Court considers an issue of uninsured motorist coverage in an interlocutory appeal

RANDALL D. KISER v. IAN J. WOLFE & CONSUMERS INSURANCE COMPANY (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2010)

This interlocutory appeal considers an issue of uninsured motorist coverage following an automobile accident in which Plaintiff Randall D. Kiser was permanently injured. The plaintiff was working within the scope of his employment, driving for a towing company, when his truck was struck by Defendant Ian J. Wolfe's vehicle. The defendant driver tendered his liability policy limits to the plaintiff and is not a party to this appeal. The employer towing company was insured by Defendant Consumers Insurance Company. In anticipation of arbitration for determination of damages and liability, the insurance company moved for partial summary judgment.

The trial court denied summary judgment but granted the insurance company permission for an interlocutory appeal to determine two issues, on which we hold:
(1) On a policy of vehicle insurance, the statutory requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. section 56-7-1201(a)(2) for a written rejection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits or written selection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits lower than liability limits is met when the insured signs an application containing a lower selection but neglects to initial a block provided for that purpose; and
(2) the insurer bears the burden of proof to show that the insured signed an insurance contract application containing a stated limit of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, but once that burden has been met, the insured must raise any issue that the insurer obtained the insured's signature unlawfully under Tenn. Code Ann. section 56-7-1201(a)(2).

We vacate the trial court's denial of the insurance company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and remand for reconsideration in light of this holding.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/kiserr_052810.pdf

Court reviews whether the exclusive remedy rule barred an employee's negligence suit

JAMES P. GRIFFITH, ET AL. v. JELLICO COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2010)

Employee, whose employer provided services pursuant to a contract with hospital, sustained injuries from a fall while working on hospital’s premises. Employee subsequently filed a negligence action against hospital. The trial court permitted employer to intervene in the suit. Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that hospital was the principal contractor pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6- 113 and the exclusive remedy rule barred employee's negligence suit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of hospital, and employee appealed. We affirm.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/griffithj_052810.pdf

Supreme Court reviews whether records made in the ordinary course of a hospital's business are covered by the peer review privilege

KIMBERLY POWELL v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC. ET AL. (Tenn. May 24, 2010)

This appeal involves the evidentiary privilege in the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)]. A former hospital employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County against the hospital and an orthopaedic surgeon on the hospital's medical staff. During discovery, the former employee sought to depose the hospital's infection control director regarding the details of an investigation into postoperative nosocomial infections and her knowledge of whether the defendant surgeon had tested positive for infectious diseases. The hospital moved for a protective order on the ground that the requested information was privileged under Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e).

The trial court declined to issue a protective order after determining that the information sought by the former employee was not privileged because it had been created in the regular course of the hospital's business and because the infection control director was the "original source" of the information. After granting the hospital an interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. E2008-00535-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 17850 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2009).

We granted the hospital's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that records received or made in the ordinary course of a hospital's business apart from the operation of a peer review committee are not protected by the peer review privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219. We have also determined that documents prepared by or at the request of a peer review committee exercising its peer review function and documents prepared by third parties as part of the work of a peer review committee performing its peer review function are privileged. Finally, we have determined that the hospital did not waive its right to invoke the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e) with regard to the work performed by its infection control director in the context of a peer review proceeding.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/powellk_052410.pdf

WADE concurring
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/powellk_CON_052410.pdf

TN Supreme Court reviews the Peer Review Law in a case involving services provided by various hospitals

LEE MEDICAL, INC. v. PAULA BEECHER ET AL. (Tenn. May 24, 2010)

This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)] to a hospital system's business decision regarding the provision of vascular access services to patients in its member hospitals. The hospital system had customarily outsourced these services at several of its hospitals, but, following an audit, it decided to discontinue outsourcing the services and to begin providing them using nurses employed by its own hospitals.

After several of the system's hospitals cancelled their vascular access services contracts, the vendor that had been providing the services filed two suits in the Circuit Court for Sumner County against the manufacturer of the catheters used to provide the services and one of its employees, a staffing affiliate of the hospital system and two of its employees, and the chief nursing officer at one of the system's hospitals.

These suits, which were eventually transferred to the Circuit Court for Williamson County and consolidated, sought damages under numerous theories based on the vendor's allegations that the defendants, all of whom had played a role in the audit, had disparaged the manner in which it had been providing the vascular access services and had improperly interfered with its contracts. During discovery, the vendor sought copies of various records relating to the audit of its services. The defendants claimed that these records were covered by the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e). After reviewing the disputed records in chambers, the trial court determined that most of the requested records were covered by the privilege. The trial court also granted the vendor permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals; however, the Court of Appeals declined to accept the appeal.

We granted the vendor's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application to address the trial court's interpretation and application of Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e). We have determined that the trial court interpreted the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e) too broadly. Therefore, we vacate the portions of the trial court's discovery orders applying the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. section 63-6-219(e) and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/leemedical_052410.pdf

WADE dissenting
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2010/leemedical_DIS_052410.pdf

TWCA reviews the limitation of permanent partial disability benefits where an employee chooses voluntary layoff

KIMBERLY WHEELER v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION (TWCA February 3, 2010)

In this workers' compensation action, the employee, Kimberly Wheeler, sustained repetitive trauma injuries to both arms. The injuries were accepted by her employer, Whirlpool Corporation, as compensable. After having surgery on both arms, she returned to work, initially in a light-duty status, and later to full duty. The product line on which she worked was then shut down and moved to another location. She was offered the option of accepting a voluntary layoff or moving to another product line. She chose the voluntary layoff. Under the terms of her employment contract, she continued to be an employee although she was not working. Eventually, the entire plant closed and Ms. Wheeler was terminated at that time. The trial court found that she had meaningful return to work and voluntarily left her employment. For that reason, it limited its award of permanent partial disability benefits to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B). The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by applying the one and one-half times impairment cap. We agree and modify the judgment.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/wheelerk_020310.pdf

TWCA reviews whether the trial court properly dismissed claims against an Injury Fund

TIMOTHY TODD v. MTD CONSUMER GROUP ET AL. (TWCA May 13, 2010)

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee fell from a platform at work. The injury was accepted by his employer as compensable. After a period of medical treatment, the authorized physicians released the employee to return to work with no permanent impairment or restrictions. The employee sought medical treatment on his own. Ultimately, he had surgery on his back and neck. He filed suit against his employer. Employee had two previous workers' compensation awards. Several months later, he amended his complaint to add the Second Injury Fund as a defendant.

After a trial on the merits, the trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury which resulted in an 85% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court apportioned the award according to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(b). It then dismissed all claims against the Second Injury Fund, based upon the statute of limitations. It awarded some medical expenses claimed by the employee, but denied others. On appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing the claim against the Fund, by incorrectly determining the percentage of disability represented by his earlier settlements, and by declining to award all requested medical expenses. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/toddt_051310.pdf

Court reviews sufficiency of trial court's award in a case involving a partnership

JOSEPH M. HASKINS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF DREW E. HASKINS, JR., DECEASED v. DREW E. HASKINS, III (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2010)

This case is on appeal for the second time after remand for determination of the defendant's request for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's award. After reviewing the record, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's judgment.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/haskinsj_051310.pdf

TWCA reviews whether the trial court erred by failing to require an employee to submit to an independent medical examination

VICKIE J. MYERS v. VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY (TWCA May 11, 2010)

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After developing an allergy to latex, a hospital employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. While the case was pending, the trial court declined to require the employee to submit to an independent medical examination in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-204(d)(1) (Supp. 2009). The trial court conducted a bench trial and determined that the employee's latex allergy was an occupational disease. The trial court also determined that the employee had a fifteen percent impairment to the body as a whole and awarded her permanent partial disability at fifty percent. The employer has appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by failing to require the employee to submit to an independent medical examination. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2010/myersv_051110.pdf

Court reviews jurisdiction of a wrongful death case against a nursing home

ALLISON J. PERSON ET AL. v. KINDRED HEALTHCARE, INC., d/b/a PRIMACY HEALTHCARE AND REHABILITATION CENTER, ET AL. (Tenn. Ct. App May 7, 2010)

This is an action for negligence and wrongful death filed against a nursing home by the administrator of decedent patient's estate. The trial court denied Defendant nursing home's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment upon finding decedent patient was not competent to execute the power of attorney pursuant to which decedent's daughter had executed an arbitration agreement with Defendant. Defendant appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Opinion may be found at:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2010/persona_050710.pdf

Rule 60.02(1) relief denied for statute of limitations

WILLIAM JEFFREY WALKER v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. (Tenn. Ct. App. August 18, 2009)

This appeal involves the dismissal of a personal injury case arising from an accident that occurred at Defendant's automobile manufacturing plant. The suit was originally filed and then voluntarily dismissed for improper venue. The case was filed again and later dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal which was denied by the trial court. Plaintiff appeals. Finding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The full text of this decision may be found at the TBA website:
http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/walkerw_082409.pdf

Officer deposition of driver condition sufficient to exclude evidence of underage drinking in rear end collision

ELISHEA D. FISHER v. CHRISTINA M. JOHNSON (Tenn. Ct. App. August 18, 2009)

This is a personal injury suit arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal of her punitive damages claim, as well as its exclusion of evidence regarding Defendant's underage consumption of alcohol prior to the accident and leaving the scene of the accident. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Defendant's intoxication, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's punitive damages claim. Because liability has been stipulated in this matter, and the punitive damages claim properly dismissed, we find Defendant's underage consumption of alcohol and leaving the scene of the accident irrelevant. Thus, we affirm the exclusion of such evidence.

The full text of this opinion may be found at the TBA website: http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2009/fishere_082409.pdf