SHAVON HURT v. JOHN DOE, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. January 17, 2012)
Plaintiff filed a personal injury action arising out of a pedestrian-vehicle collision, naming as defendant the owner of the car that allegedly struck the plaintiff. After discovery, plaintiff amended the complaint to add "John Doe/Jane Doe" as a defendant and served process on her uninsured motorist carrier. Plaintiff subsequently settled with the named defendant and dismissed the action against that defendant; the uninsured motorist insurance carrier then filed a motion to dismiss the uninsured motorist claim. The trial court granted the motion, holding that, in light of the settlement, the uninsured motorist claim no longer existed and dismissed the case. We find that the court erred in dismissing the case.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/hurts_011712.pdf
Monday, January 30, 2012
Thursday, January 12, 2012
Court reviews the allocation of fault in a case involving a mechanical bull accident
CHADWICK DAVID DORMAN MOYER v. NASHVILLE MIDNIGHT OIL, LLC, D/B/A CADILLAC RANCH (Tenn. Ct. App. January 12, 2012)
Plaintiff sued to recover for injuries sustained while riding a mechanical bull in a bar owned by Defendant. Defendant appeals the trial court's determination that it was 100% at fault and resulting judgment for plaintiff. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/moyerc_011212.pdf
Plaintiff sued to recover for injuries sustained while riding a mechanical bull in a bar owned by Defendant. Defendant appeals the trial court's determination that it was 100% at fault and resulting judgment for plaintiff. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings, we affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/moyerc_011212.pdf
Wednesday, January 11, 2012
Court reviews whether a contractor can be held liable for injuries incurred in a car accident
JOSHUA N. LEE, v. LYONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. January 10, 2012)
Plaintiff and others sustained injuries in a single car accident and sued defendant construction company and the Tennessee Department of Transportation, alleging that defendant construction company had recently completed work on that section of the highway where the accident occurred, and that a low point in the pavement caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and wreck. Defendant answered, stating that they had completed the required construction on that section of the highway, and the State had accepted its work pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 12-4-501 et seq. which provides upon proper completion of the work the contractor "is discharged from all liability to any party". Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court granted and plaintiff appealed. We hold that summary judgment for the defendant in this case was proper, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/leej_011012.pdf
Plaintiff and others sustained injuries in a single car accident and sued defendant construction company and the Tennessee Department of Transportation, alleging that defendant construction company had recently completed work on that section of the highway where the accident occurred, and that a low point in the pavement caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and wreck. Defendant answered, stating that they had completed the required construction on that section of the highway, and the State had accepted its work pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 12-4-501 et seq. which provides upon proper completion of the work the contractor "is discharged from all liability to any party". Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court granted and plaintiff appealed. We hold that summary judgment for the defendant in this case was proper, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/leej_011012.pdf
Friday, January 6, 2012
Court reviews the liability of an assisted living facility's management company
RHEAETTA F. WILSON ET AL. v. AMERICARE SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. January 6, 2012)
Decedent's next of kin filed this wrongful death action against an assisted living facility, two nurses, and the facility's management company for failure to provide proper care and treatment. This appeal concerns only the jury verdict and judgment finding the management company directly liable for failure to provide adequate staff at the assisted living facility. We find no material evidence to support a conclusion that any staffing deficiency proximately caused the decedent's death. We therefore reverse the judgment finding direct liability on the part of the management company.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/wilsonr_010612.pdf
Decedent's next of kin filed this wrongful death action against an assisted living facility, two nurses, and the facility's management company for failure to provide proper care and treatment. This appeal concerns only the jury verdict and judgment finding the management company directly liable for failure to provide adequate staff at the assisted living facility. We find no material evidence to support a conclusion that any staffing deficiency proximately caused the decedent's death. We therefore reverse the judgment finding direct liability on the part of the management company.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/wilsonr_010612.pdf
Wednesday, January 4, 2012
Court reviews a penalty issued by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL. v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION (Tenn. Ct. App. January 4, 2011)
This action was filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322, for contested cases. The petitioner challenges a penalty assessed by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers' Compensation. The stated reason for the penalty was the failure to file Form C-20, Tennessee Employer's First Report of Work Injury, regarding eighteen injuries that occurred in January and February 2003 which were medical only injuries, meaning no disability benefits were owing. The trial court affirmed the penalty.
We find the petitioner was not afforded proper notice of the Department's basis for issuing the penalty in violation of the petitioner's due process rights under the UAPA, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-307. We also find that the Department exceeded its authority by changing its "interpretation" of Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-2-1-.06, a rule that was unambiguous and, thus, not subject to interpretation. The trial court's holding is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions to vacate the penalty assessed against the petitioner.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/libertymutual_010411.pdf
This action was filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322, for contested cases. The petitioner challenges a penalty assessed by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers' Compensation. The stated reason for the penalty was the failure to file Form C-20, Tennessee Employer's First Report of Work Injury, regarding eighteen injuries that occurred in January and February 2003 which were medical only injuries, meaning no disability benefits were owing. The trial court affirmed the penalty.
We find the petitioner was not afforded proper notice of the Department's basis for issuing the penalty in violation of the petitioner's due process rights under the UAPA, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-307. We also find that the Department exceeded its authority by changing its "interpretation" of Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-2-1-.06, a rule that was unambiguous and, thus, not subject to interpretation. The trial court's holding is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions to vacate the penalty assessed against the petitioner.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/libertymutual_010411.pdf
TN Supreme Court reviews whether the statute of limitations bars negligence and strict liability claims in a products liability case
MICHAEL LIND v. BEAMAN DODGE, INC., d/b/a BEAMAN DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP ET AL. (Tenn. December 15, 2011)
The plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against not only the manufacturer, but also the dealership, as seller. Later, the plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to the seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer.
Over one year after the order granting nonsuit, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy, and, in 2009, the plaintiff again sued the seller, alleging both negligence and strict liability in tort. The seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion but granted an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal.
This Court granted the seller's application for permission to appeal to consider the application of the saving statute to these unique circumstances. We hold that the plaintiff may proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent. Because, however, the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of the seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations is a bar to recovery under that theory. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for trial.
Majority opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lindm_121511.pdf
Justice Clark's concurring opinion is available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lindm_CON_121511.pdf
The plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against not only the manufacturer, but also the dealership, as seller. Later, the plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to the seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer.
Over one year after the order granting nonsuit, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy, and, in 2009, the plaintiff again sued the seller, alleging both negligence and strict liability in tort. The seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion but granted an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal.
This Court granted the seller's application for permission to appeal to consider the application of the saving statute to these unique circumstances. We hold that the plaintiff may proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent. Because, however, the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of the seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations is a bar to recovery under that theory. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for trial.
Majority opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lindm_121511.pdf
Justice Clark's concurring opinion is available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/lindm_CON_121511.pdf
Tuesday, January 3, 2012
Tennessee Supreme Court reviews whether the trial court properly excluded an expert's hearsay evidence in a premises liability case
JAMES Q. HOLDER ET AL. v. WESTGATE RESORTS LTD. (Tenn. December 12, 2011)
During a trial of the plaintiffs' premises liability claim, the trial court excluded as hearsay a portion of the testimony of the defendant's expert. The expert would have testified that he consulted an authoritative source whose interpretation of the applicable building code was consistent with that of the testifying expert. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred because the expert's testimony was admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 703. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's error was harmless, however, and affirmed the judgment.
We hold that the Court of Appeals improperly applied an amended version of Rule 703 that was not in effect at the time of trial. We hold that the trial court properly excluded as hearsay portions of the proffered testimony of the testifying expert. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/holderj_121211.pdf
During a trial of the plaintiffs' premises liability claim, the trial court excluded as hearsay a portion of the testimony of the defendant's expert. The expert would have testified that he consulted an authoritative source whose interpretation of the applicable building code was consistent with that of the testifying expert. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred because the expert's testimony was admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 703. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's error was harmless, however, and affirmed the judgment.
We hold that the Court of Appeals improperly applied an amended version of Rule 703 that was not in effect at the time of trial. We hold that the trial court properly excluded as hearsay portions of the proffered testimony of the testifying expert. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/holderj_121211.pdf
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