005, during which he experienced tightness in his chest and shortness of breath. He experienced pressure in his chest and low energy but continued to work the following two days. On March 5, while engaged in activities unrelated to his job, he experienced nausea, profuse sweating, and severe pain in his chest, jaw, and left arm. His wife took him to a hospital emergency room where he was treated for an acute myocardial infarction.
At trial, one of his treating physicians testified that the heart attack began on March 2 and continued until March 5. A second treating physician and an evaluating physician testified that the March 2 incident did not cause the March 5 heart attack. The trial court found that the heart attack began on March 2, and the employer appealed.
On appeal, the employer 1 contends that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory presumption had not been overcome, erred in concluding that employee’s heart attack began on March 2, 2005, and erred by finding that employee’s heart attack was causally related to his employment. Although we agree that the trial court erred in its application of the statutory presumption, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/cunninghamt_022812.pdf
The employee, an undercover drug investigator for the City of Savannah, alleged that he sustained a heart attack as a result of a physical confrontation with a suspect on March 2, 2005, during which he experienced tightness in his chest and shortness of breath. He experienced pressure in his chest and low energy but continued to work the following two days. On March 5, while engaged in activities unrelated to his job, he experienced nausea, profuse sweating, and severe pain in his chest, jaw, and left arm. His wife took him to a hospital emergency room where he was treated for an acute myocardial infarction.
At trial, one of his treating physicians testified that the heart attack began on March 2 and continued until March 5. A second treating physician and an evaluating physician testified that the March 2 incident did not cause the March 5 heart attack. The trial court found that the heart attack began on March 2, and the employer appealed.
On appeal, the employer 1 contends that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory presumption had not been overcome, erred in concluding that employee’s heart attack began on March 2, 2005, and erred by finding that employee’s heart attack was causally related to his employment. Although we agree that the trial court erred in its application of the statutory presumption, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/cunninghamt_022812.pdf
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
TWCA reviews whether a nurse was totally and permanently disabled by neck and lower back injuries
VONETTA MOUSSEAU v. DAVITA, INC. (TWCA February 22, 2012)
The employee, a registered nurse, injured her neck and lower back when she slipped and fell in a pool of water. She had surgical fusions of the cervical and lumbar spine. She continued to have serious symptoms for which she received numerous medications. Her treating physician testified that she was incapable of performing any nursing functions, including those that required only sedentary work. The trial court found her to be permanently and totally disabled. Her employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding on disability and that the employee should be held to have been offered a meaningful return to work. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/mousseauv_022212.pdf
The employee, a registered nurse, injured her neck and lower back when she slipped and fell in a pool of water. She had surgical fusions of the cervical and lumbar spine. She continued to have serious symptoms for which she received numerous medications. Her treating physician testified that she was incapable of performing any nursing functions, including those that required only sedentary work. The trial court found her to be permanently and totally disabled. Her employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding on disability and that the employee should be held to have been offered a meaningful return to work. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/mousseauv_022212.pdf
Tuesday, February 21, 2012
Court reviews a workers' compensation claim brought against the TN Department of Labor and Workforce Development
ALSTOM POWER, INC., v. SUE ANN HEAD, ADMINISTRATOR, TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, et al. (Tenn. Ct. App. February 21, 2012)
Plaintiff employer confronted with a worker's compensation claim by its employee filed an action for declaratory judgment, injunction relief, and a petition for certiorari against the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and the employee. Plaintiff's principal contention was that the Department of Labor prepared an order for medical benefits directing the employer to provide the employee with additional panels of physicians from which he could choose for treatment, and concluded by averring that it was threatened with a $10,000 penalty if it did not comply.
The Trial Court initially issued a restraining order, but the Trial Court ultimately concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the issues because suit had been filed before the administrative review process was exhausted. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court, and remand.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/alstompower_022112.pdf
Plaintiff employer confronted with a worker's compensation claim by its employee filed an action for declaratory judgment, injunction relief, and a petition for certiorari against the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and the employee. Plaintiff's principal contention was that the Department of Labor prepared an order for medical benefits directing the employer to provide the employee with additional panels of physicians from which he could choose for treatment, and concluded by averring that it was threatened with a $10,000 penalty if it did not comply.
The Trial Court initially issued a restraining order, but the Trial Court ultimately concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the issues because suit had been filed before the administrative review process was exhausted. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court, and remand.
Opinion available at:
https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/alstompower_022112.pdf
Saturday, February 18, 2012
Court reviews whether the trial court properly allowed a medical expert from a non-contiguous state in a medical malpractice case
MARSHA McDONALD v. PAUL F. SHEA M.D. AND SHEA EAR CLINIC (Tenn. Ct. App. February 16, 2012)
This is a medical malpractice appeal. The plaintiff patient was treated by the defendant physician for ear problems. After the treatment, she had a complete loss of hearing in one ear. The plaintiff patient filed this lawsuit against the physician, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. After potential experts in Tennessee and contiguous states declined to testify against the defendant physician, the trial court permitted the plaintiff to use an expert physician witness from a non-contiguous state.
At the jury trial, after the jury was sworn and counsel gave opening statements, a juror notified the trial judge of the her concern about an upcoming social event she planned to attend, at which a relative of the defendant physician would be present. After voir dire, the trial judge noted that the plaintiff patient had unused remaining peremptory challenges and excused the juror. The trial court denied the defendant physician's motion for directed verdict on informed consent. The jury awarded the plaintiff substantial compensatory damages.
The defendant physician now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to obtain an expert from a non-contiguous state, in allowing the plaintiff to exercise a peremptory challenge after trial was underway, in permitting the informed consent claim to go to the jury, and in denying the defendants' motion to exclude the expert retained by the plaintiff. We affirm on all issues except the dismissal of the juror. We hold it would be error to permit the exercise of a peremptory challenge after the trial is underway, but find that any error was harmless under the facts of this case. Therefore, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/mcdonaldm_021612.pdf
HIGHERS, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/mcdonaldm_CON_021612.pdf
This is a medical malpractice appeal. The plaintiff patient was treated by the defendant physician for ear problems. After the treatment, she had a complete loss of hearing in one ear. The plaintiff patient filed this lawsuit against the physician, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. After potential experts in Tennessee and contiguous states declined to testify against the defendant physician, the trial court permitted the plaintiff to use an expert physician witness from a non-contiguous state.
At the jury trial, after the jury was sworn and counsel gave opening statements, a juror notified the trial judge of the her concern about an upcoming social event she planned to attend, at which a relative of the defendant physician would be present. After voir dire, the trial judge noted that the plaintiff patient had unused remaining peremptory challenges and excused the juror. The trial court denied the defendant physician's motion for directed verdict on informed consent. The jury awarded the plaintiff substantial compensatory damages.
The defendant physician now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to obtain an expert from a non-contiguous state, in allowing the plaintiff to exercise a peremptory challenge after trial was underway, in permitting the informed consent claim to go to the jury, and in denying the defendants' motion to exclude the expert retained by the plaintiff. We affirm on all issues except the dismissal of the juror. We hold it would be error to permit the exercise of a peremptory challenge after the trial is underway, but find that any error was harmless under the facts of this case. Therefore, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/mcdonaldm_021612.pdf
HIGHERS, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/mcdonaldm_CON_021612.pdf
Friday, February 17, 2012
TWCA reviews whether an employee willfully violated his employer's safety rules
DANNEIL EDWARD KEITH v. WESTERN EXPRESS, INC. ET A (TWCA February 17, 2012)
The employee, a truck driver, was injured in the course and scope of his employment when his vehicle left the road and turned over. His employer denied his claim for workers' compensation benefits, contending that the accident and resulting injuries were the direct result of the employee's willful violation of the employer's safety rules. The trial court found that the employee had willfully and intentionally disregarded the safety rules and entered judgment for the employer. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred because the evidence did not establish the perverseness of his conduct, a necessary element of the misconduct affirmative defense. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/keithd_021712.pdf
The employee, a truck driver, was injured in the course and scope of his employment when his vehicle left the road and turned over. His employer denied his claim for workers' compensation benefits, contending that the accident and resulting injuries were the direct result of the employee's willful violation of the employer's safety rules. The trial court found that the employee had willfully and intentionally disregarded the safety rules and entered judgment for the employer. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred because the evidence did not establish the perverseness of his conduct, a necessary element of the misconduct affirmative defense. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/keithd_021712.pdf
TWCA reviews whether the trial court adopted the proper impairment rating and found that
LARRY KENNETH HALE v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA ET AL. (TWCA February 17, 2012)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The employee fell and struck both knees on a concrete landing in the course of his employment with the employer. His left knee required surgery and his right knee received limited medical treatment. The treating physician assigned 8% permanent impairment to the left leg. Employee's evaluating physician assigned 13% impairment to the left leg and 20% impairment to the right leg. The trial court adopted the evaluating physician's opinions and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to both legs.
Employer argues on appeal that the trial court erred by finding that Employee sustained a permanent injury to his right knee, by adopting the impairment rating of Dr. Landsberg over that of Dr. Gavigan for the left knee injury, by failing to find that Employee had a meaningful return to work, and by granting an excessive award of benefits. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/halel_021712.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The employee fell and struck both knees on a concrete landing in the course of his employment with the employer. His left knee required surgery and his right knee received limited medical treatment. The treating physician assigned 8% permanent impairment to the left leg. Employee's evaluating physician assigned 13% impairment to the left leg and 20% impairment to the right leg. The trial court adopted the evaluating physician's opinions and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to both legs.
Employer argues on appeal that the trial court erred by finding that Employee sustained a permanent injury to his right knee, by adopting the impairment rating of Dr. Landsberg over that of Dr. Gavigan for the left knee injury, by failing to find that Employee had a meaningful return to work, and by granting an excessive award of benefits. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/halel_021712.pdf
TWCA reviews whether employee's lung disease was aggravated by his exposure to smoke at work
GEORGE McGOWAN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE (TWCA February 16, 2012)
An employee was exposed to smoke as a result of a fire at his workplace. Testing revealed the presence of bullous emphysema, a dangerous condition caused by cigarette smoking. Surgery was required to treat that condition. The Claims Commission ruled that the smoke exposure at work had aggravated and advanced his preexisting lung disease and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's finding of causation. We agree and reverse the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/mcgowang_021612.pdf
An employee was exposed to smoke as a result of a fire at his workplace. Testing revealed the presence of bullous emphysema, a dangerous condition caused by cigarette smoking. Surgery was required to treat that condition. The Claims Commission ruled that the smoke exposure at work had aggravated and advanced his preexisting lung disease and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's finding of causation. We agree and reverse the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/mcgowang_021612.pdf
Thursday, February 16, 2012
TWCA Reviews whether a Sheriff's Deputy's injury occurred during an incident that was unusual or extraordinary for his profession
DOYLE ALLEN CASTLE v. SULLIVAN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (TWCA February 16, 2012)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The employee, a sheriff's deputy, alleged that he sustained a mental injury as a result of a confrontation that occurred while he was serving an eviction warrant. His employer denied the claim and filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the injury was not compensable because the alleged precipitating event was not unusual or abnormal for a deputy.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred by concluding that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the incident in question was sufficiently extraordinary or unusual to support a mental injury claim. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injury qualified as extraordinary and unusual or was merely the result of stress ordinarily experienced in the line of duty, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/castled_021612.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The employee, a sheriff's deputy, alleged that he sustained a mental injury as a result of a confrontation that occurred while he was serving an eviction warrant. His employer denied the claim and filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the injury was not compensable because the alleged precipitating event was not unusual or abnormal for a deputy.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred by concluding that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the incident in question was sufficiently extraordinary or unusual to support a mental injury claim. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injury qualified as extraordinary and unusual or was merely the result of stress ordinarily experienced in the line of duty, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/castled_021612.pdf
TWCA reviews whether employee adequately proved that his injury was work-related
KENNETH STEWART v. WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY (TWCA February16, 2012)
The appellant insurance company asserts on appeal that the employee failed to prove that his spinal infection was causally related to any work-place injury and that he also failed to provide the employer with timely notice of his injury. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the expert medical proof establishes causation and that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the employee gave timely notice of his injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/stewartk_021612.pdf
The appellant insurance company asserts on appeal that the employee failed to prove that his spinal infection was causally related to any work-place injury and that he also failed to provide the employer with timely notice of his injury. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the expert medical proof establishes causation and that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the employee gave timely notice of his injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/stewartk_021612.pdf
Sunday, February 12, 2012
TWCA reviews whether a taxi driver was an employee or an independent contractor
MOHAMUD HIRSI MOHAMED v. TAXI USA OF TENNESSEE, LLC d/b/a ALLIED CAR COMPANY ET AL. (TWCA February 10, 2012)
In this case, the plaintiff, a taxi driver injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought workers' compensation benefits from the taxi company that he alleged employed him. The trial court held that he was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/mohamedm_021012.pdf
In this case, the plaintiff, a taxi driver injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought workers' compensation benefits from the taxi company that he alleged employed him. The trial court held that he was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/mohamedm_021012.pdf
TWCA reviews whether an employee was eligible for the reconsideration of her workers’ compensation settlement.
ROCHELLE M. EVANS v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY (TWCA February 10, 2012)
The employee sought reconsideration of her workers' compensation settlement. The trial court found that she had voluntarily resigned and was therefore not eligible to receive reconsideration. The employee has appealed. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/evansr_021012.pdf
The employee sought reconsideration of her workers' compensation settlement. The trial court found that she had voluntarily resigned and was therefore not eligible to receive reconsideration. The employee has appealed. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/evansr_021012.pdf
Friday, February 10, 2012
Court reviews a medical negligence case involving injuries sustained during laser eye surgery
LEON DICKSON, SR. v. SIDNEY H. KRIGER, M.D. (Tenn. Ct. App. February 10, 2012)
This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after undergoing laser corrective eye surgery. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging medical negligence. Subsequently, Defendant filed an amended answer alleging, inter alia, the affirmative defense of comparative fault.
Plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of Defendant's amended answer, and following a hearing on the motion, Defendant agreed to the entry of a consent order waiving the defense of comparative fault.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed motions in limine to preclude the testimony of two of Defendant's experts. Plaintiff argued that, because Defendant waived comparative fault, he could not use the causation testimony of the two experts to shift blame away from himself unless he first plead comparative fault under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court denied both motions. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/dicksonl_021012.pdf
This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after undergoing laser corrective eye surgery. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging medical negligence. Subsequently, Defendant filed an amended answer alleging, inter alia, the affirmative defense of comparative fault.
Plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of Defendant's amended answer, and following a hearing on the motion, Defendant agreed to the entry of a consent order waiving the defense of comparative fault.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed motions in limine to preclude the testimony of two of Defendant's experts. Plaintiff argued that, because Defendant waived comparative fault, he could not use the causation testimony of the two experts to shift blame away from himself unless he first plead comparative fault under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court denied both motions. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/dicksonl_021012.pdf
Tuesday, February 7, 2012
TWCA reviews whether an employee was eligible for benefits in spite of his being a poor witness
TETON TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. TODD WHITE (TWCA February 7, 2012)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that he injured his back at work. His employer denied the claim.
While the trial court found that the employee was not a credible witness, it found that he had sustained a compensable injury based upon the testimony of an independent lay witness and the treating physician. The trial court awarded 78% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of compensability. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/teton_020712.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that he injured his back at work. His employer denied the claim.
While the trial court found that the employee was not a credible witness, it found that he had sustained a compensable injury based upon the testimony of an independent lay witness and the treating physician. The trial court awarded 78% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of compensability. We affirm the judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/teton_020712.pdf
Friday, February 3, 2012
Court reviews whether employee's injury was a work-related aggravation of a pre-existing injury and, thus, whether employer is liable
TAMMY L. LEE v. DURA OPERATING CORP., ET AL. (TWCA February 2, 2012)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Tammy L. Lee ("Employee") alleges that she suffered an injury to her cervical spine while she was employed as a factory worker by Dura Operating Corporation ("Employer") . Employer denies that Employee's cervical spine injury was caused by her employment with Employer.
The trial court determined that Employee's cervical spine condition was a work-related aggravation of her pre-existing degenerative disc disease. The trial court awarded Employee temporary total benefits from November 8, 2007, to February 8, 2008. Finding that Employee had not been able to return to work, the trial court refused to apply the statutory cap and awarded Employee permanent partial disability benefits of 69% to the body as a whole, three times her anatomical impairment rating of 23% to the body as a whole. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination of causation, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/leet_020112.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Tammy L. Lee ("Employee") alleges that she suffered an injury to her cervical spine while she was employed as a factory worker by Dura Operating Corporation ("Employer") . Employer denies that Employee's cervical spine injury was caused by her employment with Employer.
The trial court determined that Employee's cervical spine condition was a work-related aggravation of her pre-existing degenerative disc disease. The trial court awarded Employee temporary total benefits from November 8, 2007, to February 8, 2008. Finding that Employee had not been able to return to work, the trial court refused to apply the statutory cap and awarded Employee permanent partial disability benefits of 69% to the body as a whole, three times her anatomical impairment rating of 23% to the body as a whole. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination of causation, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/leet_020112.pdf
Thursday, February 2, 2012
TWCA reviews whether an employee's injury was caused by her employment at a factory
MARIE AKINS v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION (TWCA February 1, 2012)
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Marie Akins ("Employee") alleges that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist while employed as a factory worker by Whirlpool Corporation ("Employer"), prior to the closure of Employer's plant in August 2008. Employer denies that Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist was caused by her employment with it.
The trial court found that Employee's left-wrist carpal tunnel syndrome was not caused by her employment with Employer and that Employer therefore is not liable for this injury. Employee has appealed, contending both that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding and that Employer is estopped from denying liability based on delay in the diagnosis of Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/akinsm_020112.pdf
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Marie Akins ("Employee") alleges that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist while employed as a factory worker by Whirlpool Corporation ("Employer"), prior to the closure of Employer's plant in August 2008. Employer denies that Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist was caused by her employment with it.
The trial court found that Employee's left-wrist carpal tunnel syndrome was not caused by her employment with Employer and that Employer therefore is not liable for this injury. Employee has appealed, contending both that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding and that Employer is estopped from denying liability based on delay in the diagnosis of Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/akinsm_020112.pdf
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