KATHY YOUNG ET AL. v. FIRST BANK OF TENNESSEE (Tenn. Ct. App. January 31, 2011)
Kathy Young ("the plaintiff") stepped backward onto an elevated curb as she opened the driver's door of her vehicle to leave the parking lot of First Bank of Tennessee. She was injured when she tripped over the curb and fell into the shrubbery that bordered the parking lot. She and her husband filed this action alleging that First Bank was negligent in creating or maintaining a dangerous condition. First Bank filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/youngk_013111.pdf
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Monday, January 31, 2011
Friday, January 28, 2011
TWCA Reviews Whether Employee was Permanently and Totally Disabled in a Trucking Accident
WYATT JOHNSON v. VENTURE EXPRESS, INC. ET AL. (TWCA January 28, 2011)
The employee filed a workers' compensation claim against the employer for injuries sustained in a trucking accident. The trial court ruled that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the accident and entitled to full benefits. The employer appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in finding the employee permanently and totally disabled.
The appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of fact made by the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/johnsonw_012811.pdf
The employee filed a workers' compensation claim against the employer for injuries sustained in a trucking accident. The trial court ruled that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the accident and entitled to full benefits. The employer appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in finding the employee permanently and totally disabled.
The appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of fact made by the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/johnsonw_012811.pdf
Thursday, January 27, 2011
TWCA Reviews Trial Court’s Choice of IME Rating over the Treating Physician’s Impairment Rating
DOROTHY MICHAUD v. REHAB CARE GROUP (TWCA January 27, 2011)
The employee sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder. As a result of her medical restrictions, she was unable to return to work at her previous job. The trial court adopted the impairment rating assigned by the physician conducting the employee's Independent Medical Examination over that of the treating doctor and awarded 48% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/michaudd_012711.pdf
The employee sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder. As a result of her medical restrictions, she was unable to return to work at her previous job. The trial court adopted the impairment rating assigned by the physician conducting the employee's Independent Medical Examination over that of the treating doctor and awarded 48% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2011/michaudd_012711.pdf
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
TN Supreme Court Reviews Whether Claims Brought in a Wrongful Death Suit Were Based Upon Medical Malpractice or Ordinary Negligence
ESTATE OF MARTHA S. FRENCH v. STRATFORD HOUSE ET AL. (Tenn. January 26, 2011)
The administratrix of the estate of the deceased brought this wrongful death suit against the defendant nursing home and its controlling entities, alleging damages as the result of ordinary negligence, negligence per se, and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act applied to the ordinary negligence claims, thereby precluding allegations of negligence per se or violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The trial court also dismissed a claim for punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but vacated the portion of the order dismissing the punitive damages claim. This Court granted the administratix's application for permission to appeal in an effort to clarify the standards governing nursing home liability and to resolve a conflict in the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals.
We hold that, because the administratrix of the estate of the deceased has alleged violations of the standard of care pertaining to both medical treatment and routine care, she has made claims based upon both medical malpractice and ordinary negligence. Further, she may offer proof of negligence per se and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act as support for her ordinary negligence claims. We affirm the Court of Appeals' reinstatement of the punitive damages claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/frenchm_012611.pdf
KOCH dissenting
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/frenchm_DIS_012611.pdf
The administratrix of the estate of the deceased brought this wrongful death suit against the defendant nursing home and its controlling entities, alleging damages as the result of ordinary negligence, negligence per se, and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act applied to the ordinary negligence claims, thereby precluding allegations of negligence per se or violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The trial court also dismissed a claim for punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but vacated the portion of the order dismissing the punitive damages claim. This Court granted the administratix's application for permission to appeal in an effort to clarify the standards governing nursing home liability and to resolve a conflict in the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals.
We hold that, because the administratrix of the estate of the deceased has alleged violations of the standard of care pertaining to both medical treatment and routine care, she has made claims based upon both medical malpractice and ordinary negligence. Further, she may offer proof of negligence per se and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act as support for her ordinary negligence claims. We affirm the Court of Appeals' reinstatement of the punitive damages claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the trial court.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/frenchm_012611.pdf
KOCH dissenting
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2011/frenchm_DIS_012611.pdf
Court Reviews Standing in a Case Involving the Amount of Fees Owed to an Attorney
LESA C. WILLIAMS, ET AL. v. RENARD A. HIRSCH, SR. (Tenn. Ct. App. January 26, 2011)
This application for an interlocutory appeal concerns a client's standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of fees to be paid to one of the three attorneys who represented her in a personal injury suit. The trial court dismissed the client's complaint for lack of standing but granted the client permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation. We also conclude that the client has a real interest in the litigation, and we thus reverse the trial court's order dismissing the client's complaint.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/williamsl_012611.pdf
This application for an interlocutory appeal concerns a client's standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of fees to be paid to one of the three attorneys who represented her in a personal injury suit. The trial court dismissed the client's complaint for lack of standing but granted the client permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation. We also conclude that the client has a real interest in the litigation, and we thus reverse the trial court's order dismissing the client's complaint.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/williamsl_012611.pdf
Court Reviews the Validity and the Payment of a Hospital Lien
SHELBY COUNTY HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, D/B/A REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER v. JOHN BAUMGARTNER, ELIZABETH BAUMGARTNER, A/K/A DARAY BAUMGARTNER, NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, AND HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY (Tenn. Ct. App. January 26, 2011)
This appeal involves the impairment of a hospital lien. The individual defendant was treated at the plaintiff hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by a third-party tortfeasor. The patient incurred substantial medical expenses. The hospital filed a hospital lien for the amount of the patient's medical expenses.
Subsequently, the patient received insurance proceeds from his own insurance company under his uninsured motorist coverage, and another payment from the tortfeasor's insurance company. Nothing was paid to the plaintiff hospital. The hospital filed this lawsuit against both insurance companies for impairment of its hospital lien. The parties filed motions for summary judgment.
The trial court granted in part the hospital's motion for summary judgment. Against the patient's own insurance company, the hospital was awarded one-third of the monies the patient received. Against the tortfeasor's insurance company, the hospital was awarded an amount equal to the policy coverage limit.
The hospital now appeals, arguing that it was entitled to recover from both insurance companies jointly the reasonable cost of the hospital services rendered to the patient. The insurance companies also appeal, arguing that there was no impairment of the lien and that, if there was impairment, the hospital's recovery should have been limited to one-third of the payments made to the patient. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the hospital's lien was valid and was impaired, but that the hospital can recover only for the damages caused by the impairment of its lien.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/baumgartnerj_012611.pdf
This appeal involves the impairment of a hospital lien. The individual defendant was treated at the plaintiff hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by a third-party tortfeasor. The patient incurred substantial medical expenses. The hospital filed a hospital lien for the amount of the patient's medical expenses.
Subsequently, the patient received insurance proceeds from his own insurance company under his uninsured motorist coverage, and another payment from the tortfeasor's insurance company. Nothing was paid to the plaintiff hospital. The hospital filed this lawsuit against both insurance companies for impairment of its hospital lien. The parties filed motions for summary judgment.
The trial court granted in part the hospital's motion for summary judgment. Against the patient's own insurance company, the hospital was awarded one-third of the monies the patient received. Against the tortfeasor's insurance company, the hospital was awarded an amount equal to the policy coverage limit.
The hospital now appeals, arguing that it was entitled to recover from both insurance companies jointly the reasonable cost of the hospital services rendered to the patient. The insurance companies also appeal, arguing that there was no impairment of the lien and that, if there was impairment, the hospital's recovery should have been limited to one-third of the payments made to the patient. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the hospital's lien was valid and was impaired, but that the hospital can recover only for the damages caused by the impairment of its lien.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/baumgartnerj_012611.pdf
Thursday, January 20, 2011
Court Reviews a Summary Judgment Ruling in a Medical Battery Case
MARK W. URLAUB, as next of kin and Executor of the Estate of BERTHA WORLEY URLAUB v. SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL-MEMPHIS, INC., ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. January 20, 2011)
Plaintiff filed this medical battery suit on behalf of his deceased mother and named as defendants the nephrologist who ordered an allegedly unauthorized hemodialysis procedure, another treating physician, and the hospital where she was treated. The trial court granted summary judgment to the treating physician who did not order the procedure and to the hospital. Plaintiff appeals. We find that both of these defendants were entitled to summary judgment and therefore affirm the trial court's decision.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/urlaubm_012011.pdf
Plaintiff filed this medical battery suit on behalf of his deceased mother and named as defendants the nephrologist who ordered an allegedly unauthorized hemodialysis procedure, another treating physician, and the hospital where she was treated. The trial court granted summary judgment to the treating physician who did not order the procedure and to the hospital. Plaintiff appeals. We find that both of these defendants were entitled to summary judgment and therefore affirm the trial court's decision.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/urlaubm_012011.pdf
Court Reviews A Case Involving an Employee’s Accident on a Railroad
CLAYTON WARD v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY (Tenn. Ct. App. January 20, 2011)
Plaintiff, a railroad employee, filed this lawsuit pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, alleging that his left ankle injury was caused by his working conditions. The railroad filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment but subsequently granted the railroad's motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We granted the railroad's application for an interlocutory appeal and now affirm the trial court's decision to deny the motion for summary judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/wardc_012011.pdf
Plaintiff, a railroad employee, filed this lawsuit pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, alleging that his left ankle injury was caused by his working conditions. The railroad filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment but subsequently granted the railroad's motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We granted the railroad's application for an interlocutory appeal and now affirm the trial court's decision to deny the motion for summary judgment.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/wardc_012011.pdf
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Court Reviews the Appropriation of Fault in a Case Involving a Bicycle Accident
ROBERT D. GRAY v. ANDY B. ROTEN, II and GARY B. ROTEN (Tenn. Ct. App. January 18, 2011)
This case involves an accident between a bicycle and a pick-up truck. Appellant was struck by Appellee's truck when Appellant failed to obey a stop sign and rode his bicycle into traffic. The trial court found that Appellant was sixty percent at fault for the accident, and, pursuant to a comparative fault analysis, entered judgment for Appellee.
On appeal, we find that the trial court erred in applying a pedestrian statute to a bicyclist, but that this error was harmless in light of our finding that Appellant was negligent per se in failing to obey the stop sign, and/or in failing to yield to oncoming traffic. We conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court's finding that Appellant was at least sixty percent at fault so as to foreclose any recovery under a comparative fault analysis. Affirmed for the reasons discussed herein.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/grayr_011811.pdf
This case involves an accident between a bicycle and a pick-up truck. Appellant was struck by Appellee's truck when Appellant failed to obey a stop sign and rode his bicycle into traffic. The trial court found that Appellant was sixty percent at fault for the accident, and, pursuant to a comparative fault analysis, entered judgment for Appellee.
On appeal, we find that the trial court erred in applying a pedestrian statute to a bicyclist, but that this error was harmless in light of our finding that Appellant was negligent per se in failing to obey the stop sign, and/or in failing to yield to oncoming traffic. We conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court's finding that Appellant was at least sixty percent at fault so as to foreclose any recovery under a comparative fault analysis. Affirmed for the reasons discussed herein.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/grayr_011811.pdf
Thursday, January 6, 2011
Court Reviews Whether Plaintiff Received Sufficient Time to Procure Representation and Expert Testimony in a Medical Malpractice Case
KATHY D. PARTEE V. JAIME VASQUEZ, M.D. (Tenn. Ct. App. January 6, 2011)
A woman who suffered prolonged bleeding, pain and disabling injury after gynecological surgery filed a pro se malpractice suit against the doctor who performed the surgery.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by an affidavit in which he testified that in his treatment of the plaintiff he complied at all times with the relevant standard of acceptable professional practice. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, she was unable to find an expert witness to controvert that affidavit.
The trial court granted the plaintiff several continuances to give her the opportunity to procure representation and expert testimony, but when she was unable to do so, the trial court granted the defendant's motion. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/parteek_010611.pdf
A woman who suffered prolonged bleeding, pain and disabling injury after gynecological surgery filed a pro se malpractice suit against the doctor who performed the surgery.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by an affidavit in which he testified that in his treatment of the plaintiff he complied at all times with the relevant standard of acceptable professional practice. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, she was unable to find an expert witness to controvert that affidavit.
The trial court granted the plaintiff several continuances to give her the opportunity to procure representation and expert testimony, but when she was unable to do so, the trial court granted the defendant's motion. We affirm.
Opinion available at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/parteek_010611.pdf
Tuesday, January 4, 2011
Court Reviews Whether the Trial Court Properly Denied a Rule 60.02 Motion in a Case involving an Automobile Accident
RICHARD A. WILLETTE, JR. v. CARROLL G. HULSE ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App. October 7, 2010)
This action arises out of a vehicular accident in which the plaintiff sustained serious personal injury. A complaint was filed on behalf of the pro se plaintiff; however, the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or a licensed attorney as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.01.
The plaintiff subsequently retained counsel, but the plaintiff's attorney failed to make a written appearance until months later. Moreover, neither the attorney nor the plaintiff signed the complaint to cure the signature deficiency until after the case was dismissed and the statute of limitations had run.
The plaintiff then filed a Rule 60.02 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order based on Excusable Neglect. That motion was denied and this appeal followed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's Rule 60.02 motion; therefore, we affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/willetter_100710.pdf
This action arises out of a vehicular accident in which the plaintiff sustained serious personal injury. A complaint was filed on behalf of the pro se plaintiff; however, the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or a licensed attorney as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.01.
The plaintiff subsequently retained counsel, but the plaintiff's attorney failed to make a written appearance until months later. Moreover, neither the attorney nor the plaintiff signed the complaint to cure the signature deficiency until after the case was dismissed and the statute of limitations had run.
The plaintiff then filed a Rule 60.02 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order based on Excusable Neglect. That motion was denied and this appeal followed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's Rule 60.02 motion; therefore, we affirm.
Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/willetter_100710.pdf
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